

ALMA MATER STUDIORUM
Università di Bologna

SCHOOL OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND CULTURAL HERITAGE

Laurea Magistrale in
International Cooperation on Human Rights and Intercultural Heritage

**European involvement toward the Palestinian-Israeli
question: from the Six-Day War to the Oslo Accords**

Dissertation in: Political History of European Integration and
Cooperation

Supervising Professor:

Michele Marchi

Presented by:

Ludovica Alberta Rizzi

Unique session Academic year 2022/2023

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	4
INTRODUCTION	6
CHAPTER 1 – Europe as a pervading presence in Palestine: an historical introduction (1917-1967)	9
1.1 An historical background: the Mandatory Palestine (1920-1948)	9
1.2 The European integration and foreign policy	18
1.3 Birth of European Community involvement: the Six-Day War of 1967 and its consequences	23
CHAPTER 2 – From the Seventies to the Eighties: a more consistent and coherent European policy towards the Middle East situation.....	31
2.1 Increasing the European cooperation and the consolidation of Europe’s notion of “just peace”	31
2.2 The 1973 Yom Kippur War and Oil Crisis: using the oil weapon for a Cold War approach	40
2.3 The Seventies: steps towards the Venice Declaration.....	46
CHAPTER 3 – Rethinking the peace process: limits and solutions for the Israeli- Palestinian issue	56
3.1 The Eighties: historical analysis of the comeback of an incoherent and inconsistent European Community policy.....	56
3.2 Toward the Oslo era: the Madrid Conference and the 1993’s Oslo Accords	63
3.3 European Union and its limits: a consideration to the peace process started from Oslo and the unlawful Israeli acts under international law	71
3.4 A reflection on future realities in historic Palestine	77

CONCLUSION	85
BIBLIOGRAPHY	90
Primary sources.....	90
Secondary Sources	93
Monography	93
Articles	98
Websites	104

ABBREVIATIONS

ANO	Abu Nidal Organisation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EAD	Euro-Arab Dialogue
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPT/OT	Occupied Palestinian Territory/ Occupied Territories
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PT	Palestinian Territory

SEA	Single European Act
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNC	United National Command
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Forces
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
US/USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War
WZO	World Zionist Organisation

INTRODUCTION

The Israeli-Palestinian dispute represents one of the most extended and contentious geopolitical challenges of the XX century. Rooted in a complex web of historical, religious, and territorial grievances, this controversy has generated decades of socio-political disorders and violence. The aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive examination of the European involvement in dealing with the Middle East situation, from the 1967 Six-Day War until the 1993 Oslo Accords. It was used – hopefully in the best possible way – a historiographical approach in the examination of primary sources, and because history involves an interpretation of recorded facts, consistent secondary sources were studied to give a broader and more comprehensive analysis. After analysing many different points of view, the challenge was to determine whether a thought was biased in favour of one side over another, and much more difficult was not to leak personal ideas or concerns that went beyond the specified circumstances, being this a topic about which I genuinely have always been aware and intrigued.

The work is structured into three main chapters, each of which will analyse the topic chronologically. The first chapter serves itself as an introduction since it presents the beginnings of the themes that will be addressed throughout the thesis. It is opened by a paragraph that works as a summary of the political, social, and territorial situation of Palestine in the first half of the XX century, since those years represent the foundations and origins for the subsequent developments of the dispute: it seeks to understand the roots of Zionism, the implications of the British Mandate on Palestine and the subsequent proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948. It then goes to analyse the Six-Day War of 1967 since it represents one of the triggering factors that led the European Community to progress toward political integration. Moreover, the Six-Day War in 1967 marked a significant turning point since Israel's occupation of territories (as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) exacerbated tensions between the two populations, will become a primary focus of future peace discussions. In fact, in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, United Nations adopted the Security Council Resolution 242, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories that it had occupied during the conflict and affirmed the need for a just and lasting peace in the region, including recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. This resolution laid the foundation for subsequent peace process

negotiations and became a cornerstone of diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, serving as the basis for most of all the European statements and declarations of the following years.

The second chapter focuses on the following of the Six-Day War in 1967, in which European nations – and in particular France – expressed concerns over Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories and began advocating for a negotiated agreement to establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel. This period also saw the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the representative voice of the Palestinian people, prompting European countries to engage with the organisation despite initial reluctance due to its militant activities. This chapter focuses on the European consolidation of the notion of “just peace” and his position in the mediation process: in this, the European Community played a central role in the field in defending Palestinian legitimate rights to self-determination, counterposing to the main leader of the peace process, the United States of America. Then, with the Yom Kippur War of 1973, there was a further heightened tensions both in the region and in international politics: in the midst of the Cold War, this dispute represents the logic of exploiting the cooling of relations between Western allies and the Soviet Union, with the Arab coalition utilising the oil weapon with the strategical objective to push the US to reengage with regional diplomacy. The European Community was prompted to intensify diplomatic efforts, culminating in the UN Resolution 338 calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, for a ceasefire and for negotiations leading to a just and lasting peace, and the subsequent Geneva Peace Conference in 1973. It follows an analysis of the various European Member States' positions, and a European Community – always guided by France – focused on more involvement in the Seventies: those were the years of the emergence of the Community as a central actor, with initiatives like the Euro-Arab Dialogue, which led to a consistent and coherent policy toward the Middle East situation. The culmination was reached with the Venice Declaration of 1980: despite many criticisms from Israel and US, the Venice Declaration represents the commitment of European Community in its policy, marking for the necessity of achieving a Palestinian state – serving as the basis for the later recognised international stance toward a two-state solution – and the insistence on the need for a multilateral peace process in place of a bilateral one.

The third and last chapter focuses on the Venice Declaration's aftermath, which was framed on a more inconsistent and incoherent European policy, making step backwards compared

to what had been achieved so far. In the Eighties, the Community adopted a passive position, letting the US to resolve the conflict and reverting to bilateralism in its Member States' relations with the Middle East: this was the result following some fundamental challenges as the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, the Iran-Iraq wars, and the election of Mitterrand as French President. Despite this, a cardinal turning point was reached during the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the subsequent Oslo Accords in 1993, that marked renewed international efforts to facilitate peace process negotiations, with European nations providing financial assistance to the newly established Palestinian Authority. However, challenges persisted, underscoring the complexities of achieving lasting peace in the region among competing interests and deep-rooted grievances. By critically evaluating the successes and failures of these efforts, particularly the role of the European polity and generally of the international community as a whole, this study seeks to shed light on the complexities and challenges inherent in achieving a lasting and sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians. This chapter ends with a final consideration that aims to analyse the international peace process negotiations conducted since Oslo to reach a reflection on future realities in the Palestinian region, further investigating into the possible resolution of the dispute and casting light on the one-binational-state solution, which consist in sharing land in a truly democratic way, with equal rights for both Israelis and Palestinians: by this solution is meant to reach self-determination for both communities, giving up to special status for one people at the expense of the other and merging the Law of Return for Jewish with the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees.

In sum, this dissertation aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian situation from 1967 to 1993, examining the political, social, and historical factors that have shaped this enduring and deeply entrenched dispute. Through a nuanced examination of the complexities and dynamics at play, it seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the issue and to inform efforts towards its resolution in the future, with specific attention to the role of the European policies and peace processes and how the Member States gradually increased their cooperation in foreign policy correspondingly to the events of the Middle East.

CHAPTER 1 – Europe as a pervading presence in Palestine: an historical introduction (1917-1967)

The Crusades (1099-1290), Napoleon's expedition in Egypt and Palestine (1798-1799), the establishment of the first European consulates (XIX century), European broken promises to Sharif Hussein (1915), the secret Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), the Balfour Declaration (1917), the British Mandate in Palestine (1922-1948), the West-sponsored partition plan of Palestine (1947), the creation of the State of Israel (1948), and the Suez Canal war (1956). Until 1956, Middle Eastern development have been largely influenced by European powers, and particularly Europe has always been «part and parcel of the Palestinian issue»¹. In order to understand the political positions and expectations towards Europe – from both Palestinians and Israelis – of the timeframe this thesis is intended to analyse (1967-1993), it is mandatory to start with a brief historical summary of the Palestine's territorial and political situation in the first half of the XX century.

1.1 An historical background: the Mandatory Palestine (1920-1948)

After the World War I, the Palestine territory – as many others of the Arab world – was under the British Empire's mandate: when, with the post-war reorganisation, England received the mandate on Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, the English empire, in the Arab world, had already a century of life². Unlike all other postwar mandates, by which a power was charged with providing the tools for self-government of a new state emergency, the British in Palestine were asked to organize a functional state with the native populations settled in the territory and, at the same time, to create, in that same territory, a homeland for the Jews of the world. The Balfour Declaration³ was a respond to the requests of the Jewish's nationalist

¹ A. de Vasconcelos, M. Zorowki, *The Obama moment. European and American perspectives*, Paris, European Union Institute of Security Studies, 2009, p. 178.

² The British East India Company had been dragged into the waters of the Persian Gulf in the early 19th century to combat the threat to commercial navigation posed by the maritime tribes of Sharja and Ras al-Khaima, now part of the United Arab Emirates. The Persian Gulf was an important link between land and sea between the Mediterranean and India and the British were determined to stop the piracy that raged there: to subdue what they called the "pirate race", the British turned the Persian Gulf into a British lake. E. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, London, Penguin Books, 2011, p. 217.

³ The text of the Balfour Declaration is reported in J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, New Haven (CT), Yale University Press, 1975, cit., vol. 2, pp. 101-106: «November 2nd, 1917, Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours

movement called “Zionism” born in Europe at the end of the XIX century⁴, and the Declaration was the exact formula to create conflict between communities: given Palestine’s resources, there were no material premises to create a homeland for Jews without undermining the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities already established in Palestine⁵.

«Palestine was a new country in an ancient land»⁶, putted together with different pieces of ottoman provinces to resolve British’s imperial necessities: the original land extended from the Giordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, until Iraq’s borders⁷. Palestine is a “holy land” for Christians, Muslims, and Jewish, and for this reason it was pilgrimage destination for centuries; however, from 1882, new waves of people began to arrive: settlers instead of pilgrims. Thousands of Jews from Eastern Europe and the Russian Empire – driven by the pogroms of Tsar Alexander III and attracted by the fascination of a new and strong ideology, Zionism – seek refuge in Palestine. They entered in a society formed by 85% Muslims, a minority of 9% Christians and a small indigenous community of Jews: the *yushuv* (literally: “settlement”, the native Jews of Palestine) in 1882 were no more than 3% of the population, based in Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safad⁸.

to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. Yours sincerely, Arthur James Balfour».

⁴ The movement was consolidated in 1896 with the publication of the book *The Jewish State*, written by the Viennese journalist Theodor Herzl, promulgator of Zionism. In the summer of 1897 Herzl organised the First Zionist Congress, in which the World Zionist Organisation was founded, and its objectives were defined to create in Palestine a homeland for the Jewish people guaranteed by public law. P.R. Mendes-Flohr, J. Reinharz, *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 429.

⁵ In this sense, it is crucial to mentioned that King and Crane underlined that the Belfour Declaration’s conditions of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine and that of «nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine» were not compatible. As written in the King-Crane Commission Report, the Zionists basically anticipated a total expropriation of the current inhabitants of Palestine through various forms of land and property purchase. The King-Crane Commission visited every area in Palestine in 1919 and was flooded with petitions against the Zionist movement: the anti-Zionist component was 85.3% (222 out of 260 petitions were against the Zionist movement), the highest of any district. The King-Crane Commission report was published for the first time by *Editor&Publisher* 55, 22, part 2, December 1922: a synthetic version is reported in Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, cit., pp. 191-199.

⁶ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 245.

⁷ But in the 1923 the east Giordan territories were formally given to the Transjordan, Abdullah’s Kingdom, and in the same year the Golan territories were given to the French mandate of Syria. *Ivi*, p. 246.

⁸ Demographic data for the Ottoman period are unreliable, not least because of the strong political value of the demographics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The most reliable source from which the reported data are derived is J. McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990, tav. 1.4D, p. 10.

The Arab population of Palestine assisted to the expansion of the Jewish immigration with preoccupation⁹: in the last years of the XIX century the Arab press started to condemn Zionism, but after the Balfour Declaration of 1917 – which gave the Zionist movement the official right to pursue its purposes –, the preoccupations became even more sharp. From 1922 to 1935 the Jewish population had increased from 9% to 27% of the total population: from the 20s of the XX century the Arab started to respond to the continuous expansion of the Jewish-settlers immigration and the consequential purchased of the lands¹⁰ with violent riots.

The Palestinian message was clear: the indigenous Arab population was not approving the British commitment to create a homeland to Jewish in their country; furthermore, the purchase of land by the Jews inevitably involved the removal of Arab peasants from the lands they had ploughed and cultivated, often for generations. All their messages remain unheard, because England and the whole International Community already decided the future of Palestine, without consulting its people and, especially, without its consensus. «When pacific means failed, desperate people soon turned to violence»¹¹.

After each violent episode, the British inquiry decided to act on political adjustments to calm the fears of the Palestinian majority¹²; yet, after each release of documents supporting the Palestinian cause – especially after the 1931 Passfield *White Paper*¹³ –, the World Zionist

⁹ After the end of the First World War, in Palestine arrived two distinct settlers' waves: the first *aliya* (wave of Jewish immigrants) based itself in Palestine between the 1882 and the 1903, bringing the Yishuv community from 24.000 to 50.000 unities. With the second *aliya* from 1904 to 1914, the Jewish community grown even more, with 85.000 total unities. Ivi, p. 224.

¹⁰ To make a modern Jewish state unfold, two physical requirements were necessary: a population and a territory. Immigration and land acquisition made Zionism a reality, both were oxygen to nation building – as government, territory and population are the three legal requirements of "statehood" by international law. 1919 and 1921 there was a further acceleration of immigration into Palestine with the arrival of over 18.500 settlers. In Jerusalem in 1920 and Jaffa in 1921, violent riots broke out in which 95 Jews and 64 Arabs were killed, with hundreds injured. Between 1922 and 1929, 70.000 Zionist immigrants arrived in Palestine. At the same time, the Jewish National Fund purchased over 100.000 hectares in the Jezreel Valley in northern Palestine. Intense immigration and land acquisition resulted in a subsequent wave of violence in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safad and Jaffa with 133 Jewish deaths and 116 Arabs. For the immigration data see McCarthy, *Population of Palestine*, cit., p. 224. For the victimises data see Ch. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-israeli Conflict*, Boston-New York, Bedford-St Martin's, 2001, pp. 113, 130.

¹¹ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 247.

¹² In July 1922 Winston Churchill produced a White Paper whose purpose was to calm the Arab population, concerned that Palestine might become "Jewish as England is English". The then Minister of the Colonies argued that the Balfour Declaration did not contemplate that all Palestine would be converted into a national homeland for the Jews, but only that this homeland should be founded *in Palestine*. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, cit., vol. 2, pp. 301-305.

¹³ Similarly, the serious unrest of 1929 was followed by other reports and recommendations. In 1930, the Shaw Report pointed to Jewish immigration and land purchases as the main causes of the unrest in Palestine and called for Zionist immigration to be contained in order to avoid future problems. This report was followed, again in 1931, by the Passfield *White Paper*, which reiterated the demand to limit the purchase of land and the immigration of Jews. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., pp 247-248.

Organisation (WZO) and the Jewish Agency in Palestine become active in the corridors of power in London and Jerusalem, opposing policies they considered to be harmful to achieving their objectives. In response to the Passfield *White Paper*, they convinced the UK Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to confirm that the English government was not limiting and had no intention of stopping or prohibiting both the Jewish immigration and the takeover of further land in Palestine. Arab expectations for an improvement in the situation were dashed by MacDonald's document which they called the "black letter", in opposition to the "white paper", of 1931¹⁴.

After the "black letter", the rage of the rural community was transformed into an armed insurrection with the first Arab revolt of 1936-1939¹⁵: during this time, the population began to think that the liberalisation of Palestine would have been the result of the people, instead of through the leaders of the Palestinian political parties, especially after the disappointment of the lack of presence of their representatives at al-Qassam's funeral¹⁶. In the 1937 Britain tried to respond by setting up a new inquiry commission: the report of this commission – the Peel Commission – caused a twitch because, for the first time, the British recognised that the disorders in this country were caused by rivalry between two incompatible nationalist movements, admitting that there was no possibility of agreement between them. From the Peel Commission Report¹⁷:

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ The revolt started from a man called Izz al-Din al-Qassam, who in 1935 decided to turn the anger of rural communities into armed revolt. After gaining fame between the poor Palestinians who were directly affected by the settlers' immigration and acquisition of lands. After MacDonald's "black letter" of 1931, al-Qassam began to propose the idea of an armed struggle against the British and Zionists. Many men volunteered to fight or provide weapons and ammunition. An armed group of young Muslims was formed but was killed by a British raid. The triggering cause was presented at the funeral of the "martyrs", the following day: the British had established that the funeral procession should start from the house of al-Qassam and proceed directly east to the cemetery, without entering the centre of Haifa to avoid any possible trigger of violence. The journalist Akram Zu'aytir, however, wanted the funeral to become a political opportunity to galvanize the Palestinian opposition to the mandate: he sent an article to the newspaper "al-Jami'yya al-Islamiyya" (Islamic Society) in which he summoned all Palestinians to Haifa to take part in the funeral procession. Thousands arrived to attend: contrary to the wishes of the British, the funeral took place in the main mosque and the funeral procession passed through the city centre. The angry mob headed for the Haifa police command, which was destroyed along with the cars parked in front. They attacked all the British soldiers they encountered, including the Haifa Railway Station, another symbol of British power. A. Zu'aytir, *The Palestine National Movement 1935-1939: Diaries of Akram Zu'ayti, 1935-1939*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1980, pp. 27-35.

¹⁶ At the funeral there were representations of all the northern Palestinian cities, but the leaders of the nationalist parties were not present. The brief revolt of Izz al-Din al-Qassam always changed the political framework in Palestine: the notable citizens who led the nationalist movement no longer had the confidence of the people. They had been dealing with the British for fifteen years to no avail. The Palestinians wanted men of action to deal directly with the British and Zionist threat. The result were three years of revolts that devastated the cities and the countryside of the region. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 254.

¹⁷ Peel W. et al., *Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (1937)*, in «UNISPAL», p. 370, <https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/Cmd5479.pdf>, last consultation 19/12/2023.

An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. About 1.000.000 Arabs are in strife, open or latent, with some 400.000 Jews. There is no common ground between them.

The solution proposed by the Peel Commission was the territorial division between the two contenders: the Jews would have had 20% of the territory of Palestine for their state, with most of the coast and the most fertile lands of the country in the valley of Jezreel and Galilee. To the Arabs would have been attributed the poorest lands: the Negev desert, the Arava valley, the hilly territory of the western bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip¹⁸. There were some anomalies in the distribution – like that some of the most crucial Arab parts of the country and cities would have ended up in the territory allotted to the Jews. To correct these anomalies, the Peel Commission presented the possibility of population transfers to remove the Arabs from the territories attributed to the Jews: «something that later in the century would be qualified as "ethnic cleansing"»¹⁹. The partition proposal, which positioned the Arab areas as an extension of Transjordan under King Abdullah, whom the Palestinians perceived as a British agent, did not call for the creation of an independent state of Palestine, which only served to intensify the Arab protests. The recommendations of the Peel Commission validated the worst-case scenario: rather than preserving their autonomy and right of self-government, they would end up divided and ruled by hostile outsiders like Abdullah and Zionists.

The 1937 – and the Peel Commission – was a turning point in the Arab revolt, increasing the violence: in September 1937, Palestinian extremists assassinated the district commissioner of Galilee; the British, as a countermeasure, arrested two hundred Palestinian nationalist leaders, declaring the Arab High Committee outlawed. Deprived of its leadership, the revolt degenerated into a chaotic insurrection, which had devastating consequences for the Palestinians²⁰. The massive use of the army and the widespread collective punishments

¹⁸ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 285.

¹⁹ *Ivi*, pp. 285-286.

²⁰ Every Arab attack against the British was followed by heavy reprisals. London sent 25,000 units to Palestine and the British, with legal authority formalised by emergency regulations, demolished the homes of all those involved in the attacks – or simply suspected of aiding the rebels. It is estimated that 2,000 homes were demolished between 1937 and 1940. Innocent fighters and civilians were prisoners of concentration camps: in 1939 more than 9000 Palestinians were prisoners of overcrowded foreign exchange. Suspects were subjected to violent interrogations ranging from humiliation to torture: young people between the ages of 7 and 16 were flogged; more than 30 out of 100 death sentences were actually carried out; Palestinians were used as human shields to prevent rioters from laying mines on roads used by the British army. For a more accurate description of the repressive measures taken by the British to combat the second Arab revolt see T. Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British*, Picador, 2001, pp. 415-443. See also M.

by the British degenerated into abuses of brutality that would forever tarnish the British mandate in the memory of the Palestinians²¹.

With the war threatening Europe, London could no longer afford sending strong military contingents to suppress a colonial revolt²². To restore peace to the tormented Palestinian mandate, the British set aside the Peel Commission's partition plan in 1937. A new inquiry commission was established and the document that came out of it was the *White Paper* of 1939: the new policy put a limit on Jewish immigration of 15.000 per year for five years, for a total of 75.000 immigrants; as consequent, the Yishuv population would rise to 35% of the total population in Palestine, a sizeable minority for demographic autonomy but not enough to take control of the entire country. After that there would have been no further immigration without the consent of the Arab majority; the purchase of land by the Jews would be prohibited or severely restricted depending on the region; finally, Palestine would have independence within ten years with a joint Arab and Jewish government so that the interests of each of the two communities would be insured and protected²³. However, the *White Paper* of 1939 did not satisfy neither the Arabs nor the Palestinian Jews: especially the Yishuv refuse it because it would have close Palestine to the Jewish immigration while in Europe the Nazi atrocities against the Jews were increasing²⁴.

During World War II, Britain had become increasingly unliked by the Jewish community in Palestine, the Zionist heads were infuriated after the *White Paper*'s imposed limitations to the immigrations and the proposal for an independent Palestine for the 1949 under an Arab majority. In facts, in 1944 the Jewish extremists²⁵ in Palestine declare war to Great Britain:

Hughes, *The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939*, in «English Historical Review», no. 124, 2009, pp. 313-354.

²¹ The most horrendous atrocities occurred in retaliation for the killing of British soldiers by the rioters. In a well-documented case, the British avenged their comrades killed by a mine in September 1938 by loading twenty men from the village of al-Low on a bus and forcing them to pass over a powerful mine that the British themselves had buried in the middle of the access road to the village. All the occupants were killed by the explosion, the bodies were photographed by an English soldier and the villagers were forced to bury them in a mass grave. To a full description of those events see H. Arrigonie, *British Colonialism: 30 Years Serving Democracy or Hypocrisy*, Gaskell, Devon 1998. See also the Arab report by Eid Haddad, *Painful memories from Al Bassa* in <https://www.palestineremembered.com> (<https://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/al-Bassa/Story1240.html>), 2004, last consultation 28/11/2023.

²² With about 5.000 dead and 10.000 wounded, by 1939 more than 10% of the Arab Palestinian population had been killed, wounded, imprisoned or exiled.

²³ The 1939's *White Paper* is reported in Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, cit., vol. 2, pp. 531-538.

²⁴ E.g. Kristallnacht, or the "night of broken glass", the worst pogrom in Europe, happened in November 1938. The *White Paper* of 1939 is very important because it marks the beginning of the mistrust of Israel towards Europe in the second half of the XX century, which is the very central topic of this thesis.

²⁵ Irgun (The National Military Organisation in the Land of Israel) and Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) were two Jewish terrorist organisations, responsible for the most serious violence: the members were convinced that the Jewish

There is no longer any armistice between the Jewish people and the British Administration in Eretz Israel [Israel's land] which hands our brothers over to Hitler. Our people is at war with this regime – war to the end²⁶.

After the end of World War II, England had neither the resources nor the will to remain in Palestine. The differences between Arabs and Jews were irreconcilable: if the British made concessions to the Jews, there was the danger of an Arab revolt like that of 1936-1939; if they made concessions to the Arabs, Jewish organisations allegedly carried out terrorist attacks like the one against the King David Hotel in 1946²⁷.

The British were in a stalemate, the unsustainability of the Balfour Declaration was now clear: England would never have been able to « the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people» without prejudice to «the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine»²⁸. The British government had no more solutions to propose and had also exhausted the potential for mediation against the two contenders in Palestine.

Thus, on 25 February 1947, the British Foreign Minister Bevin submitted the Palestinian question to the just established United Nations, hoping that the international community might succeed in solving the problem. The United Nations formed a special committee of eleven member states²⁹ on the Palestinian question, the UNSCOP (United Nations Special

people had an inalienable right to the land of Israel and that it was their duty to redeem it, if necessary, even with weapons. The real enemy was England which was denying the Jews their state in Palestine. Even the Jewish Agency had a military wing, the Haganah (The Defence), but it was only after the end of World War II that all three of them joined forces to fight the British in Palestine. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., pp. 311-315.

²⁶ Statement from *Jewish Underground Resistance* in Palestine, cit. in M. Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, New York, Nash Pub. Co., 1977, pp. 42-43.

²⁷ The liberation of the Nazis' extermination camps had revealed the monstrous crime of the Holocaust and the leaders of the Yishuv wanted at all costs to bring the Jews who survived the genocide to Palestine. So, they refuse to respect the limits imposed by the immigration of Jews by the 1939 White Paper. For the period from 1945 to 1946, Haganah worked with the Irgun and Lehi to force the British to change their policy: despite the Jewish agency always denied any involvement, the British authorities suspected the entire company of complicity in the violence, also seizing documents of the Jewish Agency bringing them to the secretariat of the mandate that was based in the King David Hotel, in Jerusalem. Among the papers there were evidence of his participation with the Haganah in the attacks against the British. A plan was then drawn up by the Irgun, under the orders of the Haganah, to proceed as soon as possible to the attack: On July 22, a group of Irgun operators placed in the hotel's cellars a series of boxes of canned milk that actually contained 500 pounds of high explosive. The British authorities claimed that they had never received a warning before the explosion, while the Irgun has always stated that he warned both the hotel and other institutions. Whatever the truth, the King David was not evacuated: ninety-one people died in the attack and over one hundred were injured, including the British, Arabs and Jews. For a more accurate description see Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, cit., pp. 212-230.

²⁸ From the Balfour Declaration, see cit. 3, pp. 1-2 of this chapter.

²⁹ Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Except Iran, none of the others had some particular interests on Middle East's affairs.

Committee on Palestine). As the UNSCOP delegation carried out its investigation, violence between the Jewish community and the British authorities increased³⁰, until August 1947, when the delegates presented their conclusions to the United Nations, after having had an idea of the complexity of the Palestinian situation: the unanimity demanded the end of the English mandate, while a majority of eight votes against three³¹ proposed the division of Palestine into "two States", one Arab and one Jewish. The British did not wait for the UN debate on the delegates' proposals: on 26 September 1947, the British government announced its intention to withdraw from Palestine, leaving responsibility for the mandate to the United Nations; the date for the withdrawal was set on 14 May 1948³².

The discussion of the General Assembly was based on the UNSCOP proposal of the "two States" division: in this way, they divided Palestine into six parts, three Arabs and three Jews, with Jerusalem entrusted to an international administration. The resolution attributed 55% of the territory to the Jewish state: Zionist activists lobbied all UN delegates to secure the 2/3 majority needed to approve the UNSCOP Partition Plan and the promise of a Jewish state. In all this, the American Zionists played a decisive role in gaining the support of the Truman administration³³: at last, the United States changed its initial position of non-intervention and urged the other members to support the proposed partition. On 29 November 1947, the final resolution *Palestine plan of partition* was approved by the UN General Assembly with 33 votes in favour 13 against and 10 abstentions³⁴.

The Zionists had thus finally obtained international authorisation for the creation of a Jewish state, while the Palestinian Arabs remained implacably opposed both to partition and to the

³⁰ In July 1947 the British sentenced three Irgun men to death for terrorism. A few days later, the terrorist organisation kidnapped and held two British sergeants' hostage, with the intention of preventing the execution of their comrades. When, however, the British hanged the Irgun's men, the latter did the same with the English sergeants, also stuffing them with explosives in such a way as to blow up the bodies once detached from the neck: the idea was to arouse the maximum indignation to nip the will of the British to help fight in Palestine. "Manchester Guardian", 1st August 1947, p. 5 cited in P. Bagon, *The Impact of the Jewish Underground upon Anglo Jewry: 1945-1947*, M. Phill. thesis, Oxford 2003, pp. 118-119.

³¹ Only India, Iran and Yugoslavia voted against the "two states" division, preferring a unified Palestinian federal state. See *UNSCOP Report 1947*, on <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-179435/>, last consultation 05/02/2024.

³² See *UK memorandum 1947*, on <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185776/>, last consultation 29/11/2023.

³³ In his memoirs, Harry Truman later recalled that he never «had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance». Cited in W. R. Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 485.

³⁴ See *General Assembly resolution 181* on <https://www.un.org/unispal/> (<https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185393/>), 1947, last consultation 30/11/2023.

creation of a Jewish state on their land³⁵. Jamal al-Husayni, an important political man of Jerusalem, well represented the Palestinians' frustrations in his answer to the UN's *Palestine plan of partition*³⁶:

The case of the Arabs of Palestine was based on the principles of international justice; it was that of a people which desired to live in undisturbed possession of the country where Providence and history had placed it. The Arabs of Palestine could not understand why their right to live in freedom and peace, and to develop their country in accordance with their traditions, should be questioned and constantly submitted to investigation. [...] One thing is clear, it was the sacred duty of the Arabs of Palestine to defend their country against all aggression.

In facts, no one mislead that the partition would have been without conflicts, but while the military branch of the Jewish Agency, Haganah, had received intense military training and accumulated large quantities of weapons and ammunition, on the other hand Arabs of Palestine had no military training and they relied only on the justice of their cause and the help of the neighbouring Arab states³⁷: instead of coordinating their actions between their national armies, the letters preferred to recall irregular volunteers: Arab nationalists and the Muslim Brotherhood, determined to save occupied Arab Palestine together under the name of Arab Liberation Army.

The civil war ended with the last day of the British mandate: the Jews of Palestine proclaimed their "state" of Israel on 14 May 1948, and from that date onwards they would be called "Israelis". The day after the British withdrawal from Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army and

³⁵ As reported by Rogan in *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 319, it is not difficult to understand the position of the Palestinian Arabs: in 1947 the Arabs in Palestine were a two-thirds majority with 1.200.000 inhabitants against 600.000 Jews; many Palestinian cities with an Arab-Palestinian majority, such as Haifa, had been attributed by the Plan to the Jewish state; Jaffa, although nominally belonging to the Arab side, was an enclave surrounded by the Jewish state. Moreover, as Smith reports in *Palestine and the Arab-israeli Conflict* pp. 190-192, the Arabs owned 94% of the total area of Palestine and 80% of its arable land. Based on these facts, the Palestinian Arabs refused to give the United Nations the authority to divide their country and give away half of it.

³⁶ Al-Husayni addressing his comments to the UN committee on the Palestinian question, contained in T. G. Fraser, *The Middle East, 1914-1979*, London, Arnold, 1980, pp. 49-51.

³⁷ Of all, the only Arab country in favour of partition was Transjordan: its ruler Abdullah was in favour of annexing the Arab territories of Palestine to his kingdom in order to gain access to the sea, crucial for the country's economy. His favourable attitude towards partition provoked strong resentment from Palestinian in particular, in general among Arabas political members, isolating himself in the Arab world. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 320.

the neighbouring Arab states' national armies³⁸ started the invasion: if the civil war between Palestinian Arabs and Jews ended on 15 May 1948, the first Arab-Israeli conflict began³⁹: the human cost of this conflict has been devastating⁴⁰, the disaster in Palestine is certainly the most important event in the Arab history of the twentieth century, and we still live with the consequences. The irreconcilable clash between the refusal of the Arabs to admit the loss of Palestine and the willingness of the Israelis to expand their territory, made other wars between the two inevitable.

1.2 The European integration and foreign policy

As introduced by Mark Gilbert, by European integration «we mean the historical process whereby European nation-states have been willing to transfer, or more usually pool, their sovereign powers in a collective enterprise»⁴¹. At the end of WWII and at the beginning of Cold War, European integration stopped to be a utopian vision and become a concrete political and economic project. The context in Europe after WWII was a division between the

³⁸ Governments of Egypt, Transjordan, Iraqi, Syria. and Lebanon decided to officially commit their national armies to defend the Arab Palestine just two days before the British withdraw. *Ivi*, p. 366. This was a sort of reaffirmation of the League of Arab States (LAS), established in Cairo on 22 March 1945, which was an intergovernmental pan-Arab organisation of all Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa. United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 70, p. 237 available in UN Treaty Collection <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%2070/v70.pdf>, last consultation 14/12/2023.

³⁹ From the end of November 1947 since 14 May 1948 is called "civil war" between Arabs and Jews. From the day after, 15 May 1948, it is officially considered "first Arab-Israeli conflict", which for the Palestinian is also known as Nakba (disaster), name given by C. K. Zurayk in *The Meaning of the Disaster*, transl. by R. Bayly Winder, Beirut, Khayat, 1956.

It is also important to mention that, as the language used to describe any type of event is vital in shaping how people perceive it, using the word "conflict" can be considered wrong in a sense that a conflict, in fact, presupposes a clash between two parties on the same level, between two armies, groups or armed sides that confront each other in an equal way for a dispute. As mentioned above, the one between Israel and Palestine, on the other hand, foresees an unequal clash between one of the most powerful and armed armies in the world and a political party with an armed fringe like that of Hamas and the rest of the population that tries to resist as it can. Talking about conflict is therefore misleading «because it gives back to public opinion the idea that there are two equal parties, but it is not so» - says Cecilia Dalla Negra in an interview for *The Bottom Up* - which explains how in Israel there are anti-shelterrocket, while in Gaza there is nothing like it and carpet bombings are extremely dangerous for the population who do not know where to take refuge. A. Toniolo, *Questione israelo-palestinese: perché non si può parlare di conflitto*, in «The Bottom Up», 2021 <https://thebottomup.it/2021/05/26/questione-israelo-palestinese-non-e-un-conflitto/>, last consultation 30/11/2023, and B. Dawson, A. Cafolla, T. Waite, *It's not a 'conflict': how to talk about Palestine*, in «Dazed», 2021, <https://www.dazeddigital.com/politics/article/52785/1/it-is-not-a-conflict-how-to-talk-about-palestine-israel>, last consultation 21/12/2023.

⁴⁰ The problem of Palestinian refugees remains unresolved: the original 750.000 Palestinians expelled today have become about 6 million according to the UN, further increased following the new conflict of 2023. See website UNRWA on *Palestine refugees* <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>, last consultation 30/11/2023.

⁴¹ M. Gilbert, *European Integration. A Concise History*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, p. 1.

Eastern Europe – under the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union – and the Western Europe: both sides had winners and losers of the war.

The European Union (EU) is still moving forward with its goal of European integration, which includes expanding its institutions and capabilities in addition to the economic union of its member nations. European resistance and obstacles prevented political integration from occurring as smoothly and gradually as economic integration did: from the 1950's proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman⁴² to the introduction of a single currency in 1999⁴³, the European Union has effectively evolved into a workable economic union with a distinct identity. Numerous historic treaties and instruments influenced the process of economic assimilation, such as the Treaty of Rome of 1957 – which established the European Economic Community (EEC) –, the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the Treaty of Nice of 2001, and the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007. Every treaty, with the exception of the first two, contained provisions pertaining to foreign affairs⁴⁴.

There have been numerous initiatives to expand European integration to include a foreign and security component⁴⁵. In an effort to unify Europe's armed forces under a single budget and command, the six ECSC member states signed a treaty in 1952 to establish the European Defence Community (EDC): however, the pact was not ratified by the French

⁴² Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, proposed the Schuman Declaration, also known as the Schuman Plan, on 9 May 1950, the day after the fifth anniversary of the end of World War II. It was intended to bring together the production of coal and steel in France and West Germany under a single body that would eventually grow into the European Coal and Steel Community. Gilbert, *European Integration*, cit., pp. 20-27.

⁴³ The Treaty on European Union was approved by the Heads of State or Government at the European Council at Maastricht in December 1991, where it was decided that Europe would have a strong and stable single currency by the end of the century: the treaty was signed on 7 February 1992. On 1 January 1999, the euro was introduced and the Eurosystem, composed of the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of the euro area Member States, took over responsibility for monetary policy in the new euro area. This was the beginning of a transitional period that was to last three years and end with the introduction of euro banknotes and coins and the withdrawal of national banknotes and coins. European Commission, *One currency for one Europe. The road to the euro*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007, available at <http://europa.eu>.

⁴⁴ W. James and R. Maclean, *European Union Treaties*, CIVITAS Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2015. The complete texts of treaties, legislation, case law and legislative proposals can be viewed using the EUR-Lex database of EU law: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>, last consultation 05/12/2023.

⁴⁵ In the chapter *The Enduring Relationship between NATO and European Integration* in "The Cambridge History of the European Union", Cambridge University Press, 2023, pp. 308-344, L. Ratti evaluate the enduring relationship between the military role of the United States in Europe through its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and European integration from the Cold War to the present. Ratti argues that, during the Cold War, western European security cooperation was conceived as part of a wider effort, which also included the United States and Canada. Also after the end of the East-West division, diverging priorities among the European countries and their preference for intergovernmental rather than supranational cooperation, together with US determination to preserve the transatlantic alliance, supported NATO's role as the foundation of European defence, while confining the role of European institutions to the range of peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. After the EDC's failure in 1954, European defence was unequivocally left under the US umbrella.

Parliament, and Britain declined to join this force. In 1953, the ECSC nations also talked about creating a European Political Community (EPC), but they were unable to come to an agreement on its parameters; similar to this, the Fouchet Plan of 1961-1962 was abandoned due to opposition from Atlanticists⁴⁶.

When the Member States realised that the EC needed a social and political component, the integration process accelerated by 1989. In addition, the radical changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe⁴⁷ gave foreign policy cooperation a boost and made the Community become Europe's «anchor of stability»⁴⁸. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand⁴⁹ agreed together, on 19 April 1990, to hold an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on political unification, with the goal of «defining and implementing a common foreign and security policy»⁵⁰. The idea, that the European Parliament also supported, was to abolish the distinction between the two and their integration into the Community: among the members, Portugal and Denmark took a cautious stance, while Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, and Italy backed the idea of a single

⁴⁶ The Fouchet Plan was an unsuccessful plan written by Christian Fouchet, France's ambassador to Denmark, and proposed by French President Charles de Gaulle in 1961 as part of de Gaulle's grand design for Europe at the time. The plan included a three-power directorate, consisting of France, Britain and the United States. The plan was to establish a brand-new intergovernmental "Union of States" in place of the European Communities, which had been established a few years earlier. The idea served as an attempt to maintain the balance of power in favour of France because De Gaulle believed that France would lose its national influence in the Communities, which were growing more and more supranational. The Fouchet Plan was never put into action because of the European Communities' success and other states' lack of interest in the concept. N. Petersen, *The European Union and foreign and security policy*, Ole Norgaard, Thomas Pedersen and Nikolaj Petersen (eds.), «The European Community in World Politics», Pinter Publications, London/New York, 1993, p. 14.

⁴⁷ The collapse of communism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe took place in 1989. These events happened at the conclusion of a process that started with Perestroika in 1985. Beginning at the end of 1989, the general breakdown of regimes was caused by the acceleration of reforms unique to each of these governments. One of the most significant events of the period was the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which marked the official end of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain. The USSR collapsed as a state in December 1991, while the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, the institutional frameworks of the Eastern Bloc, vanished in the summer of that same year. The events of late 1989 initiated a democratic transition process in the former Eastern Bloc countries, which culminated in the entrance of many Eastern European nations to the European Union fifteen years later. The process of democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe was regularly monitored and discussed by the European Parliament, which also passed several significant resolutions on the situation in these countries during the period before and after 1989. A. Sierp, *Democratic Change in Central and Eastern Europe 1989-90. The European Parliament and the end of the Cold War*, Luxembourg, Historical Archives Unit, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, p. 9.

⁴⁸ Petersen, *The European Union and foreign and security policy*, cit., p. 14.

⁴⁹ In addition to heading the Socialist party for ten years before to his election, Mitterrand was well-known in France politics as one of Israel's strongest supporters. As one of the founding members of the *Alliance France-Israel*, he had long been critical of France's distance from the state of Israel. Given this well-known information, it was widely anticipated that Mitterrand would drastically change France's Middle East policy once elected: as a result, when he became President of France, the position of France subsequently became unclear, uncertain and inconsistent. I. Greilsammer, J. H. H. Weiler, *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours*, Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1988, p. 288 and J. P. Filiu, *François Mitterrand and the Palestinians: 1956–95*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 38, no. 2, 2009, p. 24.

⁵⁰ Petersen, *The European Union and foreign and security policy*, cit., p. 14. It should be noted that till that time the EC's external relations was distinct from the EPC.

foreign policy under the Community framework⁵¹. The Gulf War and the Yugoslavia crisis occurred in December 1990, the same month that the IGC started. Following long discussions, on February 7, 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as outlined in Article 11 (ex-Article J.I)⁵² of the agreement. Maastricht meant a major expansion of the scope and depth of decision-making in comparison to SEA: this resulted to the EU's current «second pillar», following the Council as its primary one⁵³.

So, while the original focus was economic and monetary,

political integration has always been an important yet sensitive issue on the agenda of the European Economic Community (later the European Union) and its Member States. This was particularly the case for the conduct of foreign policy, which has traditionally been an exclusive competence of each country⁵⁴.

Following World War II, European nations initially pursued separate foreign policy agendas. But over time, they came to see that a united European presence in international relations would be more effective and in their own best interests in a world where Europe's influence was disappearing due to globalisation⁵⁵. EU involvement is a contested concept in international relation theory⁵⁶; as Moerenhout explain in his essay, EU involvement is linked to EU foreign policy: foreign policy is different from external relations in the sense that the goal of foreign policy is to influence these external actors' conduct and environment in a sustainable manner, whereas the goal of external relations is to preserve relationships with particular actors⁵⁷. We also have structural foreign policy, which is conducted on the long-term, and that focuses on all structures – such political, legal, socio-economical, and mental

⁵¹ *Ivi*, pp. 15-16.

⁵² «1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy [...] 2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. [...] », Title V “Provisions on a common foreign and security policy”, *Consolidated version of the Treaty of European Union*, 1992, p. 155 in «EUR-Lex»: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT>, last consultation 05/12/2023.

⁵³ Petersen, *The European Union and foreign and security policy*, cit., p. 18.

⁵⁴ T. Moerenhout, *Essay on EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - Consistency and Cohesiveness from 1967 to the Emergence of the Arab Spring*, 2012, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179483>, p. 1.

⁵⁵ K. E. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 1-23.

⁵⁶ S. Keukeleire, J. MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Gordonsville, Palgrave, 2008., pp. 8-35.

⁵⁷ Moerenhout, *Essay on EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 1.

– not only at the state level, but also on an individual, societal, inter-state, inter-societal, regional and global level⁵⁸.

Such is the case for EU's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian question, one argument that Al-Fattal made against the EU's foreign policy – which aims to help the Palestinian Territory (PT)⁵⁹ transition to an independent, democratic, and stable state – is that there always was an omniscient gap between rhetoric and political will, which has afflicted the EU for a long time and weakened its credibility to achieve the objectives that its rhetoric typically inspires. Basically, the political will and unity of its actors continue to be significantly dominated and limited by their competing interests or ideologies, while the perception of the EU as a real and significant player in the peace and democratisation processes in the PT has been overestimated. The literature about EU involvement in the Palestinian region frequently concentrates on regional policies and programmes created at the EU level, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) from 1995 to 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) lasted from 2004 to 2008, and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) from 2008 to 2010⁶⁰.

However, following the Structural Foreign Policy framework, in addition to programs such as the above ones, the EU's involvement in the OPT is equally determined by EU diplomacy and by the respective policies of its Member States⁶¹. In addition to initiatives like the ones mentioned, the EU's participation in the OPT is, however, equally determined by EU

⁵⁸ Keukeleire, MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, cit., pp. 8-35.

⁵⁹ The Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) – and not “Territories” – is the official term used by most of the international community, including the EU and the UN, but not by the US and Israel. Information on the terminology is available on the European Commission website https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_11_1569, and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs website <https://www.ochaopt.org>, last consultations 07/12/2023. OPT will be used interchangeably with the Palestinian Territory (PT): the term PT refers to the areas falling behind the Green Line, including East Jerusalem and the West Bank with all its zones, A, B, and C. Although Gaza Strip is not under Israel's “permanent military presence” since September 2005, it is included under the rubric of the OPT because Israel still retains control of the airspace, seafloor, cross points, and all vehicle access, including delivery of food and other goods. Plus, under international law, the Gaza Strip, since its capture from the Egyptians during the Six Day war of 1967 until today, has been considered under Israeli occupation. R. Al-Fattal, *The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2010, cit. 1, p. 1.

⁶⁰ The EMP was created to promote multilateral cooperation and partnership with the Middle East and North Africa on a political level (security, stability, democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights), on an economic and financial level (development, infrastructure, fiscal policies, free trade, taxation, and investments) and on a cultural level (civil, society, media, empowering women and youth, education, and cultural exchanges). The ENP was meant to save a failing EMP by establishing bilateral partnership and additional financial instruments that were meant to complement the multilateral EMP framework; a migration dimension was also added on top of the existing political, economic, financial, and cultural dimensions. The UfM, multilateral in nature, was meant to implement specific projects in case of political disagreement, attention of civil society, respect for human rights. It has been argued that too much overlap between the UfM and the ENP undermined the efficiency of both. *Ivi*, pp. 11-94.

⁶¹ Moerenhout, *Essay on EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p.2.

diplomacy and the various policies of its Member States (MS), in accordance with the framework of structural foreign policy.

1.3 Birth of European Community involvement: the Six-Day War of 1967 and its consequences

One of the triggering factors that led the European Community to make progress toward also a political integration was, in fact, the Six-Day war of 1967. To understand what brings to the 1967 war, it is important to examine what happened ten year before, during the 1956's Suez Crisis, which is the first international field in which we see two of the Member States of the nearly established EC⁶² (France and Britain) acting in a foreign issue: it was an «unmitigated disaster»⁶³, and everything that happened in the Suez Crisis laid the foundations of the future years relationship between Europe and USA, Europe and Israel, and Europe and the Arab world. Middle Eastern development has been heavily influenced by European powers since the Suez Crisis of 1956. Subsequently, the two Cold War superpowers have been contending control in the region, which still is burdened with three difficult characteristics: geography (being at the intersection of three continents), geology (possessing huge oil and gas reserves), and geo-theology (being the cradle of monotheism and civilisations).

The construction of the Aswan Dam marked the beginning of the road to Suez in 1955. The Egyptian government, unable to finance the dam on its own, negotiated a financing package with the World Bank, with the US and GB promising to provide the remaining funds. The US and British governments hoped to use the Aswan Dam project as a tool to exert some political influence over Nasser, but he realised that Egypt could pay for the dam alone by nationalising the Suez Canal and using the money to cover the cost of the dam if the Western nations declined to assist⁶⁴. Further, the Suez Canal Company had a public company listed

⁶² A recall that the European Economic Community (EEC) – later renamed European Community (EC) – was established the year after the Suez Crisis, in the 1957, with the Treaty of Rome of the 25 March. In fact, Britain applied to join EEC in 1961, but it was vetoed by de Gaulle; a second application in 1967 was again vetoed by France, and the last successful application was approved in 1969, after de Gaulle's resignation to French presidency. Even though the "Six founding members" refer to Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands, for argument's sake we are considering Britain as an EC member during both the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War.

⁶³ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 381.

⁶⁴ The US government also tried to make the loan contingent on a commitment from the Egyptian government not to buy more arms from the Soviet Union, but Nasser had no intention of breaking with the Soviets: Nasser had come to recognise that the rules of the Cold War precluded cooperation with both the superpowers, Americans and Soviets. For that reason, on 19 July 1956, Eisenhower announced the American withdraw of all financial aid for the dam project. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 376.

in France, with the British government as its largest shareholder, so Nasser knew that nationalising the canal would cause a global crisis, even though the Egyptian government had every legal right to do so as long as it paid shareholders a fair price for their stock. During his speech in Alexandria on 26 July 1956, the canal was secure in Egyptian hands: «We will not allow the Suez Canal to be a state within a state. [...] Today the Suez Canal is an Egyptian company»⁶⁵.

The announcement of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal shocked the world: the French were the first to respond, requesting that the Israeli Ministry of Defence purpose a tripartite attack on Egypt with the support of the Anglo-France alliance. Despite the intense mistrust between the British and Israelis, which stemmed from the asperity of the end of the Palestine mandate, the determination to stop Nasser was too high, and on 24 October 1956 the three parties stuck a secret agreement⁶⁶.

Both France and Britain had good reasons to reevaluate their cooperation with Israel; nevertheless, the former imperial countries' alliance with Israel was a strategy that was destined to deteriorate relations between Europe and the Arab world⁶⁷, and also cracked relations with the US: as the Suez Crisis developed, the US was equally astonished. The Eisenhower administration was furious with both Britain and France for providing – with their intervention in Egypt – a better distraction than the Soviets could have dreamed of: NATO solidarity was undermined just when the West most needed to provide a solid front to contain the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

In point of facts, according to Khader⁶⁸,

it is inappropriate to speak at that period [1957-1967] of a European foreign policy: it simply did not exist. Foreign policy issues remained the serve of national States, while the EEC was only tasked with furthering economic integration, perceived as a path of consolidating peace after two destructive wars.

⁶⁵ Nasser's speech is reported in M. Heikal, *Nasser: The Cairo Documents*, New English Library, London, 1972, pp. 92-95.

⁶⁶ First Israel would invade Egypt, providing an Arab-Israeli conflict that placed maritime communications through the Suez Canal in distress. Britain and France would insist on a cessation of hostilities, which would of course be ignored. The Anglo-French alliance would then intervene with their own troops to occupy the Canal Zone. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 379.

⁶⁷ France faced significant hostility for arming Israel following 1948, and for rejecting Algerian independence ambitions (1954-1962); Britain's imperial legacy persisted in tainting its relations with the Arab nationalists.

⁶⁸ B. Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014): The Performance-Expectation Gap*, in «Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali», vol. 81, no. 3 (323), 2014, p. 337.

The Suez Crisis demonstrated this concept, since Britain and France acted like they were still imperial powers at the height of the Cold War. Americans could not conceive of their NATO allies Britain and France going to war over a once-strategic waterway that led to their now-defunct empires in South and Southeast Asia.

This lack of coordination came out during the 1967, when the EC Member States were unable to express a common position when the war broke out, there was too much incoherence among the different foreign policies: some European countries sided with Israel – like Germany⁶⁹ and Holland –, while others – like France – decided to impose an arms embargo on the belligerents, including Israel: after years of France as a (military) supporter of Israel, under general de Gaulle's policy there was a shift of positions⁷⁰.

[T]he main concern of the EEC was to consolidate its internal integration process. In foreign issues, the US was leading the Western bloc and transatlantic relationship was given primacy over European external actorness. Moreover, the EEC had no legal competence to act as a unit in foreign policy matters because of the inter-governmental nature of decision-making⁷¹.

The Six-Day War played a significant role in establishing an improved international position, especially since it marked the development of the US-Israel alliance and the US's subsequent emergence as the main international player in the Israeli-Palestinian question. Over the past ten years since the Suez Crisis, the US started to surpass France as Israel's main supplier of military equipment, while Britain provided arms to Jordan and Syria, and the Soviet Union armed Egypt. The Arabs were determined to even the score after losing wars to the Israeli army in 1948 and 1956, to the point where they refused to call Israel by

⁶⁹ Germany appeared to stay neutral, a position which was seen as *de facto* supportive to Israel. Moerenhout, *Essay on EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 3.

⁷⁰ France had been one of Israel's staunchest allies: in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis the French armed the Israelis, helping them to establish their nuclear program, providing a reactor in 1957. This lasted until June 1967 war, when President Charles de Gaulle strongly and publicly opposed to Israeli offensive and demanded full withdrawal from all the territories occupied during the conflict. De Gaulle's successors, Pompidou (1969-1974) and d'Estaing (1974-1981), continued with the same policy of breach with Israel, meanwhile the main government opposition – the French Socialist party – preferred to continue to enjoy the close relationship with Israel: when Mitterrand (1981-1995) became President of France in 1981, a shift of policy was taken. Filiu, *François Mitterrand and the Palestinians*, cit., p. 1 and Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 383.

⁷¹ Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian Question*, cit., p. 338.

name in favour of referring to "the Zionist entity"⁷². The Israelis were also intent on war, fearing to be left vulnerable from territorial repercussion and surrounded by hostile forces: when the Egyptians units reached the Sinai, they came face-to-face with the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF)⁷³: UNEF was a sort of buffer force between the Egyptian army and the Israeli army, but after the Egyptian request to withdraw (which was within Egypt's sovereignty rights to request withdraw of UN troops from its territory), the UNEF units left on 31 May: in this way, no buffer was present between the Egyptians and the Israelis, heightening the tensions between the two countries. The main reason was caused because since 1957 the UN had kept the Strait of Tiran open to all shipping: this had given Israel a decade of free access to the Red Sea, but once UNEF's withdraw, the strait returned to Egyptian sovereignty. On 22 May 1967, Egypt declared the closure of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping and to all shipments destined to its port, Eilat: for Israel, this act of threat to its maritime routes was ground for war. All the efforts to avoid war were abandoned, but this meant that Israel would have face attacks on three fronts because of an intern-Arab cooperation: Syria and Egypt were already bound by the League of Arab States mutual defence pact, in which, on 30 May 1967, was also added Jordan⁷⁴. Yet, despite their mutual defence pacts, the Arabs were less prepared for war than ever, there was no military coordination between the three. Israeli government feared entering a three-front war with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and the turning point came when US gave reassurance that it

⁷² Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 418.

⁷³ Approved by Resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, the UNEF was a military and peacekeeping force established by the UN General Assembly, and it had been posted to the Sinai in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War to keep peace following the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. It was comprised of 4.500 international soldiers posted to forty-one observation positions in the Gaza Strip, along the Israeli-Egyptian frontier, and at Sharm al-Shaykh at the southern tip of the Sinai. The UN General Assembly later established a Second UNEF in 1973 in response to the Yom Kippur War. N. G. Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, New York, Verso, 2003, p. 141. For *Resolution 1001 (ES-I)* see the United Nations Digital Library: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/208418>, last consultation 13/12/2023.

⁷⁴ R. B. Parker, *The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored*, in «Middle East Journal», vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 177–197. King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Egypt the 30 May and in front of international television cameras, he signed a defence agreement with President Nasser: it was a five-year pact in which each country will consider an attack on the other as an attack on itself. With this pact, Jordan was coming into line with the majority of Arab countries. Regarding the joint defence agreement between Syria and Egypt, it was signed at Damascus on 20 October 1955 «with a view to strengthening the principles of the Pact of the League of Arab States and reaffirming the loyalty of the contracting States to those principles, desiring the development and strengthen military co-operation between them with a view to protecting the independence of their two countries and safeguarding their security, firmly believing that the establishment of a security system common to their two countries will constitute a major factor in guaranteeing the security and independence of each». United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 247-I-3461, pp. 126-136, available in UN Treaty Collection <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20247/volume-247-I-3461-English.pdf>, last consultation 14/12/2023.

would stand by Israel in the event of war: for that reason, on 4 June Israel made the decision to go to war.

The Six-Day War in 1967 marked a significant turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Following Israel's military victory, it occupied the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights. This occupation fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the region and exacerbated tensions between Israelis and Palestinians.

With the exception of France, the majority of European states responded to the 1967 war by fully aligning with US policy. This was because the Member States, particularly France, realised that having inconsistent foreign policies in the face of a major global crisis did not correspond with the economic power that Europe was establishing⁷⁵. President de Gaulle stood up to the US and all of its allies, including Israel, and declared France's independent global political role. A turning point in this process occurred when he publicly criticised Israel for the Six-Day War, supporting a UN forum call for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, and imposing an embargo on the supply of arms to Israel⁷⁶. Despite discussions about the significance of the Middle East, the Member States' positions continued to differ too much to come to a consensus on a single stance⁷⁷.

The war lasted from 4 to 10 June 1967 and it marked a significant turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Following Israel's military victory, it occupied the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights: this occupation fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the region and exacerbated tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. The Arab leadership of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan blamed the defeat on American collusion with the Israelis⁷⁸, declaring that «the war was the latest chapter in a

⁷⁵ N. A. Tahir, *European Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Inception to the Present Day*, in «Journal of European Studies», vols. 23 & 24, nos. 2 & 1, 2009, pp. 54-55.

⁷⁶ As analysed by Rondot, France, on the Middle East question, for the most part remained hesitant, submitting to US' manoeuvres, which «virtually forced France and eight other countries that were opposed to the 29 November 1947 partition resolution to change their votes», and even participating in controversial operations as the Suez War in October 1956. General de Gaulle referred to this when he wrote – as quoted by Rondot, p. 87 - «In the Middle East our affairs are at an all-time low. The Algerian crisis and the Suez incident have closed off our access to the Arab states. [...] Naturally, I intend to reestablish our position in this region of the world, where France has always been active». The decolonisation that he carried out by granting Algeria its independence via referendum created the necessary conditions to strengthen France's position vis-à-vis the Arab states: since then, the “Gaullist” view of Franco-Arab relations has influenced the three presidents who succeeded de Gaulle, also shaping French policy on the Palestinian question. P. Rondot, *France and Palestine: From Charles de Gaulle to Francois Mitterrand*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vo. 16, no. 3, 1987, pp. 87-88.

⁷⁷ N. Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 100-126.

⁷⁸ On the first day of the war, the Voice of the Arabs broadcast the accusation that «the United States is the enemy. The United States is the hostile force behind Israel. The United States [...] is the enemy of all people [...] that is preventing you from liquidating Israel». BBC Monitoring Service, cited in M. B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of*

long history of imperialist domination of Egypt and the Arab world, with the United States now taking the leads»⁷⁹. All this led to the adoption of a radical new age of Arab politics of all the new governments that raised after the losses of 1967: the legitimisation of the nationalist approach was adopted in the calling for the destruction of Israel, the liberation of Palestine, and the triumph over imperialism – this time epitomised by the US. Moreover, 1967 also completely transformed American's position in the Middle East:

It was then that the special relationship between the United States and Israel began, commensurate with Arab antagonism toward the United States. The split was bound to happen, given the differences in their respective geostrategic priorities. The Americans could not convince the Arabs to take their side against the Soviet menace, and the Arabs could not get the Americans to respect their views of the Zionist threat⁸⁰.

There was a huge criticism toward US participation in the war on Israel's side, claiming that America was using Israel to advance its own domination over the region in a new wave of imperialism: in retrospect, we know that those assertions were false, but in fact there was the U.S.S. *Liberty* episode⁸¹ that confirmed and reflected the true nature of the new special relationship between Israel and the United States.

In the other hand, in the aftermath of the Six-Day war, also Arab attitudes toward Israel endured an obvious progression: Nasser and Hussein, respectively Egypt and Jordan, started to negotiated settlement through engaged exchanges and opened direct channels

the Modern Middle East, Penguin, London, 2003, p. 209. Moreover, on 9 June Nasser gave a broadcast speech in which he blamed the defeat of the Arabs to the Anglo-American collusion with Israel, present in A. El-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, London, Collins, 1978, pp. 175-176.

⁷⁹ *Ivi*, p. 179.

⁸⁰ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 429. Translating the 1967 war into the major field of Cold War, Johnson's administration abandoned neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict and titled in favour of Israel, because Nasser's socialism was taking the Arab world into the Soviet camp.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*. On the fourth day of the war, Israeli air and naval forces attacked a surveillance ship, the U.S.S. *Liberty*, killing thirty-four US servicemen and injuring 171. The Israelis never provided a public explanation for their attack, though it is apparent that they wanted to disable the ship to keep the Americans from monitoring Israeli communications from the battlefield. The fact that such an unprovoked attack, incurring so many American casualties, could so easily be forgiven reflected the nature of the new special relationship between Israel and the United States.

with the Jewish state⁸²; they were however marginalised by the hard line adopted by the rest of the Arab world: during the meeting of Arab heads of state occurred in the end of the 1967, the Khartoum Summit, is known for the adoption of the “three NOs” of Arab diplomacy: no recognition of the Jewish state, no negotiation with Israeli officials, and no peace between Arab states and Israel.

Despite that, the international community still hoped to bring Israel and the Arabs together to conclude a just and enduring peace: on November 1967 the UN Security Council approved Resolution 242, that called for the «withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict» in return for «respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries»⁸³. The resolution gained the support of Egypt and Jordan, but not of Syria or the other Arab states, a result of the application of the Khartoum Summit’s diplomacy policy. The Palestinians had the most to lose from the postwar diplomacy:

During the two decades since they had been driven from their homeland, the Palestinians had never gained international recognition as a distinct people with national rights. Since mandate times, they had been referred to as the Arabs of Palestine, rather than as Palestinians. In 1948 the Jews of Palestine took on a national identity as Israelis, whereas the Palestinian Arabs remained just “Arabs” – either “Israeli Arabs”, the minority who remained in their homes upon the creation of the state of Israel, or “Arab refugees”, those who took refuge from the fighting in neighbouring Arab states⁸⁴.

Most important, between 1948 and 1967, the Palestinians disappeared as a political community, and this lack of awareness of Palestinian national aspirations was reflected in the UN Resolution 242: as reasonable as it sounds to us now, at the time it represented the end of all Palestinian national aspirations. The “land for peace” resolution’s principle would

⁸² On Nasser’s diplomacy see A. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, W.W. Norton, New York, 2000, pp. 117-123; on the initiation of Hussein’s meetings with Israeli officials see A. Shlaim, *The Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace*, London, Allen Lane, 2007, pp. 192-201.

⁸³ UN Security Council Resolution 242 on UN Peacemaker <https://peacemaker.un.org/middle-east-resolution242>, last consultation 15/12/2023.

⁸⁴ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 431.

confirm Israel's permanence among the community of nations, returning what little territory remained of Arab Palestine to Egyptian or Jordanian trusteeship.

The country formerly known as Palestine would disappear from the atlas forever, and there would be no state for all Palestinians driven from their homes as refugees by the two wars of 1948 and 1967. It was not enough for Palestinians to reject Resolution 242. They also had to bring the justice of their cause to the attention of the international community by all possible means⁸⁵.

Since the propensity of nationalism and intergovernmentalism within the Member States, on economic and security grounds, the European Community was willing to exercise more influence, at least as counterweight of the United States. In the following pages we are going to see that in the next years EC was put in the corner, and with the subsequent emergence of the US as the main international player, within Member States there was an increasing frustration for being excluded from high-level summitry on the Arab-Israeli peace process, with the addition of some Washington's efforts to penalise Europeans for not toeing America's line on policies and containment. Giving all the possible analysis, the question that comes into mind is: besides its economic interests, is it an essential attribute of a big power (as US and EC) to act as mediator in the major conflicts of the world?

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

CHAPTER 2 – From the Seventies to the Eighties: a more consistent and coherent European policy towards the Middle East situation

2.1 Increasing the European cooperation and the consolidation of Europe's notion of "just peace"

During its initial years of existence, the European Community made relatively little progress towards political unification: economic integration had progressed steadily by 1967, but the European common foreign policy was still essentially a concept. Along with the impact of the increasingly integrated internal market on political coordination, the 1967 conflict was a major factor in the emergence of the European Political Cooperation, which had its first ministerial meeting in 1970. In late May 1967, the Six governments met in Rome for the EEC Summit, mainly to discuss the possibility of the UK joining the Community; plus, the international situation called for a common Community declaration on the Middle East crisis, but no agreement on a common position was reached, as there was still too much divergence in the Member States' positions⁸⁶. Indeed, the Six achieved the remarkable result of expressing each different position, following their national policy, and privileging what was perceived to be the national interest – from France's condemnation of Israel to Germany's support of Israel –, disguised behind a formal neutrality⁸⁷.

The inability to come to a consensus on the political role for Western Europe alongside the United States, the Member States' divergent Middle East traditions and interests, and the strength of their ties to Israel and the Arab world all played a part in the failure to reach a common agreement on that occasion: facing the 1967 crisis, the Six became more and more aware of the necessity to advance and strength Europe's political reputation globally as well as improve Europe's integration process⁸⁸. In November 1970 the foreign ministers of the Six Member States met in Munich for the first time within the framework of the newly established European Political Cooperation: the issue on the agenda was foreign policy and the situation in the Middle East was one of the top priorities. When it comes to foreign policy,

⁸⁶ Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, cit., pp. 100-126.

⁸⁷ C. Musu, *The EU and the Middle East peace process: a balance*, in «Studia Diplomatica», vol. 60, no. 1, Global Europe, 2007, p. 12.

⁸⁸ O. Norgaard, T. Pedersen, N. Petersen, *The European Community in World Politics*, London/New York, Pinter Publications, 1993, p. 148.

the Israeli-Palestinian situation (or the Arab-Israeli, as it was called in the Seventies⁸⁹) has remained a constant concern and a top priority for the EU ever since that meeting in Munich in 1970⁹⁰.

The failure to reach a common position was only a prelude to the gradual change over the following years: in 1971 an internal document – the Schumann Document on the Middle East, or Schumann Secret Report⁹¹ – of the EPC was approved by the Six MS' Ministers of Foreign Affairs, defining a collective position of the Community's countries on the Israeli-Arab situation: it was largely based on UNSC Resolution 242, calling for demilitarised zone and gradual coordinated return of refugees, demanding for «Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied territories in return for recognition of Israel by Arab States»⁹². The status of the document was unclear as the MS could not agree on whether the document was an official policy – as considered by France –, or an informal working paper – as described by Germany and the Netherlands⁹³. Nevertheless, it was never published because of German disapproval: in the Israeli-Palestinian question, Germany's position was «predominantly determined by shame for the atrocities of the Holocaust, a history that continues to shape their diplomatic approach up until today»⁹⁴.

One main consideration toward the European stance on the Israeli-Palestinian question is that Europe never learn to deal and accept its colonial and anti-Semitic history, making especially Palestinians pay off the debt of its sense of guilt toward its own history:

The fact that the Palestinians, who were not responsible for the Holocaust, had to bear the brunt and to take the rap, was not a matter of concern. The Palestinian question was either put in the backburner, or considered as a humanitarian issue to be tackled by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)⁹⁵.

⁸⁹ A. Perssons, *Legitimizing a just peace: EU's promotion of the parameters of just peace in the Middle East*, in «Jad-Pbp Working Paper», Series no. 9, Lund University, 2010, p. 8.

⁹⁰ J. Peters, *Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Declaration of the European council of Berlin and Beyond*, in «Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the Middle East», Bertelsmann-Gutersloh, Sven Behrendt & Christian-Peter-Hanelt (eds.), 2000, p. 154.

⁹¹ It is named after the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Schumann, not to be confused with Robert Schuman, one of the founders of the EU, the Council of Europe and NATO.

⁹² The formulation resembles the Arab Plan was made public 30 years later its creation, in 2002. Perssons, *Legitimizing a just peace: EU's promotion of the parameters of just peace in the Middle East*, cit., p. 8.

⁹³ S. Dosenrode, A. Stubkjaer, *The European Union and the Middle East*, London-Sheffield, Academic Press, 2002, p. 84.

⁹⁴ M. Overhaus, H. W. Maull, S. Harnisch, *German Foreign Policy and the Middle East Conflict*, in «German Foreign Policy in Dialogue», Mei, 2002.

⁹⁵ Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 337.

In 1971, the European Community (EC) released its initial formal statement about the Middle East situation. It was also the first time the EC had used the term "just peace" in respect to EC relations with the Middle East. In this statement it was declared that:

it is of great importance to Europe that a just peace should be established in the Middle East, and they [the foreign ministers] are therefore in favour of any efforts which may be made to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict, and particularly of the negotiations in which Mr Jarring is involved. They urge all those concerned to ensure that this mission proves successful. They confirm their approval of Resolution No. 242 of the Security Council dated 22 November 1967, which constitutes the basis of a settlement, and they stress the need to put it into effect in all its parts⁹⁶.

Important to note is that nowhere the term "Palestinian" is used in the text, which was also the case for the UN Security Council Resolution 242⁹⁷: the Resolution has constituted as the foundation of the EC strategy for handling this issue since the early 1970s and has been included in nearly all of the EC's statements about the Israeli-Palestinian question. However, as was previously mentioned, when the EC called for a "just peace" in the Middle East in 1971, the Palestinians were not even mentioned as a party to the conflict.

The EC sought to establish a just and durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians since the early 1970s. Over the years, the Community had in its declarations, constantly and more than any other international actor, emphasised the need for a just peace between the two sides: "just peace" had little attention in the peace and conflict literature⁹⁸, and this naturally

⁹⁶ *Bulletin of the EC 6-1971*, in «Archive of European Integration», http://aei.pitt.edu/4550/1/epc_ministers_3rd_meet.pdf, p. 31.

⁹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 242 had emphasised «the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war» and called for Israeli withdrawal «from territories occupied in the recent conflict». The Resolution also emphasised «the need to work for a just and lasting peace» and «the right of every State in the area [...] to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries». It affirms further the necessity «for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem» but it does not refer to it as a Palestinian problem. UN Security Council, *Resolution 242*, cit.

⁹⁸ K. Aggestam, A. Bjorkdahl, *In Search for Just Peace: Constructing a Third Culture of Negotiation*, in «The National Conference in Peace and Conflict Research», Conference paper, Lund University, 2008, p. 2. The academics Aggestam and Bjorkdahl have further analysed how, even though justice and peace have sparked lively debates about the dilemmas and trade-offs in several contemporary peace processes, there is still surprisingly little research and few conceptualizations of the interplay between the two of them. To deepening see also:

K. Aggestam, A. Bjorkdahl, *Deliberating and Negotiating Just and Durable Peace*, Conference paper, ISA, 2009.

raises questions such as: what a just peace is, how it can be achieved, how the Member States have conceived just peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and how the Community has worked in the decades to achieve it⁹⁹?

Speaking of which, in the eyes of Europe what constitutes a “just peace” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has significantly changed over the decades: the Palestinian problem has moved from being a problem of refugees subordinated to territorial and other security issues, into the very centre stage of any possible conflict resolution regarding peace in the Middle East¹⁰⁰. This development was reflected in the various EC statements of the Israeli-Palestinian situation: as the Palestinian problem rose to prominence, the terminology of the EC statements changed as did the Union’s notion of just peace in the situation. Quoting Khader¹⁰¹,

K. Aggestam, A. Bjorkdahl, *Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans*, London, Routledge, 2012.

⁹⁹ Several academics, such as Hoppe and Mani (p.5), have argued that there is a connection between conflict and injustice as well as between peace and justice: Hoppe (p. 71) argued that «peace is put at risk where justice is violated – and where peace is lost, conditions of deep injustice will soon prevail». Both justice and peace have long been the focus of much debate as well as numerous attempts of conceptualisation up to a point where there is now what Richmond (p. 15) calls «a tyranny of multiple terminologies» surrounding them. As mentioned, just peace has been very little studied, but those who have studied it, like Allan and Keller (p. 199) or the previous mentioned Aggestam and Bjorkdahl (*In Search for Just Peace*, cit., p. 16), typically view just peace as a process rather than a set of requirements, one that entails reaching an intersubjective consensus on what each side’s fundamental interests are and what constitutes a just peace. As just peace is focused more on the process than the substance it seems to be a concept that is easy to describe but harder to define. One of the few academics who have actually tried to define just peace rather than loosely describing the term is Allan (p. 115) who argues that «just peace is stable peace with justice». Indeed, just peace resembles stable peace in many ways but with some notable exceptions. Like just peace, stable peace can be seen as an ongoing and dynamic process, rather than a single situation, which might take place in many different settings (Kacowicz, Bar-Siman-Tov, p. 11). Stable peace also resembles just peace in that neither of them can be seen as resulting from a single predominant cause or condition. Instead, they 6 are the results of a number of interrelated factors (Kacowicz, Bar-Siman-Tov, p. 33). The main difference according to Pierre Allan lies in the latter’s strong emphasis on justice. In this regard, just peace goes beyond the notion of stable peace in the sense that the peace order is seen not only as natural or normal, but as just. Because of this just peace is morally superior to stable peace, argues Allan (p. 115). Therefore, the use of the word just in just peace is not arbitrary; it serves to measure not only the stability of every political order but also the ethical quality; for example, how far it aims to develop and uphold life conditions in which basic demands of justice are met (Hoppe, p. 71). More specifically, Allan and Keller (p. 195) see just peace as a process whereby the conflicting parties reach peace and justice through an intersubjective understanding of peace and of the core issues at stake. I find this approach very useful, although this paper deals only with an intersubjective EU understanding of just peace and not with wider Israeli and Palestinian notions of just peace.

T. Hoppe, *Just Peace as Leading Perspective: Towards the Concept and Task Profile of an Ethics of International Politics*, in «Studies in Christian Ethics», vol. 20, Nr. 1, 2007, pp. 68-76.

R. Mani, *Beyond Retribution. Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002.

P. Allan, A. Keller, *What is a Just Peace?*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.

K. Aggestam, A. Bjorkdahl, *In Search for Just Peace*, cit., p. 16.

A. M. Kacowicz, Y. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Stable Peace Among Nations*, Boulder, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

¹⁰⁰ B. Friedemann, *The Dilemmas of a Policy of Even-Handedness*, in «Germany and the Middle East: Past, Present and Future», Jerusalem, The Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2003, p. 146.

¹⁰¹ Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 362.

[i]t is therefore possible to speak about a «European political *acquis*»¹⁰² regarding the Arab-Israeli question, based on the affirmation of conceptual guidelines (just peace, Palestinian self-determination, two-State solution, etc) and on the restatement of international law (illegality of settlement and annexation policies, inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, etc).

In addition, as illustrated in table 1 by Perssons displayed below, Europe has in fact shown a degree of consistency in its policy towards the conflict over the years, even if it is argued that the continuous divisions among the Member States stands for European incoherence and inconsistency, pointing out that the long-term policy of the Community has been inconsistent and incoherent¹⁰³, which are going to be further inquired into the next paragraph and chapter.

The evolution of EU's notion of just peace, 1971-2009

1971 EC statements	1973 EC statements	1977 EC statement	1980 Venice Declaration	1999 Berlin Declaration	2009 EU statement
No mentioning of the Palestinians as a party to the conflict.	EC recognised the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.	EC took into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.	EC recognised the Palestinians right to exercise fully its right to self-determination . EC called for	EU declares its explicit commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state .	EU recognises Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state.

¹⁰² A. Dieckhof, *The European Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, in C. P. Hanelt, F. Neugart, M. Peitz «Europe's emerging foreign policy and the Middle East challenge», Munich, Guetersloh, 2002, p. 151.

¹⁰³ As analysed by Moerenhout, *EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., pp. 11-14, the EU has surely failed in developing and implementing a structural foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if structural foreign policy is indeed defined as a long-term foreign policy intended to influence or create sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, and mental structures at not only the state level but also on an individual, societal, inter-state, inter-societal, regional, and global level. Furthermore, four main factors are found to lie at the basis of the EC's incoherence and inconsistency: (1) incoherence among Member States; (2) inconsistency between economic and political policies; (3) the failure to understand and focus on mental structures (in particular, religion); and finally (4) the problematic transatlantic partnership.

			the PLO to be included in the negotiations.		
--	--	--	---	--	--

Table 1: *The evolution of EU's notion of just peace, 1971-2009* in Perssons, *Legitimizing a just peace: EU's promotion of the parameters of just peace in the Middle East*, cit., p. 19.

Furthermore, regarding criticism of the EU's role as a «political toothless actor»¹⁰⁴ in terms of lack of leadership, visibility, efficiency, internal consensus and international recognition, it is necessary to point out that, since 1972, the Palestinian question has been a core-issue of EPC, contributing – to a great extent – to forge a European Common Foreign Policy. Additionally, in the final analysis, the Europe Union has been more forward-looking than the rest of the international community: table 2 below, by Khader, summarises the documentary record of European declarations on the Palestinian question and offers evidence of the argument.

The evolution of EEC/EU's position on the Palestinian question 1972-2013

Year	EEC/EU STATEMENTS
1970	For the EEC, the Palestinian question was a refugee problem.
1971	The EEC called for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.
1973	November 6: The EEC recognised the legitimate claims of the Palestinians.
1977	London European Council: The EEC called for a homeland to the Palestinian people.
1980	Venice Declaration: The EEC added the mention of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organisation], which should be included in the negotiations.
1986	The EEC adopted the rule on Palestinian agricultural exports.

¹⁰⁴ Dieckhof, *The European Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, cit., p. 151.

1989	Madrid Declaration: The PLO had to fully take part in the peace process.
1994	The EU started to provide aid to the Palestinian Authority.
1995	The EU incorporated the Palestinian Authority in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
1999	Berlin Declaration: The EU supported the creation of a Palestinian State and rejected the annexation of East Jerusalem.
2009	Brussels Meeting: The EU insisted on the two-State solution and recognised Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian State.
2012	December 10: The EU indicated that agreements between the EU and Israel are not applicable to the Occupied Territories.
2013	June-July: Labelling statements products and refusing funding to Israeli entities established in the Occupied Territories.

Table 2: *The evolution of EEC/EU's position on the Palestinian question 1972-2013* in Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 363.

Still according to Khader¹⁰⁵, the EU's inability to put its rhetoric into practice is not due to the ineffectiveness of its discourse, but rather to institutional limitations, differences among the Commission, Council, and EU Parliament¹⁰⁶, distinct priorities and memories among its

¹⁰⁵ Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 362.

¹⁰⁶ The EU's institutional set-up is unique, and its decision-making system is constantly evolving. There are four main decision-making institutions which lead the EU's administration, and which collectively provide the EU with policy direction, working together – despite the different roles – in the law-making process: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission. In general, the European Council does not make laws, however, it can agree on changes in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. Its main role is to determine the EU's political direction and priorities. Meanwhile, the European Commission puts forward proposals for new laws, and Council of the EU and European Parliament negotiate, agree, and jointly adopt European laws. The powers, responsibilities, and procedures of the EU's institutions are laid down in the founding treaties of the EU: the Treaty of Rome on the Functioning of the European Union (1957), the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992), and the Lisbon Treaty (2007) which introduced certain amendments and additions to their competencies.

https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/types-institutions-and-bodies_en, last consultation 02/01/2024.

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E/TXT>, last consultation 02/01/2024.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF, last consultation 02/01/2024.

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT>, last consultation 02/01/2024.

Member States, a reluctance on the part of the EU to use its leverage, and a limited degree of external autonomy: combined together, these factors have made the EU less able to influence events and increase its actorship.

Beside all the criticism that can be moved, it should be also acknowledged that, when it comes to this particular issue — which is considered as one of the most divisive in international affairs — the EU, which is frequently associated with inadequate capacity to come together and speak with one voice when confronted with serious challenges, has in fact been far more progressive than the rest of the international community: in retrospect, it is clear that the EPC managed to form a common position among the members, but, at the same time, it must be mentioned that even if there is a widespread agreement in the EU on the future solution of the situation, fundamental differences still exist among EU members over how to approach the conflict on a more daily and practical level, especially in matters related to Israel¹⁰⁷.

Furthermore, the early 1970s saw an increase in the EC's diplomatic and economic activity in the Middle East as well as three new members: Britain, Denmark, and Ireland. Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian situation, Britain placed itself in between France and Germany position, neither considering being clearly pro-Palestinian nor pro-Israeli. Britain has historically tried to function as a bridge between the EC and the US, believing that American involvement in the peace process was crucial¹⁰⁸. The admission of Britain complicated the decision-making processes even further, although it was clear from the beginning that the EC had severe problems of moving beyond the issuing of declarations to actually enforce its politics¹⁰⁹. The October 1973 war between Israel and Egypt and Syria that we are going to deep in the next paragraph, came as a surprise for the Member States of the EC: the following Arab oil embargo had a shocking effect on them and to all Western countries as

¹⁰⁷ Peters, *Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Declaration of the European council of Berlin and Beyond*, cit., p. 19.

¹⁰⁸ P. Muller, *Europe's Policial Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process – A Comparison of the Foreign Policies of the "Big-Three" EU Member States vis-à-vis the Peace Process*, Conference paper, BISA, 2006, p. 58.

¹⁰⁹ S. A. Pennick, *On the right track: challenges and dilemmas of Eu peace-keeping in the Middle East*, Jad- PbP, Working Paper, no. 6, March 2010, p. 8.

well, since were all dependent on energy supplies from the Middle East¹¹⁰. Panayiotis sums up the effects of the oil crisis on the EC in this way¹¹¹:

It [the oil embargo] made Europeans brutally aware of their vulnerability in both economic and political terms; it changed the pattern of relationships with both Israel and the Arab world, and brought about a dramatic shift towards more pro-Arab attitudes; it revealed the extent of European external disunity and generated calls for more integration as a result of this experience; it had economic effects not imaginable before the crisis; and last but not least, it brought to the surface the uneasy nature of Euro-American relations.

Although energy and trade became major issues that certainly shaped EC policy in the Middle East, there were other factors that mattered for the European countries in this area: according to Perssons, from the beginning of the 1970s the members of the EC felt in a «genuine displeasure against Israel's continued occupation and particularly against the construction of settlements on occupied territory, which the EC – and then EU – has always perceived as illegal under international law»¹¹².

Within the framework of the EPC, the conflict in the Middle East was consciously placed highest on the agenda for both external and internal reasons: besides the importance of finding a solution to the conflict, which indeed has always been a real concern (not least in the wake of the growing dependency on energy and trade with the countries in the region), this conflict was singled out and used by Europe to foster integration within the

¹¹⁰ As much as 60% of Europe's total energy came from the Middle East, a figure far higher than that of the US, which was relatively independent of energy supplies from the Middle East. In addition to that, the EC member states had a growing interest in the region as a trade partner. In 1972, EC exports to the eight Arab members of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were valued \$2.97 billion. By 1979, they were valued \$27.7 billion, an almost tenfold increase in seven years. There should be no doubt that energy and trade considerations played a significant role in shaping EC policy towards the Middle East in the 1970s. S. Dosenrode, A. Stubkjaer, *The European Union and the Middle East*, p. 85, and A. Garfinkle, *Western Europe's Middle East Diplomacy and the United States*, Philadelphia, Philadelphia Policy Papers, 1983, p. 8.

¹¹¹ I. Panayiotis, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy*, Averbury, Aldershot, 1987, p. 421.

¹¹² A. Perssons, *Legitimizing a just peace: EU's promotion of the parameters of just peace in the Middle East*, cit., p. 10. Regarding Israel's actions perceived illegal under international law, for an example see the *European Council in 2010*, in «Consilium Europa», <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21369/qc3010507enc.pdf>, last consultation 26/12/2023.

Community¹¹³. The rationale behind this “hidden agenda” was that by being able to show a united stand on this particular issue, which already then was considered to be one of the most difficult issues in international affairs, the international community would start seeing the Union as a serious international actor¹¹⁴. The logic to show that unity is necessary for being counted upon as a serious international actor goes back all the way to the early days of the EPC and explain much of the Union’s ever-present quest for being able to show a united front in the region¹¹⁵.

In spite of all its limitations, constraints, and flaws, Europe’s declaratory policies have not been totally unproductive or unhelpful: while the US did not live up to their role of honest mediator, European more even-handed approach helped not only shoring up Palestinian legitimate claims, but it also served as an agenda-setter and has been instrumental in the worldwide recognition of Palestinian rights.

2.2 The 1973 Yom Kippur War and Oil Crisis: using the oil weapon for a Cold War approach

Apart from the Community’s failure to complete the program of economic integration and to move toward political unification, it was also challenging to stop occasional regression: the oil crisis of 1973-1974 dramatically increased the danger of an actual break down and, in fact, the last months of 1973 constituted a period of general tension in international politics.

After Nasser’s death, Sadat assumed the role of successor¹¹⁶, and he faced an unfavourable international environment when he took office: the Nixon administration was pursuing a policy of détente¹¹⁷ with the Soviet Union, allied with Egypt, but as tensions between the two

¹¹³ Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, cit., 142.

¹¹⁴ Keukeleire, MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, cit, p. 46.

¹¹⁵ Ivi, p. 69.

¹¹⁶ He was one of the founders of the Free Officers movement, a group of revolutionary Egyptian nationalist officers in the Egyptian Armed Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces that instigated the Egyptian Revolution of 1952: the Revolution ushered in a wave of revolutionary politics in the Arab World, and contributed to the escalation of decolonisation, and the development of Third World solidarity during the Cold War. To deepening see Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., pp. 355-366.

Though he had taken part in the 1952 revolution as one of the original members of the Revolutionary Command Council, Sadat remained «something of an unknown quantity at home and abroad». He had none of Nasser’s charm or public appeal and had to prove himself to remain in power. Ivi, p. 459.

¹¹⁷ French for “relaxation”. The term is often used to refer to a period of general easing of geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, started to being a core element of the foreign policy of US President Richard Nixon: the Nixon administration promoted a greater dialogue with the Soviet government in order to facilitate negotiations over arms control and other bilateral agreements. M. Hunt, *The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present – A Documentary Reader*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 269–274.

superpowers diminished, regional disputes such the Arab-Israeli one took on less urgency in both Moscow and Washington. Both the Soviets and the Americans were willing to live with the “status quo”, a policy of “no war, no peace” between the Arabs and Israel. Sadat knew that the status quo policy inclined to favour Israel: «[w]ith each passing year, the international community would come to accept Israel’s hold over the Arab territories occupied in 1967»¹¹⁸. For this reason, he thought that he had to take the initiative to break the impasse, pushing the Soviets to provide high-tech weapons to the Egyptian military and forcing the Americans to reengage with the Arab-Israeli conflict¹¹⁹: in order to achieve his goal, he needed to go to war.

Egypt was intended to not repeat the same mistakes of the Six-Day War, so the first thing to do was to plan and conclude a war plan with Syria to launch a two-front attack on Israel; on account of this, they stuck a secret agreement in January 1973 to unify the command of both their armed forces. The next thing to do was to decide on the ideal date to launch their attack, in order to achieve the greatest degree of surprise: the Egyptian general el-Gamasy and his officers find out that the ideal day for crossing the Suez Canal would coincide with the Jewish religious holidays Yom Kippur¹²⁰, and this was considered to be optimal because the Israeli military and general public could be distracted by the feast day¹²¹. Taking into consideration all these factors, it was decided to begin operations on Saturday 6 October 1973.

The cardinal consideration is that Arabs decided to use an entirely different weapon in this war: oil. The world in 1973 was far more dependent on Arab oil than it was in 1967: American oil production had reached its peak in 1970 and was now falling each year, Saudi Arabia had replaced Texas in pumping more oil, with the result that the US and the industrial powers were more vulnerable to the oil weapon than ever before¹²². For the first time, Arabs could have a chance to lead in an international conflict: the intention was not to use «oil as a

¹¹⁸ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 460.

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*. Israel was much more prepared for a war than the Arab states, in this case Egypt was entirely dependent on the Soviet Union for advanced weaponry, and the Soviets still lagged well behind the Americans in the quality of the supplies.

¹²⁰ Literally “Day of Atonement”, is the holiest day of the year in Judaism, and it generally occurs to a date in late September or early October. Alongside the related holiday of Rosh HaShanah (literally “head of the year”), Yom Kippur is one of the two components of the High Holy Days of Judaism.

¹²¹ «We discovered that Yom Kippur fell on a Saturday and, what was more important, that it was the only day throughout the year in which radio and television stopped broadcasting as part of the religious observance and traditions of that feast. In other words, a speedy recall of the reserve forces using public means could not be made». M. A. G. El-Gamasy, *The October War: Memories of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt*, Cairo, American University in Cairo Press, 1993, pp. 180-181.

¹²² A. A. Attiga, *The Arabs and the Oil Crisis, 1973-1986*, Kuwait, OAPEC, 1987, p. 247.

weapon in a battle which only goes on for two or three days, and then stop», but the purpose was «to see a battle which goes on for long enough time for the world opinion to be mobilised»¹²³. When war broke out, after a few days both Israel and the Arab coalition (Egypt and Syria) were running down their reserves of arms and munitions, and by the end of the first week, both sides needed resupply¹²⁴. On 10 October the Soviets began airlifting weapons to Syria and Egypt, and on 14 October the Americans initiated their own secret airlift of arms and ammunition to the Israelis: Israeli forces were consolidating their lead over their Arab rivals, bringing the military situation to a deadlock.

It was at this point that the Arabs decided to use the oil weapon: they knew that the industrial world was dependent on them, so when they raised the price of their oil, they knew that by this action they were able to inflict immediate punishment on the industrial countries that supported Israel. The Arab oil ministers imposed a 17% price hike without inform the Western oil companies, so the impact on oil markets was immediate and provoked widespread panic: by the end of the day, oil traders had raised the posted price of a barrel of oil to \$5.11, up 70% over the trading price of \$2.90 in June 1973¹²⁵. The price hike was but the first crack of the whip to get the world's attention, since the Arab oil ministers released a communiqué outlining a series of production cuts and embargos to force the industrial powers to modify their policies toward the Arab-Israeli situation¹²⁶:

All Arab oil exporting countries shall forthwith cut their production respectively by no less than five percent of the September production and maintain the same rate of reduction each month thereafter until the Israeli forces are fully withdrawn from

¹²³ Saudi Arabia King Faysal, cited in D. Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*, New York, Free Press, 1991, p.597. The Saudi king believed his country could use its oil resources effectively and promised Sadat his support if Egypt went to war against Israel. Furthermore, Khaled al-Hasan, an early adviser of Yasser Arafat, PLO leader and a founder of the Palestinian political and militant organization Fatah, repeated the same point to Alan Hart, in A. Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peace-maker?*, London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984, p. 370: «The condition is that you will fight for a long time and you won't ask for a ceasefire after a few days. You must fight for not less than three months».

¹²⁴ El-Gamasy, in *The October War: Memories of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt*, cit., p. 347, claimed that 27 Israeli aircraft were shot down on October 6 and that 48 aircraft were downed on October 7, for a total of 75 Israeli planes in the first two day of war. He put Israel's armoured losses at more than 120 tanks destroyed on October 6 and 170 tanks on October 7, pp. 217, 233. These figures seem credible when compared to the official figures for the war as a whole, in which Israel lost a total of 103 aircraft and 840 tanks, and Arab forces lost 329 aircraft and 2.554 tanks. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, cit., p. 321.

¹²⁵ Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*, cit., pp. 601-606.

¹²⁶ R. N. El-Rayyes, D. Nahas, *The October War: Documents, Personalities, Analysis, and Maps*, Beirut, An-Nahar eds., 1973, pp. 71-73.

all Arab territories occupied during the June 1967 War, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are restored.

They also reassured friendly states that they would not be affected by the same measures, because, by the same communiqué, only «countries which demonstrate moral and material support to Israeli enemy will be subject to severe and progressive reduction in Arab oil supplies, leading to a complete halt»¹²⁷, like the US and the Netherlands that, given their traditional friendship for Israel, were threatened with a complete embargo¹²⁸.

Being much more dependent on oil imports from the Middle East than the US, European economies had bigger effects from the crisis just arisen, but as pointed out by Möckli¹²⁹,

the challenge for the Nine was more complex since the Arab oil producers did not treat them as a group, but differentiated their export cuts according to the degree of support given by individual EC members to the Arab cause.

In fact, EC member states decided to become actively involved in Middle East policy because Washington was incapable of protecting their specific interests: the US was much less dependent on energy imports than the Nine, and it had no power to secure Arab oil supplies to Europe.

After demonstrating their strength on the battlefield and over the oil markets, the Arabs states opened a diplomatic front in the White House: the Arab ministers found the American administration compliant to put the UN Security Council Resolution 242 into effect, calling for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in June 1967 in return for full peace between Israel and the Arab states. In this occasion, the Algerian foreign minister asked why the Resolution had never been implemented in the first place: «Kissinger [Secretary of State during the Nixon administration] said that, quite frankly, the reason was the complete military

¹²⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*: «until such time as the Governments of the USA and Holland or any other country that take a stand of active support to the Israeli aggressors reverse their position and add their weight behind the world community's consensus to end the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and bring about the full restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people».

¹²⁹ D. Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*, London, I.B. Tauris & Co, 2009, p. 184.

superiority of Israel. The weak, he said, don't negotiate. The Arabs had been weak; now they were strong»¹³⁰. To them, it seemed that the Americans comprehended nothing but power. As a matter of fact, European and American threat perception strongly diverged with regard to the Yom Kippur War: Kissinger treated it much more as a «Cold War confrontation than a local conflict with indigenous causes»¹³¹, his only concern was getting the Soviets out of the region. Actually, US found itself in a difficult position: it wanted to placate the Arab world but not at the expense of Israel's security. In terms of the Cold War, the Americans were determined that Israel, supplied with weapons from the United States, would defeat the Arabs, armed with weapons from the Soviet Union. Despite that, when the Arab oil states imposed the complete embargo, Western governments faced growing pressure from their citizens to bring the oil embargo to a close¹³²: since the price of oil had quadrupled in six months, radically unsettling Western economies and hurting costumers, the only way to resolve the oil crisis was to address the Arab-Israeli question. Thanks to the oil weapon, Sadat had achieved his strategical objective to push the US to reengage with regional diplomacy.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the third week of war, new tensions between the two Cold War superpowers started to raise: as the Israelis threatened the Egyptian army on the west bank of the Suez Canal, Soviet Prime Minister sent a letter to US President Nixon calling for joint diplomatic action. The superpowers made the decision to come together in an attempt to resolve the 1973 October War diplomatically; both the Egyptians and the Israelis were impatient to bring the conflict to an end too: after sixteen days of intensive fighting, both sides were ready to lay down their arms, and a ceasefire was negotiated through the UN Security Council on 22 October. The same day, the Security Council passed Resolution 338, which reaffirmed the earlier Resolution 242 with the addition of a peace conference and a resolution of Arab-Israeli differences through an exchange of land for a «just and durable peace in the Middle East»¹³³. That December, the United Nations called an international conference in Geneva to address the issue of Arab land occupied by Israel in 1967 as a first step toward a just and enduring resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict¹³⁴: the conference was

¹³⁰ M. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, London, Collins, 1975, p. 275.

¹³¹ Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*, cit., p. 361.

¹³² C. Issawi, *The 1973 Oil Crisis and After*, in «Journal of Post Keynesian Economics», vol. 1, no. 2, 1978, p. 12.

¹³³ *Security Council Resolution 338: Ceasefire in the Middle East* in United Nations Peacemaker, Document Retrieval <https://peacemaker.un.org/middleeast-resolution338>, last consultation 05/01/2024.

¹³⁴ *The Need for Convening the International Peace Conference on the Middle East*, in United Nations, The Question of Palestine, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-206430/> last consultation 05/01/2024.

opened on 21 December 1973 and it was co-sponsored by the US and the USSR, with the attendance by delegations from Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Syria's President refused to attend when no guarantee could not be obtained by the conference of the restore of all occupied territories on the Arab states. Moreover, in this conference regarding especially the Palestinian area, no Palestinian representation was present, since Israel vetoed the effective "government-in-exile" of Palestinian people participation, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)¹³⁵.

The Geneva conference was inconclusive: it was not the first time that «the Arab delegations failed to coordinate before the conference, and their presentations revealed deep divisions in Arab ranks»¹³⁶, a recurrent circumstance throughout Arab history of being unable to communicate while having a common position. Despite that, Heikal argued that «all that can be said on the credit side is that the world was the Arabs acting for once in unison and oil being used, even if clumsily, as a political weapon»¹³⁷, the display of discipline, and unity of purpose (the evacuation of all Arab territories occupied in June 1967) impressed the international community, forcing so the superpowers to take the Arab world more seriously.

On an economic level, the events of the 1973 led to full Arab independence from the Western oil companies: according to Shaykh Yamani, the Arab oil states had asserted mastery over their own commodity and came out of the oil crisis immensely wealthier. Oil, which had traded at less than \$3 a barrel before the 1973 crisis, stabilised at \$11-13 for most of the Seventies. While the Western public opinion painted the Arab oil states as villains that were holding the world to ransom, Western businessmen were quickly attracted to this emerging market of apparently limitless resources: due to the increase in price, even the Western oil companies saw significant gains from the crisis due to the appreciation of their large oil reserves. The final result of the Yom Kippur War was also seen as a diplomatic success:

¹³⁵ The Palestine Liberation Organisation, PLO, is a Palestinian nationalist coalition which is internationally recognised as the official representative of the Palestinian people. It was founded in 1964, sought to establish an Arab state over the entire territory of the former Mandatory Palestine, advocating the elimination of the State of Israel. However, in 1993, the PLO recognised Israeli sovereignty with the Oslo Accord, which we are going to analyse in the last chapter, and now only seeks Arab statehood in the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) that have been militarily occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War. M. R. Al-Madfa'i, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974–1991*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 21.

¹³⁶ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., pp. 467-468. The Egyptian referred to the West Bank as a Palestinian territory, undermining Jordan's negotiating position: the Jordanians felt the Egyptians were punishing them for not having taken part in the 1973 war. The Jordanian foreign minister called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, including East Jerusalem; Israel's foreign minister insisted instead that Israel would never return in the 1967 lines, declaring Jerusalem the "undivided capital of Israel". The only significant result of the conference was the creation of a joint Egyptian-Israeli military working group to negotiate a disengagement of both forces in the Sinai.

¹³⁷ Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, cit., p. 275.

Sadat had succeeded in using the war to break the deadlock with Israel. Concerted Arab military action had proved a credible threat to Israel, and the war had raised dangerous tensions between the Soviets and Americans. The international community now gave high priority to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict through diplomacy based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338¹³⁸.

Nevertheless, it is also to be taken into account that UN resolutions unhelped the territorial integrity of all the states in the region, they made no mention of the «stateless Palestinians»¹³⁹, other than to promise a «just settlement of the refugee problem»¹⁴⁰: the PLO faced a harsh choice between participating in the new diplomacy, or watching as Jordan and Egypt reacquired control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of the peace agreement, ending in this way any chance of Palestinian independence.

2.3 The Seventies: steps towards the Venice Declaration

The view of the EEC on the Middle East situation has continued to be exchanged between the Nine governments of the Community, with different statements and congresses, indicating a more balanced European position: Israeli reaction toward the European position was mainly harsh and sharp, calling on EC to not interfere in Middle Eastern affairs¹⁴¹, even if the Nine considered imperative to get involved in finding a solution for the Arab-Israeli issue. The oil crisis and the embargo imposed on some European countries served as additional accelerator for a greater European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, mainly through the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD)¹⁴², and with the 6 November 1973 Declaration on the Middle East that contained a common policy on the Arab-Israeli issue which marked the

¹³⁸ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 469.

¹³⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁰ Security Council Resolution 338. According to this statement there's also Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 338.

¹⁴¹ D. Cronin, *Europe's Alliance with Israel: Aiding the Occupation*, London, Pluto Press, 2011, p. 64.

¹⁴² The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) is a conference system between the European Community and the Arab League, designed to explore the ways and means of establishing an interregional partnership. Launched in early 1970 and based largely on the Arab policy of France, it took shape in 1973 following the Yom Kippur War and the first oil crisis, thanks to French President Pompidou and his Foreign Minister, Jobert. The aim was to thoroughly review the very nature of Euro-Arab relations and to achieve an overhaul of relations between the partners, on the basis of equality and respect for the interests of each. At the same time, the Euro-Arab dialogue had a strong political content which aimed to create Euro-Arab cooperation to counterpose the United States-Israeli cooperation and to put the latter on pressure. A. R. Taylor, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership*, in «Middle East Journal», vol. 32, no. 4, 1978, pp. 429-443.

necessity to keep pace through the application of the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338¹⁴³.

Europe's response to the Middle East challenge took two forms: first, the Nine issued a Middle East declaration in which they offered support for the peace process and expressed their own positions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, emphasising the necessity for Israel to end its territorial occupation; second, the Nine also supported the possibility of a plan for extensive collaboration with the Arab nations. As they were kept out of the peace process, they developed a long-term strategy to strengthen the bonds of interdependence between Europe and the Arab world: the objective of the Euro-Arab Dialogue was to reduce the incentives for the oil producers to use the oil weapon against Europe once more, as well as to increase Arab involvement in secure European economies and aid in the stabilisation of the Middle East¹⁴⁴.

In the wake of the Yom Kippur War and of the 1973 oil shock, EC's attempt to deal with pressure from both the US and the Arab countries is to be found in the EAD. According to Guasconi¹⁴⁵, the EAD represented the other facet of the Global Mediterranean Policy, even if the Dialogue did not involve only Mediterranean countries and was not focused on the Mediterranean. When the EAD was first proposed, it was meant to be an instrument for developing bilateral and international, cultural and economic ties in order to advance Euro-Arab relations: «economic cooperation will be the principle theme [of the EAD]»¹⁴⁶. Thus, the official objectives of the framework focused solely on developing economic, technical and cultural cooperation with the Arab world, especially in the areas of agriculture, rural development, industrialisation, trade, basic infrastructure, finance, science and technology¹⁴⁷. The question of oil supply was a crucial issue: the dependence of European countries on oil from the Mediterranean and, in particular, on Arab oil-producing countries and the need to assure oil supplies to their economy, gave the assumption to start a debate among the EC member states on the need to shape a new approach towards the

¹⁴³ Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East, available in CVCE, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable_en.pdf, last consultation 12/02/2024.

¹⁴⁴ Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*, cit., pp. 361-362.

¹⁴⁵ M. E. Guasconi, *Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1970s: The Setting Up of the Euro-Arab Dialogue*, in «IRICE», vol. 1, no. 3, 2013, p. 164.

¹⁴⁶ French memorandum of 1975 cited in R. Miller, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention in the Middle East, 1974–1977*, in «Middle Eastern Studies», vol. 50, no. 6, 2014, p. 938.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

Mediterranean before the actually 1973 oil crisis¹⁴⁸. The EAD was first proposed by France in February 1974, approved by Community foreign ministers in March, formally instituted on 31 July 1974 in Paris, and formally launched in 1976, creating a comprehensive political framework for long-term regional cooperation between the EC Member States and the countries of the Middle East. As explained by Guasconi¹⁴⁹, the dialogue had two primary goals: first, the Europeans wanted to compensate their exclusion from the Middle East peace process by strengthening their influence in the area; second, they were interested in reducing their dependence on Middle Eastern oil by encouraging greater economic ties with the Arab world.

At the first meeting, both sides emphasised that security in Europe was linked to the security of the Mediterranean and Arab regions, recalling the historical, civilisational and geographical links between the two areas; the Middle East crisis was also discussed in detail, reaching the conclusion that the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people was imperative for a lasting and just solution¹⁵⁰. Nevertheless, the EPC was seen with scepticism by some Arab intellectual circles¹⁵¹, who thought the Community wanted to restrict the dialogue to economic issues and avoid an effective active role in the resolution of the conflict¹⁵². The approach of the EC on a “comprehensive solution” instead of a step-by-step approach was one of the reasons why Egyptian President Sadat signed the bilateral treaty Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978¹⁵³: the Arab League itself asked the EC to suspend the Dialogue in response to Egypt’s signing the treaty with Israel, which broke up the fragile unity among the Arab states.

¹⁴⁸ G. Garavini, F. Petrini, *Continuity or Change? The 1973 Oil Crisis Reconsidered*, in A. Varsori, G. Mignani, «Europe in the International Arena During the 1970s», Bruxelles, Peter Lang 2011, pp. 211-230.

¹⁴⁹ Guasconi, *Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1970s: The Setting Up of the Euro-Arab Dialogue*, cit., p. 169.

¹⁵⁰ R. Albinyana, F. Fernández, *From the Euro-Arab Dialogue to a Euro-Arab Summit: Revamping the EU-Arab Partnership*, in «European Institute of the Mediterranean – IEMed», 2018, available in <https://www.iemed.org/publication/from-the-euro-arab-dialogue-to-a-euro-arab-summit-revamping-the-eu-arab-partnership/>, last consultation 12/01/2024.

¹⁵¹ S. Hafez, *Edward Said’s Intellectual Legacy in the Arab World*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 33, No. 3, Spring 2004, pp. 76-90. To deepening see E. Said, *Orientalism*, New York, Vintage Books, 1979.

¹⁵² M. Al Sayed El Salim, *The European Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, in «Relations between the European Union and the Muslim World in Contemporary Geopolitical and Economic Scenario», Karachi, Area Study Centre for Europe, 2003, p.93.

¹⁵³ The Camp David Accords were agreements between Egypt and Israel, signed by the two governments on 17 September 1978 at the White House and witnessed by the President of the United States Carter, after twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David. The first framework – *A Framework for Peace in the Middle East* – which dealt with the Palestinian territories, was written without participation of the Palestinians, and for this reason was condemned by the United Nations. K. Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*, Abingdon, Taylor & Francis, 1999, pp. 228–229.

As analysed since now, European countries were directly implicated in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of their geographic proximity, their dependence on oil and security needs, as well as the historical role played by several of them in the region¹⁵⁴. However, it has never been simple to come to terms with the EC's Member States different perspectives on the Arab-Israeli issue: despite their common interest in finding a just and lasting solution to the conflict, MS' particular interests varied significantly, as seen by their several approaches to the Middle East peace process in the previous pages. It might be claimed that rather than policy convergence, policy coordination has often been achieved through congruence, or the right compatibility of Member State goals to support the formation of a single policy.

Notwithstanding, it was during that time that EC started discussing the idea of a homeland for Palestinians, not yet necessarily implying sovereign statehood: this position, together with the preference of the Community for a comprehensive peace agreement over a process based on bilateral negotiations, is made explicit in the 1977 London Statement¹⁵⁵:

The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned.

Regarding France, French policy in the Middle East has privileged France's relations with the Arab world, even if at the same time it has tried to maintain good relations with Israel. In the area, Paris has frequently advocated for an independent French policy, which has mostly meant pursuing a course of action distinct from that of the US¹⁵⁶: occasionally, this approach has even escalated hostilities with other EU members, since independent French actions in

¹⁵⁴ P. M. de la Gorce, *Europe and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A survey*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», Berkeley, vol. XXVI, No. 3, Spring 1997.

¹⁵⁵ *European Council Meeting, 29 and 30 June 1977 in London*, available in Consilium Europa https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20785/london_june_1977_eng_.pdf, last consultation 11/10/2024.

¹⁵⁶ Moerenhout, *EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 4, and Musu, *The EU and the Middle East peace process*, cit., p. 15.

the Middle East appear to have been undertaken without first consulting its European partners¹⁵⁷.

Despite its lengthy history of participation in the region, transatlantic connections are given far more importance on the British foreign policy agenda than Middle East policy: this indicates that Great Britain has a tendency to follow American lead in this area. In order to allow Europe to play an autonomous role in the peace process, London has been inclined to favour a policy that secures American approval and avoids direct confrontation with US policy¹⁵⁸; even so, despite the benevolent tendency, Great Britain joined France's approach to defend the idea of an EC-led peace process, focusing on the concept of an international peace conference¹⁵⁹.

Furthermore, the governments of some European nations, like Germany¹⁶⁰ and the Netherlands¹⁶¹, have been reluctant to critique Israeli policies due to the sensitive nature of their relationship with Israel. Under the pretext of seeking a common European stance, these countries have found advantageous the possibility of shifting national positions: this has allowed them to start a process of rapprochement with the Arab world, justifying it as an "unavoidable price" for pursuing the more important goal of unifying Europe while avoiding upsetting their own national public opinion.

To summarise,

it is fair to say that all EU Member States continue to have their own foreign policy agendas and to set their own priorities within these agendas with regard to their Middle East policy¹⁶².

¹⁵⁷ See for example President Chirac's trip to the Occupied Territories on 1996, in *Chirac Calls for a State For the Palestinians*, in «The New York Times», 25 October 1996, <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/25/world/chirac-calls-for-a-state-for-the-palestinians.html> (last consultation 09/01/2024) and in *Chirac demands a state for Palestine*, in «The Independent», 23 October 1996, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/chirac-demands-a-state-for-palestine-1359871.html> (last consultation 09/01/2024).

¹⁵⁸ *Europe and the Middle East: Perspectives for Engagement and Cooperation*, Gütersloh, Discussion Paper of the XI Kronberg Talks, January 23-25, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005, pp. 17-27.

¹⁵⁹ C. Musu, *European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 40.

¹⁶⁰ For an overview of German policies towards Israel, see P. Belkin, *Germany's relations with Israel: Background and implication for German Middle East Policy*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2007.

¹⁶¹ Moerenhout, *EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 4.

¹⁶² Musu, *The EU and the Middle East peace process*, cit., p. 16.

Regardless of this point, Moerenhout points out the fact that the oil crisis was in fact the crucial point for the EC to formulate a more coherent common position, showing that economics was from the very beginning an important and sometimes determinant factor in EU foreign policy making¹⁶³.

In December 1969 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EC's Member States were instructed to «study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement»¹⁶⁴. In turn, the Six Foreign Ministers instructed the Belgian Political Director, Davignon, to prepare a report which would serve as the basis for the future European Foreign Policy: the Hague Summit Declaration and the Davignon Report sanctioned the official birth of EPC¹⁶⁵, defining the initial structure of what more than twenty years later would become the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)¹⁶⁶. The reason behind the creation of EOC was «to pave the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission»¹⁶⁷. The activities of EPC were kept as separate as possible from those of the Commission and of the Parliament: this model of political cooperation basically «relied of the principle of official collegiality to build up the consensus in preparation for Foreign Ministers' intergovernmental decisions»¹⁶⁸.

The MS were rip in two different aspirations: on one hand responding to international crises by attempting to project in the international arena the combined political weight of all Community members through foreign policy coordination; on the other hand, maintaining national control over important foreign policy decisions that were thought to be within a State's exclusive jurisdiction¹⁶⁹. After The Hague Summit Communiqué, EPC progressively developed with the inclusion of new instruments of political cooperation¹⁷⁰: in this framework,

¹⁶³ Moerenhout, *EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 4.

¹⁶⁴ *The Hague Summit Declaration: Communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Member State of the European Community*, The Hague, 2 December 1969, Paragraph 15, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_hague_summit_2_december_1969-en-33078789-8030-49c8-b4e0-15d053834507.html, last consultation 09/01/2024.

¹⁶⁵ J. Pinder, *Prospects for Europe after the Summit*, in «The World Today», vol. 26, no. 1, 1970, pp. 5-18.

¹⁶⁶ Musu, *The EU and the Middle East peace process*, cit., p. 13. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) contributes to the EU's objectives of preserving peace, strengthening international security, promoting international cooperation, and developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. *Common Foreign and Security Policy*, in «European Commission», cit.

¹⁶⁷ *The Hague Summit Declaration: Communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Member State of the European Community*, cit., Paragraph 3.

¹⁶⁸ C. Hill, K.E. Smith, *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 75.

¹⁶⁹ Musu, *European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*, cit., p. 25.

¹⁷⁰ J. Pinder, *Prospects for Europe after the Summit*, cit., pp. 5-18.

the Middle East was often used by the MS as a “testing ground” for these instruments¹⁷¹. As we have seen in the previous pages, the first EPC ministerial meeting took place in November 1970, in Munich, and the necessity to harmonise the Six’s policy towards the Middle East was one of the major topics discussed. At the time of the meeting, though, the MS’ positions were still too divergent and distant from each other to reach an agreement over a common public position: what is interesting here, however, is the fact that

since that first meeting in Munich, the Middle East conflict has been an almost permanent feature of EPC discussions, regardless of the very limited success obtained by the EC in dealing with the matter. It can be said that certain principles of today’s European Union Middle East policy took shape as far back as in the first years of EPC, and particularly between 1970 and 1980¹⁷².

In the period leading up to the 1980 we can see a continuation of the initial factors influencing EC policy: a difficult relationship with the US (that found difficult to accept another international player on the scene), a problematic understanding with Israel, the Community which was majorly focusing on the economy (especially for the oil crisis), and the defending of Palestinians’ right to self-determining. The Community also moved beyond, getting involved with political structure and not merely focusing on economic one:

the focus on political structures is made clear in the Venice Declaration that defends a homeland for Palestinians and the inclusion in negotiation of the PLO, at that time regarded as a terrorist organisation by many, including the United States¹⁷³.

Furthermore, the adoption by the European Community of the Venice Declaration in 1980 favoured a role which was independent from the US and their Camp David Accords¹⁷⁴: those accords were signed in 1978 by US President Carter, Egyptian President Sadat, and Israeli

¹⁷¹ R. A. Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 54.

¹⁷² Musu, *The EU and the Middle East peace process*, cit., p. 14.

¹⁷³ Moerenhout, *EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 5.

¹⁷⁴ Greilsammer, Weiler, *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours*, cit., p. 286.

Prime Minister Begin, and they meant to establish a historic peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979¹⁷⁵. The EU had not been involved at all, being now effectively pushed to support the US-led peace process, since any Franco-British efforts to a European-led peace process were received with strong opposition by both US and Israel¹⁷⁶.

In 1980, the Community adopted the Venice Declaration, which represent a key point in the development of European foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian question. The main points of the Declaration were: (1) endorsement of UN resolutions 242 and 338; (2) recognition of the legitimate rights included the support for Palestinian self-determination; (3) the involvement of the PLO in the peace negotiations, also (4) condemning the settlement policy of Israel as violating international law, which was considered a «serious obstacle» to the peace process; finally (5) renunciation of the use of force by all the parties concerned¹⁷⁷:

3. [...] the nine countries of the community base themselves on (UN) Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 10 September 1970, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish minister of foreign affairs at the 34th UN General Assembly.

4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region,

¹⁷⁵ *Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*, Milestones: 1977-1980, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david#:~:text=The%20Camp%20David%20Accords%2C%20signed,and%20Egypt%20in%20March%201979>, last consultation 11/01/2024. Furthermore, «the successful conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty represented the high-water mark for the Peace Process during the Carter Presidency. After March 1979, the issue would not receive the same level of U.S. attention due to the competing demands of crises, especially those in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as Carter's desire to reduce his personal involvement in the next round of negotiations devoted to Palestinian autonomy. For those talks, Carter appointed a "special negotiator" to represent the United States; former Special Trade Representative Robert Strauss served in this role briefly before being replaced in the fall of 1979 by Sol Linowitz, who had previously helped negotiate the Panama Canal treaty. The talks failed to produce much as Palestinian representatives refused to participate, and the gap between Egyptian and Israeli positions on Palestinian self-government, not to mention their respective stances on Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and the legal status of East Jerusalem, proved unbridgeable».

¹⁷⁶ Musu, *European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*, cit., pp. 37-30.

¹⁷⁷ *Venice Declaration*, Declaration of the European Council on the Middle East of June 13, 1980, available in EEAS – European Union https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf, last consultation 11/01/2024.

including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

[...]

7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus to the Palestinian people, and to the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.

[...]

9. The nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

Under pressure from the US, the Declaration's contents were actually modified, but Israel's reaction was still very negative¹⁷⁸, with an embitterment of Israel consideration towards European involvement and the increasing of the already existing distrust¹⁷⁹. Until 1979 the EC avoided to mention the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinian people, changing

¹⁷⁸ S. Z. Von Dosenrode-Lynge, *The European Union and the Middle East*, London, Sheffield Academic Press, 2002, pp. 96-98. Prime Minister Begin also compared the Venice Declaration to Hitler's "Mein Kampf": «Since "Mein Kampf" was written, no words were ever more explicit for all the world to hear – Europe included – on the striving to destroy the Jewish state and nation», cit. in W. Claiborne, *Israel Condemns West Europeans' Stance on Mideast*, in «The Washington Post», June 16, 1980, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/16/israel-condemns-west-europeans-stance-on-mideast/3a58a209-635c-4d7f-9c26-3918c2e1228d/> last consultation 11/10/2024.

¹⁷⁹ In the Israeli media, Pardo and Peters demonstrate for example that despite the excellent commercial relations between Europe and Israel, the EU is often perceived as hostile, still presented as a marginal economic power with an "anti-Jewish" tendency. S. Pardo, J. Peters, *Uneasy Neighbour: Israel and the European Union*, Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2010. p. 87.

this with in the Venice Declaration, considering vital to associate PLO with the negotiations: according to Khader, this represented «probably the major shift in EEC policy with regard to the Palestinian question»¹⁸⁰.

To review, from the Venice Declaration of 1980 the guidelines of Europe's policy have been, in fact, constant: the centrality of the Palestinian question, the necessity of achieving a two-state solution, the importance attached to UN resolutions and to the principles of international law and the insistence on the need for all the relevant issues to be taken on simultaneously through the convening of an international peace conference where regional actors could meet in a multilateral framework. Finally, these principles (particularly the centrality of the Palestinian question and the goal of achieving a two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute) were embraced only years later by Israel and the United States, and it was only in 1991 that the first international conference on the Middle East peace process was gathered in Madrid. However, early on, it also became evident what the boundaries of coherence in European policy were, how different Member States' positions contrasted with one another, and the serious tensions that the development of a European autonomous stance in the Middle East created between Europe and the United States.

¹⁸⁰ Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 341.

CHAPTER 3 – Rethinking the peace process: limits and solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian issue

3.1 The Eighties: historical analysis of the comeback of an incoherent and inconsistent European Community policy

We have seen that the European Community reacted to the suspension of the Euro-Arab Dialogue by releasing the Venice Declaration, which established a united European position and continues also nowadays to serve as the basis of European policy to deal on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. As expected, the Venice Declaration was denounced by Israel as to be equal to «another Munich» and as something which «deals with a terrorist organisation [referring to PLO]»¹⁸¹. Furthermore, it also became a source of friction between the US and Europe, since the Declaration had emphasised the centrality of the Palestinians' plight and sort of downgraded the importance of the Camp David Accords: «to American eyes, Europe was ingratiating itself with the Arab world for the sake of oil and its claim to be a helpful and fair-minded partner in the peace process was unconvincing»¹⁸². Despite this, the PLO accepted the declaration, but with some reservations: it wanted to be officially recognised as the representative of the Palestinian people by the EC; meanwhile, the rest of the Arab countries considered the Declaration as a first step in the right direction.

However, the period after this landmark policy instrument was one of returning to the earlier tradition of pursuing individual national policies, leading to an incoherence and inconsistency among European members¹⁸³: the EC adopted a passive position by affirming – mainly – the US to resolve the conflict, reverting to bilateralism in its Member States' relations with the Middle East. This was the result not only of the US and Israeli opposition of the policies and stances adopted in the previous years, but also because of the chaotic developments taking place in the period, due to a number of reasons which are going to be further examined: the first reason was the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, the latter which blocked most peace initiatives and, for this behaviour, condemned by the EC¹⁸⁴; also, the Middle East experienced one violent conflict after another (such as the Iran-Iraq wars) and the US

¹⁸¹ R. Hollis, *Europe and the Middle East: power by stealth?*, in «International Affairs», Oxford, vol. 73, no. 1, January 1997, p. 18.

¹⁸² S. Noor, *European Union and the Middle East: A Historical Analysis*, in «Pakistan Horizon», vol. 57, no. 1, 2004, p. 32.

¹⁸³ Moerenhout, *EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 5.

¹⁸⁴ Dosenrode-Lynge, *The European Union and the Middle East*, cit., pp. 96-98.

– from 1981 to 1989 under the Reagan administration – did not accept any European interference since the policy environment was not optimal for European initiatives¹⁸⁵. The second reason was the election of Mitterrand in France: since the new President adopted a pro-Israel stance, the position of France subsequently became «unclear, uncertain, and inconsistent»¹⁸⁶. Thirdly, the EC tried to bring back the Euro-Arab Dialogue: while the US administration protested this revival, the Arab countries tried to use it for political means. The EC only aspired to play an economic role and to ensure a secure supply of energy – even if due to the increase in the world oil supply, Europe was able to reduce some of its reliance on Arab oil – and was therefore trapped between the US and Arab states¹⁸⁷. In summary

the 1980s led to the downplaying of the role of the EU as an international actor in the region. Israel distrusted the EC, the US saw it as a difficult and disappointing ally and the Arab states considered it an unreliable partner¹⁸⁸.

We are now going to look at these arguments in more detail. Firstly, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon opened a new phase in the conflict: when the Israeli soldiers invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982, a strong condemnation by the EC was invoked, which also called for immediate withdrawal of troops. As a consequent, the EC imposed an arms embargo on Israel and delayed implementation of the EC-Israel Financial Protocol¹⁸⁹. The invasion was in fact triggered by an attack on British soil: in June 1982 the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO)¹⁹⁰ – also known as Fatah Revolutionary Council – attempted to assassinate the

¹⁸⁵ *Ivi*, p. 100.

¹⁸⁶ Greilsammer, Weiler, *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours*, cit., p. 288.

¹⁸⁷ Musu, *European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*, cit., pp. 40-44.

¹⁸⁸ Moerenhout, *EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 5.

¹⁸⁹ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Implementation of the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade related matters between the European Community and Israel*, Brussels, 1998 in Archive of European Integration, <https://aei.pitt.edu/3345/1/3345.pdf>, last consultation 17/01/2024.

¹⁹⁰ The ANO was a Palestinian militant group founded by Abu Nidal in 1974. It broke away from the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah, a Palestinian nationalist and social-democratic party, a faction within the PLO, following the emergence of a rift between Abu Nidal and Yasser Arafat. The ANO was designated as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the United States (*Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Country Reports on Terrorism 2013*, in U.S. Department of State, 2014, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm>, last consultation 17/01/2024), the United Kingdom (*Terrorism Act 2000, Schedule 2, Act No. 11 of 2000*, in Legislation Government UK, 2000, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/2>, last consultation 17/01/2024), Canada (*Currently listed entities*, in Public Safety Canada, 2018, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#2>, last consultation 17/01/2024), the European Union (*Notice for the attention of Abu Nidal Organisation 'ANO' — (a.k.a. 'Fatah Revolutionary Council', a.k.a. 'Arab Revolutionary Brigades', a.k.a. 'Black September', a.k.a.*

Israel's ambassador in the United Kingdom. Though Abu Nidal was a group violently opposed to PLO, and though PLO itself had observed a year-long cease-fire with Israel, Israeli government took the assassination attempt as grounds for war against PLO in Lebanon¹⁹¹: Israel's Prime Minister Begin had ambitious plan to reshape the Middle East by driving the PLO and Syria out of Lebanon¹⁹², so he take advantage of this situation to go ahead with his plan. He believed that the Christians in Lebanon would have been a natural ally for the Jewish state, believing that Israel could easily secure treaty with Lebanon if both the PLO and Syria were driven from the country: in his plan, peace with Lebanon, following the peace with Egypt, would isolate Syria and leave Israel to freely move in the annexation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank, occupied by Israeli forces in the 1967 Six-Day War. The major problem was that the new Likud government¹⁹³ was determined to integrate those territories in the West Bank, but without absorbing its native Arab population: West Bank was considered to be referring to the Biblical territories of Judea and Samaria, and the solution was found into driving

the Palestinians out of the West Bank and to encourage them to fulfil their national aspirations by overthrowing King Hussein and taking over Jordan, a country whose population was already 60 percent Palestinian. This represented what Sharon [Israeli Minister of Defence] liked to call "Jordan Option"¹⁹⁴.

Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims included on the list provided for in Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, in «Official Journal of the European Union», 2011, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52011XG0624\(01\)&rid=1](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52011XG0624(01)&rid=1), last consultation 17/01/2024), and Japan (*Implementation of the Measures including the Freezing of Assets against Terrorist and the Like*, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 2013, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/7/0705.html>, last consultation 17/01/2024). However, it was backed by Iraq from 1974 to 1983, by Syria from 1983 to 1987, and by Libya from 1987 to 1997. S. Sloan, S. K. Anderson, *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, Scarecrow Press, 2009, p. 186.

¹⁹¹ The PLO's presence in Lebanon goes back to the late 1960s, following the 1967 Six-Day War.

¹⁹² S. Ryan, *Israel's Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 11/12, 1982, pp. 23–37.

¹⁹³ Likud is a right-wing political party of Israel; it was founded in 1973 by Begin and Sharon. In May 1977 Begin led the Likud Party to victory, devastating the Labour Party's monopoly of government since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. Under Begin's leadership, the Likud Party was committed to establishing Jewish settlements to retain the Arab territories that Israel occupied in the June 1967. E. Karsh, *Israel: The First Hundred Years: Politics and Society since 1948*, vol. 3, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 141.

¹⁹⁴ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 520. On Sharon's plans for the restructuring of the Middle East, see Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, cit., pp. 395-400.

These were ambitious plans, achievable only by military means and a «cold indifference to human life»¹⁹⁵: over the ten weeks of invasion, UN figured more than 17.000 Lebanese and Palestinian were killed and 30.000 wounded by the Israeli occupation, the majority of which were civilians¹⁹⁶. By this way, the residents of Beirut became the helpless victims of the conflict between Israel, the Palestinians, and the Syrians; furthermore, the Israelis targeted the PLO, forcing its leadership into exile, hoping to decapitate the movement by killing its head, Arafat, who was forced to change residence daily to avoid assassination¹⁹⁷.

The war's violence reached its highest in August 1982, and Begin relented only after intense US pressure: the Reagan administration arranged a cease-fire agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, under which PLO fighters would evacuate Beirut by sea under the supervision of a multinational force made up of US, French, and Italian forces. The leaving Palestinian fighters were to be spread among many Arab nations, including Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan, Algeria, and Tunisia, where PLO set up its new headquarters. Moreover, Arafat was the last to evacuate on August 30, essentially ending the siege of Beirut, and his departure signalled the end of the PLO as a cohesive combat force¹⁹⁸. One of the primary responsibilities of the multinational force was the protection of families of Palestinian combatants who were forced to flee Lebanon, but after the final force contingent departed in September, nobody remained to defend the Palestinian refugee camps from their numerous opponents.

Secondly, it was already mentioned in chapter 1 how significant the election of the President Mitterrand was for France in the production of a huge change toward the French Middle East policy. Until then, France was adopting a Gaullist vision, and with Gaullism the Palestinian issue went through several phases: first of all, the Palestinian problem *per se* was avoided until May 1967 when, on the eve of the June war, de Gaulle raised it in political terms for the first time. Having finally dealt with its colonial past extricating the Algerian problem giving independence, France was able to reapproach with the Arab world, and the outbreak of the Six-Day War gave the opportunity to clarify its position, and especially General de Gaulle's one. On the press conference of the 27 November 1967, he denounced the «scandalous fate of the refugees in Jordan», observing that «the Israeli occupation of the territories it

¹⁹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹⁶ *Yearbook of the United Nations 1982 (excerpts II)*, in United Nations – The question of Palestine, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-195619/>, last consultation 17/01/2024.

¹⁹⁷ L. Mikdadi, *Surviving the Siege of Beirut: A Personal Account*, London, Onyx Press, 1983, pp. 107-108.

¹⁹⁸ Y. Sayigh, *Palestinian Armed Struggle: Means and Ends*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 16, no. 1, 1986, pp. 95–112.

captured cannot continue without oppression, repression, expulsions, nor without the emergence over time of a resistance it will then label as terrorism»¹⁹⁹. Furthermore, in the same press conference, de Gaulle came close to putting the establishment of the state of Israel in a colonial context when he alluded to its «implementation»²⁰⁰. In order to strengthen the position of Europe in the region and to help the neighbours Arab states to reach a level of development that would be sufficient to calm Israel's expansionist behaviour, de Gaulle attempted to stabilise the situation: however, the result of the 1967 war made such scenario impossible to realise.

When Pompidou became French President in 1969, he continued de Gaulle's foreign policy approach, which was primarily designed to maintain French independence in foreign affairs. At his first Elysée press conference on 10 July 1969, Pompidou reaffirmed France's Middle East policy²⁰¹:

France owes it to herself to defend her moral and material interests, which are considerable and diverse in the entire Mediterranean region; particularly important are her longstanding and renewed ties with the Arab states. Our policy is, and has always been, to counsel prudence whenever possible, and then to try to promote or assist in promoting a solution which would allow the state of Israel to exist peacefully within secure and recognised borders, while at the same time revolving the human and political problems posed by the existence and withs of the Palestinian people.

Whether conservative or progressive, whether pro-Soviet or pro-American, the Arab League recognised that France was the only supportive power in the Security Council²⁰² and that it could push for a European policy favourable to them. Moreover, also President d'Estaing demonstrated his desire to continue the Gaullist policies of his predecessors, supporting the

¹⁹⁹ Press conference of Charles de Gaulle, Paris, Palais de l'Elysée, 27 November 1967, <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00139/conference-de-presse-du-27-novembre-1967.html>, last consultation 18/01/2024.

²⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

²⁰¹ Press conference of Georges Pompidou, Paris, Palais de l'Elysée, 10 July 1969, <https://www.georges-pompidou.org/portail-archives/conference-presse-10-juillet-1969-au-palais-elysee>, last consultation 18/01/2024.

²⁰² In July 1973, the French delegate to the Security Council took this position: «Beyond the humanitarian aspect of the problem, which UNRWA is concerned with, the political aspect of the refugee problem has reached such a point over the past few years that no solution can ignore the Palestinian people». Rondot, *France and Palestine: From Charles de Gaulle to Francois Mitterrand*, cit., p. 91.

concept of the necessity of a homeland for Palestinians. Furthermore, as a natural consequence of French position, the French government authorised the PLO to open an information office in Paris: by this action, French recognition of the PLO was not official, yet the opening of this office constituted a key step, especially since it was an important message for the other European countries with reticent positions. The definition of the “Palestinian homeland” concept was never specified by President d’Estaing, which avoided the issue declaring that «France cannot determine the nature of a Palestinian homeland [...]. It is up to the Palestinians to decide what ties they will have with other countries in the region»²⁰³.

Ever since de Gaulle presidency, not many Israelis considered France a “friendly” country; nonetheless, even if France in those years had repeatedly pushed for the return of the 1967 occupied territories, according to Rondot it had done in «too vague terms – referring to the Palestinians’ “legitimate rights”, in particular that of a “homeland” – and totally avoiding any mention of what those terms entailed»²⁰⁴. Despite that, France’s position had a great impact within the EC: West Germany, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy, and Ireland followed the French lead, which was playing a crucial role to make Europe’s voice heard. The aim to success this was to counterpower American diplomacy, which with the Camp David Accords had opted for bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt instead of a comprehensive peace process solution involving all parties to the conflict: in short, the European countries wanted the PLO and Israel to sit face to face, an unable solution since both parties did not even want to hear about²⁰⁵.

Mitterrand’s election as President in 1981 significantly altered French policy, especially given Mitterrand’s expressed sympathy for the Israeli Labour party: the early stages Middle East’s policy adopted by the new President could be described by desiring to humour Israel while keeping open the channel for dialogue with the Palestinians²⁰⁶. Nonetheless, it was during Mitterrand presidency that France adopted a more balanced policy in the region, which was seen as favouring Israel. In fact, to Mitterrand was soon given the opportunity to demonstrate his approach in the Middle East, since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon showed even more the evolution in relations between Israel, France, and the PLO: strongly condemned by France, the war gave Mitterrand the chance to express his support for a solution which took into account the Palestinians’ desire for a state, while maintaining the security of Israel,

²⁰³ *Ivi*, p. 93.

²⁰⁴ *Ivi*, p. 94.

²⁰⁵ *Ivi*, p. 95.

²⁰⁶ *Ivi*, p. 96.

which needed to be recognised by the PLO²⁰⁷. He went farther than his predecessor in recognising the Palestinians' right to establish a state instead of just a homeland. Despite that, in line with Filiu thoughts, France's eclipse was due to its repeated demonstrations of loyalty to the US: in sharp contrast to his predecessors, Mitterrand had never challenged US' power and, in fact, had always followed the cooperation with Washington in the Middle East situation²⁰⁸; moreover, he was responsible for suspending implementation of the EC's Venice Declaration and prevented any European initiatives that risked undermining US goals and leading role in the region: «France was no longer in the position to change the rules of the international game, preferring to adopt a just-passive-supporting position of US policy»²⁰⁹. But Mitterrand also went out of his way to take into full consideration the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle: he declared many times that the PLO fighters deserved dignity²¹⁰. Eventually, all French initiatives in support of the Palestinian cause – from General de Gaulle to President Mitterrand – reveal a certain continuity: France gradually come to accept the idea of a Palestinian state which would be the culmination of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and even if there was no well-formed idea about what shape this entity should take, it was believed that it cannot emerged without Arab consensus and Jordanian participation.

Thirdly, and finally, it was analysed how the activity of the Euro-Arab Dialogue was suspended in 1979 upon request of the Arab League as a respond to the bilateral Camp David Agreements, after only four sessions of the General Committee. With the Venice Declaration in June 1980, the EC decided that it was time to work on the political aspects of the EAD, organising a preparatory meeting for the Committee in Athens in December 1983: Egypt's absence due to its suspension from all the activity of the Arab League²¹¹ was enough to prevent full resumption of activity. Following Egypt's return, there was a further attempt to relaunch the Dialogue in December 1989: once again, it was France that led initiative of a

²⁰⁷ D. Moisi, *La France de Mitterrand et le conflit de Proche-Orient: Comment concilier emotion et politique?*, in «Revue Politique Etrangere», no. 2, 1982.

²⁰⁸ Filiu, *François Mitterrand and the Palestinians: 1956–95*, cit., p. 39.

²⁰⁹ *Ibidem*.

²¹⁰ *Ivi*, p. 40.

²¹¹ As already mentioned, the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace deal significantly undermined the EAD framework: no Egyptian representatives attended the fourth EAD General Committee in Damascus in December 1978, and on 31 March 1979, the Arab League members (including a Palestinian delegation) ejected Egypt from the League for signing a separate peace with Israel. In 1987, Arab League states restored diplomacy relations with Egypt, readmitted to the League in May 1989. Miller, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention in the Middle East, 1974–1977*, cit., p. 954.

Euro-Arab Ministerial Conference, convened in Paris for the following year; unfortunately, the Gulf Crisis²¹² and the following Arab splits blocked the Dialogue in the meantime.

The Eighties showed the weak points of the European policy: even though there was a common position toward the war in Lebanon, it only emerged after long discussions among the Member States²¹³. The lack of concrete practical implementation efforts following the Venice Declaration was the primary cause of the consistency issues that emerged during the Eighties, rather than a sort of US's strategy to lead the process putting aside the Community, point that remained essentially unchanged throughout the years. Furthermore, the absence of political progress towards Palestinian cause eventually led to the First Intifada²¹⁴, which, according to Moerenhout, was «indirectly, partially caused by the EC not translating its rhetoric in actual foreign policy in the ground»²¹⁵. The rhetoric of the Venice Declaration contrasted sharply with the realities on the ground, as the EC later returned to securing its own economic interests and encouraging economic integration in the Israeli economy²¹⁶. After the release of the Venice Declaration, Palestinian citizens, society, and political players may have hoped for a shift, but this expectation was disappointed when the Community's rhetoric failed to translate into actual state-building assistance actions.

3.2 Toward the Oslo era: the Madrid Conference and the 1993's Oslo Accords

The Iraqi invasion of the Kuwait in August 1990 ended to be a turning point in the deal with the Palestinian-Israeli situation, since the American-led war to liberate Kuwait had the

²¹² On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded neighbouring Kuwait, fully occupying the country within two days. The armed conflict was between Iraq and a coalition led by US, which closed the campaign with the Liberation of Kuwait on 28 February 1991. The country coalition had 42 country and some of them were: US, GB, France, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

²¹³ Greilsammer, Weiler, *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours*, cit., p. 289.

²¹⁴ Literally "The First Uprising", was a sustained series of protests, civil disobedience and riots carried out by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. It was motivated by collective Palestinian frustration over Israel's military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip began with the 1967 War. the uprising lasted from December 1987 until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.

²¹⁵ Moerenhout, *EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, cit., p. 5.

²¹⁶ C. du Plessix, *The European Union and Israel: A lasting and ambiguous "special" relationship*, in «Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem», 2011, <https://journals.openedition.org/bcrfj/6675>, last consultation 06/02/2024. As explained in du Plessix's paper, the EU is one of the prime commercial partners of Israel, with commercial exchange volume that reached 20.2 billion Euros in 2009, having one of the most advanced status among the non-member States regarding its contractual relations with the EU: even though Israel does not belong to the European Economic Area (EEA), as Norway, and is not located on the European continent, as Switzerland – that is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) together with Norway, Island, and Liechtenstein –, it is particularly well integrated in the European market as well as in certain number of European programs. For a discussion on the different Israeli options toward the EU see A. Tovias, *Mapping Israel's Policy Options Regarding Its Future Institutionalised Relations with The European Union*, in «Centre for European Policy Studies», working paper no. 3, January 2003.

unintended consequence of forcing United States – once again, similar for the 1973 oil weapon – to address the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Differently from the 1973, this time the American government recognised that the Kuwait crisis had placed its Arab allies (like Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) under a huge pressure: this increased the already existing crack among the Arab states, since Saddam Hussein's frequent references to liberate Palestine had deepened him the popular support across the Arab world, exposing governments of Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to public condemnation²¹⁷ for not supporting him and allying with US position. In fact, citizens thought that they should be fighting Israel to liberate Palestine all together, not fighting «against Iraq on American's behalf to liberate Kuwait wealth and oil»²¹⁸. Furthermore, the American «double standard in treatment of Iraq and Israel as occupiers was self-evident»²¹⁹, since it was giving support to Israel when the latter was still occupying the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and part of southern Lebanon, considering the UN resolutions unavoidable but doing nothing to restore the occupied lands; yet, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the same US invoked UN Security Council resolutions as inalienable.

Despite that, when the conflict ended in 1991, the Bush administration announced a new Arab-Israeli peace initiative: nevertheless, the Palestinian support on Saddam Hussein cost them a lot, with the exclusion of the PLO from the international community, with the addition of finding itself in a weak financial position²²⁰. Nevertheless, the American initiative came as a surprise since, even with US' well-known position toward the Palestinian-Israeli issue, Bush Sr. made the following policy statement: «A comprehensive peace must be grounded in resolution 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace»²²¹, and Bush's secretary of state declaring Israeli settlements in the West Bank the «greatest obstacle to peace»²²².

²¹⁷ S. Nusseibeh, *Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life*, London, Halban, 2007, p. 342.

²¹⁸ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., pag. 583.

²¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²²⁰ The Palestinian movement faced imminent financial and institutional collapse in 1993: the oil states of the Gulf had cut off all financial support to the PLO in retribution for Arafat's support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf crisis, so by December 1991 the PLO's budget had been cut in half. Thousand of fighters and employees went months without pay, and by March 1993 one-third of all PLO staff received no pay at all. The financial crisis led to charges of corruption and maladministration that split PLO ranks, risking no longer survive the pressure being a government in exile: a peace deal with Israel stood the chance of opening new sources of financial support. Y. Sayer, *Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 656-658.

²²¹ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush*, March 6, 1991, in US Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-doc-pg218-3.htm>, last consultation 23/01/2024.

²²² *James Baker's Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians*, October 18, 1991, in United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/letter_of_assurance.pdf, last consultation 23/01/2024.

Some Palestinians were more sceptical of American intentions²²³, since the first thing the Americans made clear was that the PLO would not be permitted to participate in any way in the negotiations, after its support to Saddam Hussein and Israeli government refusing to attend any meeting with the PLO:

I am looking for Palestinians from the Occupied Territories who are not PLO members and who are willing to enter into direct bilateral two-phased negotiations on the basis of UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace, and who are willing to live in peace with Israel²²⁴.

Only a few Palestinian activists replied to US, since the Palestinians saw Baker's initiative as an attempt to create an alternative Palestinian leadership: they did not want to undermine in any way the PLO's internationally recognised position as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. One of those activists was Shafi²²⁵, who replied that there would be no peace process if the Israeli settlements activities would continue in the Occupied Territories.

The agenda of the Madrid Conference was framed by six months of negotiations between the Americans and the Palestinians, with the Americans moving between the Israelis and the Palestinians trying to bridge nearly irreconcilable positions to ensure a successful conference. During this period of negotiations, the Israeli government proved to be a greater impediment to American peace plans than the Palestinians, since it was stepping up its settlement activity both to extend its claim to West Bank territory and to provide new houses

²²³ Hanan Ashrawi, a leading Palestinian political activists and professor at Bir Zeit University, dissected the language of Bush's statement, claiming that «Bush would "invest the credibility that the United States had gained in the war in order to bring peace to the region". We read that as claiming the spoils of war». By that, Ashrawi saw the whole peace initiative as an American effort to subordinate the Middle East to its rules. «The claim was that a New World Order was emerging with the end of the Cold War and that we [Palestinians] were part of it. We read that as a reorganisation of our world according to the American blueprint. The claim was that a window of opportunity was opening up for a Middle East reconciliation. We read that as a peephole, a long tunnel, or a trap». H. Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, New York, Simon&Schuster, 1995, p. 75.

²²⁴ Bush's secretary of state Baker declaration cited in Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 585.

²²⁵ Haidar Abdel Shafi was a physician and president of the Gaza Medical Association and senior statesman in the Occupied Territories, served as speaker of the Palestinian parliament while Gaza was under Egyptian rule, from 1948 to 1967.

for the new immigrants which were coming²²⁶. The Bush administration showed sympathy for the Palestinian position, and it was clearly bothered by the intransigence of the Israeli government's demands, with the addition that, with the end of the Cold War, Israel's value as a "strategic asset" to the US was obviously eroded, pushing America towards a less intransigent position²²⁷: nevertheless, in many other ways, the US continued to privilege Israeli demands over Palestinian arguments, like indulging on the exclusion of the PLO from the process. This meant that some of the most influential Palestinians were banned from an official role in the Madrid negotiations, even if their presence was still present in the official Palestinian delegation guided by Shafi and, for example, in his speech which was drafted by Ashrawi²²⁸:

From Madrid we launch this quest for peace, a quest to place the sanctity of human life at the centre of our world and to redirect our energies and resources from the pursuit of mutual destruction to the pursuit of joint prosperity, progress, and happiness. [...] We are here together seeking a just and lasting peace whose cornerstone is freedom for Palestine, justice for the Palestinians, and an end to the occupation of all Palestinian and Arab lands. Only then can we really enjoy together the fruits of peace: prosperity, security and human dignity and freedom.

In the end, after four years of Intifada, all Palestinians wanted, expected, and demanded to see some concrete results for their years of struggle and sacrifice, and PLO expressed a distinct interest in engaging negotiations, recognising the necessity for concrete progress and resolution²²⁹.

With the conclusion of the Madrid Conference, a new phase of the peace negotiations was opened under American umbrella, which engage bilateral negotiations to resolve the differences between Israel and its Arab neighbours: though eventually unsuccessful, the Madrid Conference initiated the most extensive peace negotiations that the Arab-Israeli

²²⁶ With the end of the Cold War, Soviet Jews enjoyed the liberty to emigrate to Israel, and the Israeli government was determined to reserve its options on all the land under its control to accommodate the new wave of immigrants. Regan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 586.

²²⁷ S. Hassan, *Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine*, in «Social Scientist», vol. 39, no. 7/8, July-August 2011, p. 67.

²²⁸ The full text of Haidar Abdul Shafi's speech is reproduced on the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre website, <http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=345>, last consultation 24/01/2024.

²²⁹ B. Rubin, J. C. Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: A political Biography*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.

question ever had in over forty years of conflict. The bilateral negotiations were intended to resolve the issue by returning occupied land in exchange for peace, in line with UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338: the divergent ways in which the Arab states (such as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan) and Israelis interpreted those resolutions²³⁰ unable negotiations from the beginning. Furthermore, some political changes in 1992 led to some switches in the peace process: firstly, the Israeli election that brought Rabin, of the Labour Party, to power; secondly, Clinton defeating Bush Jr. in American presidential elections.

During his electoral campaign, Clinton had made clear his unconditional support for Israel, so the Arab team was concerned the negotiations proceed. Although, the breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations came from the change in Israeli policy: Rabin's reputation was as a man who had authorised physical violence against Intifada demonstrators²³¹, and, by this, it was giving to Palestinians little grounds for confidence of a peacemaker²³². Israel required a little more time to reach the point of willingness in the recognition of PLO and in the consideration of a compromise solution with it. Furthermore, it had been time since Israeli society and polity had been divided over the future of the Occupied Territories: the Labour Party government advocated "Land for Peace" in relation to its Arab neighbours, but explicitly rejected both the PLO and the idea of a Palestinian state, while the right-wing governments led by Likud sought to plant settlers in the Occupied Territories, often motivated by religious and nationalist reasons, aligning with Zionist aspirations²³³. Yet, from 1967 to early 1990 there was a gradual shift in public opinion in the direction of willingness to compromise over the OT, and, eventually, to accept the idea of a Palestinian state²³⁴: the argument that Israel could not maintain an occupation and deny rights to over three-and-a-half million Palestinians, expecting them to just accept the situation quietly and indefinitely,

²³⁰ The Arab states seized on the principle of the «inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war» set out in the preamble of the resolution to argue for a full Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territory occupied in the June 1967 War as a prerequisite for peace. The Israelis, in contrast, claimed that the resolution only required «withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied» in the 1967 War – not *all* territories, just "territories" – and insisted they had already fulfilled their commitments to Resolution 242 by withdrawing from the Sinai Peninsula following the peace treaty with Egypt. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 590.

²³¹ E. Inbar, *Israel's Small War: The Military Response to the "Intifada"*, in «Armed Forces & Society», vol. 18, no. 1, Fall 1991, pp. 29-50, and S. Hammad, *Stories from the first Intifada: "They broke my bones"*, in «Aljazeera», 10 December 2017.

²³² Asharawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, cit., p. 212.

²³³ Hassan, *Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine*, p. 66.

²³⁴ A graph of public opinion in G. Golan, *Israel and Palestinian Statehood*, in «Global Convulsions: Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century, New York, Winston Van Horn, 1997, pp. 169-188, indicated a gradual shift with a sharp "jump" in the direction of the idea of a Palestinian state at the time of the Intifada. Whereas prior to its outbreak a majority of Israelis preferred the "status quo" with regard to the Occupied Territories, this percentage subsequently dropped significantly. Many in Israel had come to realisation during the Intifada that the policy of "status quo" was not sustainable and that the situation created by uprising was putting too great a strain on Israeli economy.

was gaining greater reliability; in fact, the OT were now becoming a threat to Israelis' personal security rather than just to Israel's security²³⁵. The public reaction to the first Intifada and the Gulf War led Israeli politicians – including Rabin – to be tired by the non-stop dispute: as a result, Israel's national power was eroding and necessitated a different approach in peace negotiations²³⁶.

Rabin government was thus convinced that an agreement with the Palestinians was in Israel's national interest, recognising that a settlement could only be reached through direct negotiations with the PLO: for instance, Israeli government gave authorisation to two Israeli academics to meet in secret with the PLO treasures in Oslo, marking the beginning of what would become later an intense and fruitful negotiation, conducted in fourteen meetings under the auspices of the Norwegian foreign ministry²³⁷. In eight months, and in total secrecy, Palestinians and Israelis discussed their differences and secured their governments' backing for a framework to resolve them: yet, by August 1993, the two sides had concluded an agreement they were willing to make public. The Clinton administration was puzzled to see the Norwegians succeed where the Americans had failure: plus, in Israel the opposition of the Likud Party accused the Rabin government of betrayal, meanwhile in the Arab world strong criticism were made to PLO for having concluded a secret deal with Israelis, and Palestinians dissident groups condemned their leadership for extending recognition to Israel and for having agreed to what was effectively a partition plan for Palestine.

We have examined since now how many factors and events played significant roles, but, according to Hassan²³⁸, it was the Intifada of December 1987 the decisive influence in the direction that finally brought the Oslo Accords of 1993. The first Intifada was launched at an initiative of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (and not the PLO leadership based at Tunis), and this underline that the same PLO was in a weakened position in 1993²³⁹, as a result of the shift in the Palestinian political position, which was now being shaped by the local Palestinians, and especially by Hamas, one of the Palestinian Islamist movement

²³⁵ G. Golan, *Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans from Oslo to Disengagement*, New York, Markus Wiener, 2007, p. 10.

²³⁶ H. Kelman, *The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How can we overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution*, in «Political Psychology», vol. 8, no. 3, September 1987, pp. 347-363.

²³⁷ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., pp. 591-592.

²³⁸ Ivi, p. 65.

²³⁹ E. Inbar, *Arab- Israeli Coexistence: Causes, Achievements and Limitations*, in «Israel Affairs», vol. 6, nos. 3-4, Summer 2000, pp. 256-270.

which emerged during the first Intifada²⁴⁰. Nevertheless, at the same time Israel received unprecedented support for the Oslo Accords throughout the Arab world: after the Palestinians made an agreement with the Israelis, the other Arab countries felt free to pursue their own interests towards the Jewish state without running the risk of being accused of betraying the Palestinian cause.

The Oslo Accords actually consisted of a series of “Interim Agreements”²⁴¹ with the purpose to reach a common position on the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: it was the interim nature of these agreements that led to their downfall, the underlying concept was that the two sides were not yet ready for a full peace agreement and, therefore, an interim period was needed during which establish mutual trust. On the Palestinian side there was a lot of optimism that peace had finally been reached: this raised expectations for improvements to take place on the ground, but in reality, peace had not been negotiated and «hence the course of events could not match expectations»²⁴². No goal was well defined, and even though the interim period was supposed to last five years, it still gave plenty of time for obstacles to stand in the way of final agreements.

The following are the agreements that made up the Oslo Accords²⁴³:

1. Letters of Mutual Recognition between Israel and the PLO – 9 and 10 September 1993
2. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (“Oslo-I”) – 13 September 1993
3. [Paris] Protocol on Economic Relations – 28 April 1994
4. Agreement on Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (“Cairo Agreement”) – 4 May 1994
5. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities – 29 August 1994 (additional agreement, 28 August 1995)

²⁴⁰ Two underground organisations emerged to give direction to the Intifada. In West Bank the local branches of the PLO factions, the Popular and the Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Communists, combined together to create an underground leadership that called itself the United National Command (UNC); meanwhile, in Gaza Islamists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood created the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its Arabic acronym “Hamas”. The strength of Israeli repression made it possible for these underground leaderships to meet or exercise their authority in the open. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 541.

²⁴¹ *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords)*, 13 September 1993, in United Nations Peacemaker <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloaccord93>, last consultation 25/01/2024.

²⁴² S. Hassan, *Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine*, cit., p. 68.

²⁴³ *Ibidem*.

6. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ("Oslo-II") – 28 September 1995
7. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron – 15 January 1996
8. Wye River Memorandum – 23 October 1998
9. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum – 4 September 1999.

When Oslo I was signed in September 1993, PLO leader Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin shook their hands on the White House: this was a symbolic act that was supposed to mark the end of a violent history and the beginning of an era which would see Palestinians and Israelis to share a country each claim as exclusively its own²⁴⁴. The leaders agreed to a three-stage plan toward peace: the first stage involved the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho; the second stage implemented an Interim Agreement ("Oslo II") that redeployed Israeli forces in the West Bank and transferred certain agreement powers; the third and final phase envisioned the creation of a Permanent Status Agreement finalised by the end of the Interim Period, on May 1999. In particular, Oslo I specifies that the aim of the negotiation was to create an interim Palestinian Authority (PA)²⁴⁵, which would provide authority over education, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Oslo I also set out the framework for Oslo II, which discussed that once the PA would be elected, Israel would withdraw its military forces outside of the populated areas²⁴⁶.

In contrast to the hopeful results launched at Oslo to reach a peace process, its major criticism was that its faulty structure was determining the manner of its implementation: for example, Said²⁴⁷ argued that Oslo's fatal weakness was that it was neither an instrument of decolonisation nor a mechanism to implement UN resolutions relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian issue; rather, it was a framework aimed at changing the basis of Israeli control over the Occupied Territories in order to perpetuate that control: as such, the process was structurally incapable of producing a viable agreement and must ultimately result in further conflict. It is also to be considered that the relationship between Israel and the PLO at Oslo

²⁴⁴ S. D. Dallal, *The Palestinian Israeli Peace*, Syracuse, J. Int'l L. & Com., 1996, p. 45.

²⁴⁵ J. A. Weiner, *Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo Accords*, in «Fordham International Law Journal», vol. 43, no. 1, Berkeley, Electronic Press, 1999, p. 243. Oslo 1529 «Stating that authorized land will be transferred only after inauguration of PA».

²⁴⁶ *Ibidem*. Oslo 1544 «Subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis».

²⁴⁷ E. Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After*, New York, Knopf Doubleday, 2001. Also E. Said, *Palestinians under Siege*, in «London Review of Books», vol. 22, no. 24, December 2000, pp. 9-14.

is not based upon reciprocal recognition of equal or comparable rights: the relevant agreements never refer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “occupied”, as well as they do not commit Israel to desist from illegal activities such as settlements designed to consolidate Israeli rule, in contravention of international law; furthermore, there was also no effort to resolve the core issue that define the Israel-Palestinian question, like borders, refugees, and the role of Jerusalem, neither guidelines for further steps towards a two-state solution²⁴⁸. Moreover, the authors of the Oslo Accords created a step-by-step process to introduce peace in the Middle East: however, in many instances it seemed that leaders from both sides worked against the Oslo Accords, since there have been many violations of the accords by both Israelis and Palestinians²⁴⁹.

3.3 European Union and its limits: a consideration to the peace process started from Oslo and the unlawful Israeli acts under international law

In 1993, the just established²⁵⁰ European Union (EU) and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) supported the Oslo Accords, since CFSP contributes to the

EU's objectives of preserving peace, strengthening international security, promoting international cooperation and developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms²⁵¹.

Moreover, state-building was considered by the same EU to be the best way of achieving peace in the Palestinian Territory; however, with the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the Oslo Interim Agreements of 1993, the EU ceded high diplomacy of the peace process to the

²⁴⁸ M. Rabbani, *Rocks and Rockets: Oslo's Inevitable Conclusion*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, Spring 2001, pp. 68-81.

²⁴⁹ Weiner, *Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo Accords*, cit., pp. 253-259.

²⁵⁰ As already mentioned, the Maastricht Treaty laid down the foundation for the European Union. The treaty was signed by 12 countries in the Dutch city of Maastricht in 1992 and went into effect in 1993. The treaty, besides transforming the EC into the European Union, institutionalised the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the “second pillar” of the Union, replacing so the EPC. Noor, *European Union and the Middle East: A Historical Analysis*, cit., p. 34.

²⁵¹ *Common Foreign and Security Policy*, in «European Commission», https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/common-foreign-and-security-policy_en#:~:text=The%20Common%20Foreign%20and%20Security,human%20rights%20and%20fundamental%20freedoms, last consultation 07/02/2024.

US. It was not a matter of choice: the EU was almost forced to play «second fiddle» and to adopt a low profile²⁵². Important steps were taken firstly in the Barcelona Conference of 1995 when EU incorporated the PA in its new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and secondly in the Berlin Declaration of 1999 – during the interim period of the Oslo Accords – when EU called for the creation of a «democratic, viable, and peaceful Palestinian State»²⁵³. In summary, the Nineties have been characterised by a political marginalisation in the peace negotiations, with the EU mainly focused on two roles: one as an economic player and funder in the US-led peace process, and another as an autonomous actor with programs such as the EMP. The EU adopted a long-term strategy that primarily targeted the PA and included the democratisation of the region, economic development and integration, the establishment of strong institutions, and the encouragement of a wider cultural debate²⁵⁴. But, according to Khader, the financiering of the nascent PA not only created a «culture of dependence», but also «contribute to the occupation, thus indirectly contributing to the statement in the absence of any pressure on Israel»²⁵⁵.

The logic behind the Oslo process was: if reconstruction and socio-economic development were to be promoted, and the establishment of the PA was followed by the ability of Palestinians to organise and manage their own political, economic and social affairs, then an independent Palestinian state – living peacefully side by side by Israel – could be established too: «building Palestinian institutions was viewed by most within the international community as a first step towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state»²⁵⁶. Over the years, the EU has adopted a comprehensive state-building policy toward its Palestinian partners (by the EMP, through the Barcellona Process of 1995), which includes, as evidenced by Solana and Ferrero-Waldner²⁵⁷, support for: (1) the establishment of modern and democratic police forces, (2) comprehensive institution-building and good governance, (3) the sustainable growth of the Palestinian economy, (4) the areas of customs and trade, (5) sustainable PA finances and (6) emergency and humanitarian purposes.

²⁵² Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 360.

²⁵³ Berlin European Council, 24 and 25 March 1999, *Presidency Conclusions*, in European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ber1_en.htm#UP, last consultation 05/02/2024.

²⁵⁴ Musu, *European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*, cit., pp. 45-54.

²⁵⁵ Khader, *The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014)*, cit., p. 361.

²⁵⁶ A. Le More, M. Keating, R. Lowe, *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine*, London, Chatham House, 2005, p. 27.

²⁵⁷ J. Solana, B. Ferrero-Waldner, *Statebuilding for Peace in the Middle East: an EU Action Strategy*, in Consilium Europa, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/97949.pdf, last consultation 26/01/2024.

In the wake of the 1993 Oslo Accords, the EU provided «over half the funding that supported the setting up of the Palestinian Authority quasi-state institutions»²⁵⁸ and, in EU words,

since the Madrid Conference, we had started to organise ourselves to deal with Palestinian nation-building [...]. We thought that one of the most important things would be to set up the institutional framework which would help Palestinian self-determination as supported in the 1980 Venice Declaration²⁵⁹.

In fact, the Venice Declaration, besides supporting the Palestinian right to self-determination, also formed the basis of the two-state solution, which found international consensus only in 2002 when US President Bush spelled out his vision of «two states, living side by side, in peace and security»²⁶⁰. Although different approaches have always existed between the US and the European administration, it is true that, as it was already mentioned, when it comes to the Middle East peace-making, the US is the dominant political actor: as underlined by Le More, «[the] US decides, the World Bank leads, the EU pays and the UN feeds»²⁶¹.

With the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht treaty, the EU managed to produce a consistent set of common principles and positions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and also the unanimously agreement over the two-state solution, a «fair solution to the complex issue of Jerusalem», a «just, viable and agreed solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees», and a «solution in the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks»²⁶²: these are general points also shared by the greater part of the international community, including the Quartet (UN, US, EU, and Russia) having been the most influential part, but it must to be pointed out that European diplomacy has actively helped to shape them.

The international community had agreed to the Oslo Accords' blemish of international norms and marginalisation of multilateral institutions; at the same time, it has provided significant

²⁵⁸ R. Youngs, *Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September 11*, London, Lynne Rienner, 2006, p. 146.

²⁵⁹ Quoted in A. Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 89.

²⁶⁰ *Statement by President George Bush in the Rose Garden of the White House*, in «The Guardian», June 24, 2002, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jun/25/israel.usa>, last consultation 26/01/2024.

²⁶¹ A. Le More, *Killing with kindness: funding the demise of a Palestinian state*, in «International Affairs», vol 81, no. 5, 2005, p. 995.

²⁶² A. Pijpers, *The EU and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: The limits of the CFSP*, The Hague, Clingendael Institute, 2007, p. 1.

financial assistance, not only to facilitate Palestinian state building, but also to help redress the consequences of the occupation for Palestinians. This dynamic has «allowed Israel to externalise the political and financial costs of its occupation, and condemned Palestinians to a seemingly endless state of external dependency»²⁶³: the Oslo Accords and the process they triggered have served to secure an occupation they were meant to end. The chances of achieving a two-state solution have declined in the lack of a significant diplomatic process, which is also giving weight to both sides who support individual tactics. The Oslo process could have given way to a Palestinian civil rights-based approach that takes aim at Zionism's foundations as a movement for Jewish self-determination; on the contrary, the new situation had become even more unstable, characterised by ever more fragmentation of the Palestinian national movement, cycles of intensified intercommunal violence and state repression, and increased extremism on both sides.

The main facts are that EU did not manage to bring either peace or resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, nor did it manage to play a decisive role building a successful Palestinian state: European states had the power to influence these dynamics, but they have so far proved reluctant to use the tools at their disposal to discourage Israel from its unlawful practices, or push Palestinian factions towards national re-unification and re-democratisation²⁶⁴. Azarova also argued that if Europe truly believes that preserving the possibility of a two-state solution is a strategic and moral imperative, it must rethink the current peace-making model, which has «acquiesced to Israel's practice and policies» and has failed to «effectively challenge the underlying basis for its continued occupation of Palestinian territory»²⁶⁵.

Moreover, until now there have been several peace agreements, but none of them seems to have brought a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question, nor to have established a Palestinian state²⁶⁶. For this reason, an effort is necessary to identify how Europe can better hold the line against Israeli efforts to irrevocably alter the political geography and demographic character of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, obscure the OPT's legal

²⁶³ Ivi, p. 2.

²⁶⁴ O. Dajani, H. Lovatt, *Rethinking Oslo: How Europe can Promote Peace in Israel-Palestine*, Berlin, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017, p. 2.

²⁶⁵ V. Azarova, *Israel's unlawfully prolonged occupation: Consequences under an integrated legal framework*, Berlin, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017, p. 11.

²⁶⁶ N. Narea, *The many, many times Israelis and Palestinians tried to make peace – and failed*, in «Vox», 22 November 2023, <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/11/22/23971375/israel-palestine-peace-talks-deal-timeline>, last consultation 26/01/2024.

status, and undermine the potential for a two-state solution²⁶⁷. Still according to Azarova²⁶⁸, in order to achieve that, Europe must follow through with differentiation practices to ensure that its actions and policies towards Israel are consistent with its own domestic legal order: to realign Israel's incentives and put an end to its violations of international law and its occupation of Palestinian land, Europe will also need to spend political capital with more audacity. Furthermore, Europe should attempt to re-legitimize Palestinian governance structures and shift its support for Palestinian institutions from capacity building to sovereignty building²⁶⁹.

As stated by Dajani and Lovatt²⁷⁰, the Oslo Accords further contributed to entrenching Israel's occupation by marginalising international law as a tool of conflict resolution and supplanting it with a system that effectively formalised the inherent power imbalance between the occupier and the occupied. In addition, Israel has used the Oslo Accords to obscure the legal clarity which international law views its status and obligations as an occupying power, Palestinians' right to self-determination, and the extent of third state responsibilities²⁷¹: for instance, Israeli officials argued that «the term "occupied territories" is a politically motivated term and does not reflect a binding legal determination about the status of the territory or the factual situation on the ground [created by the Oslo Accords]»²⁷². Moreover, Israel has claimed that, since the Oslo Accords did not transfer either civilian or

²⁶⁷ Azarova, *Israel's unlawfully prolonged occupation: Consequences under an integrated legal framework*, cit., p. 13.

²⁶⁸ *Ivi*, pp. 13-14.

²⁶⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁷⁰ Dajani, Lovatt, *Rethinking Oslo: How Europe can Promote Peace in Israel-Palestine*, cit., p. 3.

²⁷¹ International law outlines the responsibilities incumbent upon third-party states, which become operative in the event of a significant violation occurring under a fundamental norm of universal international law. These fundamental norms, also known as peremptory norms, are universally acknowledged and accepted by the international community as standards that allow no exceptions: third-party states bear responsibilities when these norms are violated. These responsibilities encompass refraining from offering assistance or support, referred to as "non-assistance," when addressing a serious breach perpetrated by another state to uphold the resultant situation. Furthermore, the concept of "non-recognition" dictates that states are obliged not to acknowledge as legitimate any situation resulting from a serious breach of international law under a peremptory norm. They are also prohibited from providing aid or assistance in perpetuating such a situation. This obligation applies specifically to situations stemming from these significant breaches. For instance, if a state endeavours to assert sovereignty over a territory by disregarding the self-determination rights of its people, other states are mandated to abstain from formally recognising the situation and from taking actions that imply recognition. A. M. Tanzi, *A Concise Introduction to International Law*, The Hague, Eleven International Publishing, 2023, pp. 163-190.

²⁷² Cited in *Ibidem*, from *Comments submitted by the Israeli Football Association (IFA) to the draft report of the Chairman of the Monitoring Committee*, 24 April 2017, in «Court of Arbitration for Sport», last consultation 30/01/2024. See also statements by Israel's deputy foreign minister Hotovely that the term "occupation" is a distortion: R. Ahren, *Israelis cry foul as UN leaders lament 50 years of "occupation"*, in «The Times of Israel», 6 June 2017, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israelis-cry-foul-as-un-leaders-lament-50-years-of-occupation/>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

security authority over Area C of the West Bank to the PA²⁷³, ongoing settlement activity and displacement of the local Palestinian population in that area is permitted: pro-settler organisations have likewise built international campaigns around such arguments, portraying the EU as «acting illegally by funding unauthorised Palestinian building in areas placed under Israeli control by international law»²⁷⁴. This distortion of international law has created uncertainty regarding the legal responsibilities of Israel and third states, including among some members of the US Congress and various parliaments in Europe. It suffices to note that

the Accords neither absolve Israel of its IHL [international humanitarian law] obligations as an Occupying Power, nor constitute an act of consent by Palestinian representatives to waive rights that have been subsequently undermined by Israeli violations of international laws²⁷⁵.

If the international community had been willing to hold Israel responsible for its violations of the accords and, more generally, of international law, the Oslo Accords would have prevented the occupation from becoming permanently rooted. Instead, thanks to the international community's hesitation, Israeli authorities were able to control the speed and scope of any de-occupation initiative and place politically difficult demands on their Palestinian counterparts in order to obstruct peace negotiations. Multilateral institutions, like the UN General Assembly, UN Security Council, UN Human Rights Council, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have sometimes undertaken to clarify the applicable legal framework and its implications; so, EU institutions have done too, being inflexible in explaining the applicability of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to the OT.

Palestinians as well have looked for recourse to international mechanism for accountability such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) to uphold their legal rights and enforce

²⁷³ The Oslo Accords divided the Palestinian West Bank into three administrative zones: Area A (18%), where the Palestinian Authority (PA) administers civil and security matters; Area B (22%), where the PA administers only civil matters; and Area C (60%) where Israel maintains full control. Weiner, *Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo Accords*, cit., pp. 245-249.

²⁷⁴ J. W. Simons, *European Union is "breaking international law by funding illegal West Bank building projects", report claims*, in «Daily Mail», 5 February 2015, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2874883/EU-funding-illegal-building-West-Bank-says-report.html>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

²⁷⁵ Azarova, *Israel's unlawfully prolonged occupation: Consequences under an integrated legal framework*, cit., p. 11.

accountability over Israel's unlawful actions. But these processes have been ignored – and in certain cases, purposefully obstructed – far too frequently by third party governments: since 1945, a total of thirty-six UN Security Council draft resolutions related to Israel-Palestine have been vetoed by one of the five permanent members (the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France): out of these, thirty-four were vetoed by the US²⁷⁶. Furthermore, some EU member states have even attempted to dissuade Palestine from joining the ICC and criticised the UN Human Rights Council resolutions which were focusing on Israel's international law violations²⁷⁷.

Finally, Palestinians must determine for themselves which route to take in order to achieve self-determination: the US, the EU, and the international community continue to support a two-state solution, but given the changing realities on the ground, the EU and the international community cannot ignore the need to think through its alternatives for responding to different futures, since it is clear from the analysis conducted so far that the two-state solution has so far failed because both sides can maybe agree on the concept, but can never agree on effective practical action.

3.4 A reflection on future realities in historic Palestine

Even though the two-state solution is widely internationally shared, that does not automatically guarantee that this is the most equitable path to follow. Encouraging a discussion about alternatives does not imply rejection of the two-state solution or modify Israel's obligations under the law of occupation. However, having a discussion like this might help international leaders – including both Israelis and Palestinians – better understanding the unavoidable consequences of the current direction of policy.

The two-state solution is till these days the official program and ideology for the PLO²⁷⁸, and yet, despite the efforts to promote this solution, the percentage of those supporting a two-

²⁷⁶ S. Asrar, M. Hussein, *How the US has used its veto power at the UN in support of Israel*, in «Aljazeera», 26 October 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/26/how-the-us-has-used-its-veto-power-at-the-un-in-support-of-israel#:~:text=A%20history%20of%20US%20vetoes%20protecting%20Israel&text=Since%201945%2C%20a%20total%20of,the%20United%20Kingdom%2C%20and%20France>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

²⁷⁷ Dajani, Lovatt, *Rethinking Oslo: How Europe can Promote Peace in Israel-Palestine*, cit., p. 4. See also *Human Rights Council 34: UK explanation of voting on the resolution regarding Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, in «Gov.UK», 24 March 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/human-rights-council-34-uk-explanation-of-voting-on-the-resolution-regarding-israel-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territories>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

²⁷⁸ In those years, only fifty-four percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians: according to them the leadership should give wide powers to municipalities and local councils and form popular committees in the neighbourhood and villages to support municipalities and local

state settlement between Palestinians and Israelis is today the lowest in more than two decades, not constituting a majority on either side²⁷⁹. On the other hand, there is no Palestinian political party that promotes the option of other alternatives, like the one-state solution. Other recalled that the two-state solution is in fact a “recent” position for Palestinians, who

always rejected the idea of partition as a device used by British and later the UN and Western states for accommodating Zionism ambitions in the country. Today’s Western supported for a two-state solution springs fundamentally from the same motives²⁸⁰.

According to Said’s view, Oslo peace process has in fact put off the real reconciliation between Zionism and the Palestinian people, setting indeed the stage for separation; the real peace, for him, can come only with a one bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state.

This is not easy to imagine. The Zionist-Israeli official narrative and the Palestinian one are irreconcilable. Israelis say they waged a war of liberation and so achieved independence; Palestinians say their society was destroyed, most of the population evicted²⁸¹.

This irreconcilability was already quite obvious since the beginning: as pointed out by Sternhell²⁸²,

councils in maintaining internal security and lead the popular resistance. H. Jaber, *Palestinians Taking the Initiative: Dissolve the PA and Embrace a One-State Solution Strategy... Now*, in «Palestinian Centre for Policy & Survey Research», 2019, p. 2.

²⁷⁹ According to Public opinion pool no. 67, in «Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research», 2018, <https://pcpsr.org/en/node/725>, last consultation 02/02/2024.

²⁸⁰ G. Karmi, *The One-State Solution: An Alternative Vision for Israeli-Palestinian Peace*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 40, no. 2, Winter 2011, p. 63.

²⁸¹ E. Said, *The One-State Solution*, in «The New York Times Magazine», 10 January 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/10/magazine/the-one-state-solution.html>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

²⁸² Z. Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 93.

Zionism was not blind to the presence of Arabs in Palestine, even Zionist figures who had never visited the country knew that it was not devoid of inhabitants. At the same time, neither the Zionist movement abroad nor the pioneers who were beginning to settle the country could frame a policy toward the Palestinian national movement. The real reason for this was not a lack of understanding of the problem but a clear recognition of the insurmountable contradiction between the basic objectives of the two sides. If Zionist intellectuals and leaders ignored the Arab dilemma, it was chiefly because they knew that this problem had no solution within the Zionist way of thinking.

It was firstly proposed by philosophies Magnes and Buber, and also by the political organisation Brit Shalom²⁸³, in the late 1920s and 1930s as a way to enable Jews and Arabs to live in a bi-national state in historic Palestine, but it was rejected by both Zionists and Palestinians for compromising their national rights²⁸⁴. Although the idea was still presented to the UNSCOP of 1947²⁸⁵, and then reformulated by Fatah in 1969 and the PLO in 1971 under the slogan of a democratic state in Palestine inclusive of Jews, Muslims, and Christians²⁸⁶, the one-state idea did not find political support among the international community, that preferred to pursue with the two-state solution. According to Jaber²⁸⁷, since the impossibility of achieving the two-state solution is given due to the non-stop Israeli settlement expansion across the territories of the wished Palestinian state, the one-state really is the most achievable solution. Moreover, the Palestinian cause is off the agenda of the various Israeli parties, with the addition that there is no genuine international inclination or ability to bring pressure on Israel to address it. Furthermore, it is also believed that even if the two-state solution will be achieved, no solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees would be provided and, by that, would not bring the conflict to an end: the failed

²⁸³ In April 1925, a small group of Jewish intellectuals met to find a new movement that would advocate power-sharing with the Arab population: formally launched in March 1926, Brit Shalom «aimed to persuade Jews and Arabs to work together» to create «a state for two nations». Brit Shalom fell apart in the 1930s, but in the 1940s its members founded Ihud, a political party with the goal of creating a binational state in Palestine that would be integrated into a larger Arab federation. B. Morris, *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2009, p. 46.

²⁸⁴ L. Farsakh, *The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects*, in «Middle East Journal», vol. 65, no. 1, Winter 2011, p. 56.

²⁸⁵ *UNSCOP Report 1947*, cit. In CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS (III) is mentioned that a plan for a federal-state proposal was presented.

²⁸⁶ U. Avnery, *A Binational State? God Forbid!*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 28, no.4, Summer 1999, <https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/41080>, last consultation 05/02/2024.

²⁸⁷ Jaber, *Palestinians Taking the Initiative: Dissolve the PA and Embrace a One-State Solution Strategy... Now*, cit., p. 1.

formulas stipulates an inequitable division of land and resources, precluding the return of Palestine's indigenous people to their homeland, despite international law and precedents applied elsewhere²⁸⁸. So, an alternative can be found in the «national, realistic, ethical, and popularly supported Palestinian plan»²⁸⁹ which embrace a one democratic state solution in historic Palestine, that guarantees:

- (1) full equality for all its citizens;
- (2) the right of return for refugees;
- (3) no group dominates the other;
- (4) the development of short and medium-term programs that seek to bridge the gap among the citizens in all spheres, especially the economic, on the basis of equal opportunity and positive discrimination towards the poor; the security sector must seek to integrate all, at all ranks and levels;
- (5) that the one democratic state should pursue a foreign policy based on neutrality, i.e., that will not engage any in any international or regional alignment out of respect for the religious and historical significance of this land to a huge portion of humanity and in order to benefit from its promising tourism and commercial future²⁹⁰.

The problem is that the two-state solution does not only confine itself to deal with the symptoms it had created, but it actively helps to maintain the causes and roots that lie in the ongoing expansionist Zionist project: Zionism has not adapted to its environment in more than seventy years, nor accepted limits on its aspirations; the more has been able to take, the more it has wanted to take, resulting in a self-perpetuating cycle of aggression and expansionism²⁹¹. As pointed out by Said²⁹²,

²⁸⁸ According to Jaber, *ibidem*; Karmi, *The One-State Solution: An Alternative Vision for Israeli-Palestinian Peace*, cit., p. 73, and L. E. Andersen, Y. Jaradat, *Future of Palestine. A sovereign Palestinian state remains the only sustainable solution*, in «Danish Institute for International Studies», 2020, p. 2.

²⁸⁹ Jaber, *Palestinians Taking the Initiative: Dissolve the PA and Embrace a One-State Solution Strategy... Now*, cit., p. 3

²⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

²⁹¹ Karmi, *The One-State Solution: An Alternative Vision for Israeli-Palestinian Peace*, cit., p. 67.

²⁹² Said, *The One-State Solution*, cit.

the conflict appears intractable because it is a contest over the same land by two peoples who always believed they had valid title to it and who hoped that the other side would in time give up or go away.

The background is, in fact, a little different, since a Jew born in another country has the right to settle in the land (according to Israel's Law of Return²⁹³), whereas a Palestinian who lived there for centuries, cannot return in their land: it is necessary to remark again the fact that almost six million²⁹⁴ of Palestinian refugees are now present, with nearly one-third of them living in fifty-eight recognised Palestine refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem²⁹⁵. Still according to Said, Oslo did little to actually change the situation: «Oslo required us to forget and renounce our history of loss, dispossessed by the very people who taught everyone the importance of not forgetting the past»²⁹⁶.

Israel's ambition has always been that there should be a separate country, a refuge, exclusively for Jews, to embody the idea that the Jews (rejected in Europe) should create a state of their own, where they could express their identity and decide their own fate: it is, by definition of the Basic Laws of Israel²⁹⁷, «a democratic Jewish state», meaning that even if it belongs to the Jews, non-Jews can live there with equal civil rights, in theory: in practice, non-Jews in Israel are very far indeed from such equality. Furthermore, Oslo itself was based on the principle of separation between Jews and others, as recalled by Rabin²⁹⁸. Yet, since Israeli settlements were first implanted on the occupied territories in 1967, the lives of Jews have become tangled up with those of non-Jews more than ever. So, after all those years, classic Zionism has neither provided a solution to the Palestinian presence nor an

²⁹³ The Law of Return was passed on 5 July 1950 and published in Sefer HaChukim (Book of Laws) No. 51, p. 159. Since then, Jews have been entitled to simply show up and request to be Israeli citizens, assuming no imminent danger to public health, state security, or the Jewish people as a whole. Essentially, all Jews everywhere in the world are Israeli citizens by right. In 1955, the law was amended to specify that dangerous criminals could also be denied that right. In 1970, Israel took another step granting automatic citizenship not only to Jews, but also to their non-Jewish children, grandchildren, and spouses, and to the non-Jewish spouses of their children and grandchildren. From The Jewish Agency for Israel <https://archive.jewishagency.org/first-steps/program/5131/>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

²⁹⁴ According to United Nations, today 5.9 million Palestine refugees are eligible for UNRWA services. <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

²⁹⁵ UNRWA, <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>.

²⁹⁶ Said, *The One-State Solution*, cit.

²⁹⁷ The Basic Laws of Israel are fourteen quasi-constitutional laws of the State of Israel, which can be changed by a supermajority vote in the Knesset, the unicameral legislature of Israel and supreme state body. The Basic Laws can be found in <https://main.knesset.gov.il/en/activity/pages/basiclaws.aspx>, last consultation 05/02/2024.

²⁹⁸ J. Neriah, *Yitzhak Rabin, the Oslo Accords, and the Intelligence Services*, in « Jewish Political Studies Review », vol. 30, no. 3/4, 2019, pp. 136–65.

exclusively Jewish presence in the region: Said sees no other way than to «begin now to speak about sharing the land that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way, with equal rights for each citizen», adding moreover that «there can be no reconciliation unless both people, two communities of suffering, resolve that their existence is a secular fact, and that it has to be dealt with as such»²⁹⁹. By this solution he means self-determination for both communities, giving up to special status for one people at the expense of the other, and considering the combination of the Law of Return for Jews with the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees, both at the same level:

Palestine is and has always been a land of many histories; it is a radical simplification to think of it as principally or exclusively Jewish or Arab. [...] The alternatives are unpleasantly simple: either the war continues (along with the onerous cost of the current peace process) or a way out, based on peace and equality (as in South Africa after apartheid) is actively sought, despite the many obstacles³⁰⁰.

Farsakh³⁰¹ pointed out three main challenges among the Palestinian community that the creation of a one-state movement could create: first, the difficulty of redefining the Palestinian cause in terms of a struggle for equal political rights rather than for a state *per se*. In order to define the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and provide an end to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the one-state solution requires a re-evaluation of the "state" paradigm. Second, the solution that the one-state movement has to frame must be realistic, rather than utopian terms: it has to address the present power structures and legal framework available, both domestically and internationally, which remain favourable to the two-state solution. Third, building a one-state movement implies extent (if not change) the present Palestinian leadership, having activism that can mobilise support for this idea among the various Palestinian constituencies.

It is believed that the same path of changes must be done also to the Israeli counterpart. Lustick argues that it is unimaginable that a government that carries out the one bi-national

²⁹⁹ Said, *The One-State Solution*, cit.

³⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

³⁰¹ Farsakh, *The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects*, pp. 56-57.

state solution could be established in Israel since the country's politics have grown so uncompromising over the years³⁰². Furthermore, he argues that a *de facto* annexation will inevitably – even if not immediately – lead to the reality of a one-state democratic, non-Zionist entity. Rather than a two-state solution which has «passed the point of no return», Lustick too conceives «an inclusive multinational democracy, that would serve as a state for all its citizens», a long-term prospect that would entail overcoming the challenge of Palestinian emancipation³⁰³.

Moreover, also Beinart, a longtime supporter of the two-state solution, declared that he had reached the conclusion that this solution was dead: «It is time to imagine a Jewish home that is not a Jewish state, to abandon the traditional two-state solution and embrace the goal of equal rights for Jews and Palestinians»³⁰⁴. In point of facts, according to a 2018 survey³⁰⁵, more than twenty percent of Israelis supported the one-state option in which the rights of all citizens are equal. The claim that it is impossible for Israeli Jews to accept a one-state solution option cannot be credibly tested without putting Israel in a position where it is obliged to choose between the two-state solution and the one-state solution³⁰⁶. In addition, there are above two million Palestinians who are Israeli citizens or residents, forming twenty percent of the total population of Israel and more than two-thirds of them support the one-state solution³⁰⁷.

Those are positive indicators of the willingness of some Israelis to accept the Palestinian demands, if presented within the confidence that a one democratic state will guarantee their rights in the future regardless of their numbers³⁰⁸. It is true that the binational idea invalidate

³⁰² I. S. Lustick, *Israel in Depth, Episode 4*, interview by D. Waxman, *Israel in Depth*, in «UCLA Y&S Nazarian Centre for Israel Studies», 22 June 2020, audio, min. 40:51, https://www.international.ucla.edu/israel/article/223547?fbclid=IwAR0ntEYE8zidfa2daUBRFiJFXyM9Zo%02gauocEtjPUedHKNRqliZLe_CIKPzw, last consultation 02/02/2024.

³⁰³ I. S. Lustick, *Israel's One-State Reality and the Challenge of Democratisation*, in «TPQ», 30 November 2022, <http://transatlanticpolicy.com/article/1166/israels-one-state-reality-and-the-challenge-of-democratization>, last consultation 02/02/2024.

³⁰⁴ P. Beinart, *I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State*, in «The New York Times», 8 July 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/opinion/israel-annexation-two-state-solution.html>, last consultation 02/02/2024. See also P. Beinart, *Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine*, in «Jewish Currents», 7 July 2020, <https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-palestine>, last consultation 02/02/2024.

³⁰⁵ Jaber, *Palestinians Taking the Initiative: Dissolve the PA and Embrace a One-State Solution Strategy... Now*, cit., pp. 4-5.

³⁰⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁰⁷ According to *The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll*, in «Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research», June-July 2017, https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Table%20of%20Findings_English%20Joint%20Poll%203%20June%202017_1.pdf, last consultation 02/02/2024.

³⁰⁸ Concerns over the number of Jews exist today as well, so the return of the Palestinians refugees can make a big change: in August 2022, Israeli geographer Soffer announced that Jews were becoming a ruling minority in Israel: by

the very essence of the Zionist idea, the *raison d'être* of Israel as perceived by its Jewish citizens, but it can be argued by these surveys that popular attitudes may change, that Zionism may fade away, and that ideas like a non-national, supranational, multinational, or binational society will take root: yet, such a transformation can only come about over a long period of time, by slow development. Thus, it is implied that Palestinian people must wait for fifty, one hundred, or maybe more years for such an implementation to happen, and with the relentless push of Israeli settlements going on, a legitimate question thrives in the mind: what will remain of Arab Palestine and its population itself?

While this question has a worrying answer, another question was proposed at the end of the first chapter: “is it an essential attribute of a big power to act as mediator in the major conflicts of the world?”. The purpose of this thesis was trying to examine and analyse how the intervention and mediation by the international community (focusing mainly on the European ones) in the Middle East have gone over the years, pointing out that it will be too easy for outside states to debate which is – without even living the actual reality of the situation – the better solution while the crisis lasts, confusing a ceasefire or some agreement with an actual settlement and peace, and then move forward. Furthermore, it is crucial for the EU to learn how to accept and deal with its colonial and anti-Semitic history and, for international community – like for instance US – in general, learn to understand when is better to step aside, allowing people of that country to live and make errors throughout their own political and democratic process.

Finally, an outside meditation, rather than criticism or picking sides, is required to help both Palestinians and Israelis move forward. In Said's words, «once we grant that Palestinians and Israelis are there to stay, then the decent conclusion has to be the need for peaceful coexistence and genuine reconciliation»³⁰⁹, and despite the awareness that only gradual development over an extended period of time may bring about such a transformation (implying concerns towards the Palestinian cause), and despite history warns that the “no solution” solution seems likely to be the most probable real-world outcome of the present tragedy, one should never give up hope.

Soffer's count, there were now 7.53 million Arab Israelis and Palestinians, and 7.45 million Jews (less than 47 percent of the population) in the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. TOI Staff, *Jews now a 47% minority in Israel and the territories, demographer says*, in «The Times of Israel», 30 August 2022, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/jews-now-a-minority-in-israel-and-the-territories-demographer-says/>, last consultation 02/02/2024.

³⁰⁹ Said, *The One-State Solution*, cit.

CONCLUSION

In the course of this dissertation, we have deeply delved into the intricate Palestinian question up until the dawn of the XXI century, considering its various aspects alongside the European integration and peace processes. It was aimed to better understand the complexity of the situation and its interactions with broader geopolitical dynamics by conducting a thorough examination of the political, social, and economic factors that have defined this unsolved dispute, attempting to illuminate significant yet frequently ignored aspects of the situation. Now that the research is coming to a conclusion, it is appropriate to go over the key results and consider the consequences of these discoveries.

First of all, it is to be marked that this research ended at the dawn of the XXI century because it would be too complicated to enter into a subject not yet historically stratified, but its intent is indeed to better understand the present events in the logic of analyse the past ones. In fact, as pointed out by Marc Bloch in his *The Historian's Craft*, past and present are linked in an intimate way, it is needed to understand the present by the past and *vice-versa*, since to discover something on the present is needed to start from the past and search for the roots and truths of things: this is the meaning of understanding the present by the past.

Secondly, the events of the XXI century further complicated what was an already intricate situation: after the 9/11, both the role of the US and the EU changed in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli issue, starting with American response by declaring war on a largely unknown enemy – the so-called War on Terror – beginning with al-Qaida³¹⁰ and continuing «until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated»³¹¹: this triggered the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and, in 2003, the invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, connected with this extended distrust generated with the War on Terror, a key moment was reached when Hamas was elected in January 2006, elections organised and monitored by EU and by that considered legitimate by the international community: despite this, the Hamas-led government was diplomatically isolated very quickly, since the EU and

³¹⁰ No organisation claimed credit for the attack, but US intelligence services suspected Osama bin Laden's group, al-Qaida, from the outset. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had identified all nineteen hijackers: all were Muslim Arab men with connections to al-Qaida, fifteen from Saudi Arabia, two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt, and one from Lebanon. Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., p. 607.

³¹¹ *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, in «The White House: President George W. Bush», <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html#:~:text=Our%20war%20on%20terror%20begins,why%20do%20they%20hate%20us%3F>, last consultation 13/02/2024.

international actors demanded to Hamas to immediately recognise Israel's right to exist and renounce all violence³¹². When this did not happen in two months, financial support was dropped and changed to a temporary international mechanism, focused on emergency assistance and relief, which was exactly the opposite of the involvement and strategy the EU had pursued in the Nineties, when it focused on long-term development and institution-building.

By this, EU rapidly altered its reputation of trying to involve difficult actors in the peace process: while it had successfully pushed for PLO participation at a time this organisation was seen as terrorist, it never pushed such a policy with Hamas. The problem was that the rise of Islamism was more and more seen as the true defender of Palestinian rights, represented by Hamas. Among other factors, the decision of the international community in general, and the EU in specific, to isolate Hamas resulted in the complete division and polarisation of Palestinian community and politics in the Hamas-controlled Gaza and Fatah-controlled West Bank enclaves: the Arab Spring has made clear that even though the international community might opt for stability and refrain from providing balanced support to non-violence civil society actors, the pressure within societies can mount to an unforeseen level of civil disobedience. As a group, young Arabs felt that their governments did not do enough to handle issues like Israel and Iran, prevent international problems like the Iraq invasion, promote regional cooperation, resolve conflicts peacefully, or listen to people's voices. They were frustrated by autocratic leaders and corrupt regimes that focused more on their own security than on meeting the needs of their citizens.

Furthermore, by not recognising the Hamas government and in the handling of the Arab Spring, the EU undermined its own work and rhetoric about democratisation in the past decades: even when Palestinians gave more legitimacy to Islamist organisations, the EU could not understand that this was a reaction against the ineffectiveness of the PA. On the other hand, it is well known that, in times of crisis, extremism has fertile land among the people and the masses, because it appears to be the only one capable of providing actual changes: in this case, Hamas was seen by the majority of Palestinians as the only plausible option after years of sacrifice and no change in their situation. The EU's response lacked long-term strategic vision, choosing for stability in the area over democracy, but it should not be forgotten that, in this scenario, the migration crisis has been part of a conglomerate of

³¹² G. Harpaz, *The dispute over the treatment of products exported to the European Union from the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – The limits of power and the limits of law*, in «Journal of World Trade», vol. 38, no. 6, 2004, pp. 1049-1058.

crisis that have affected the EU since the late 2000s, as the financial and sovereign debt crisis of the Great Recession, Brexit, the COVID-19 crisis, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well as tensions within transatlantic relations: all this resulted in political impasse and renationalisation of border controls, rather than deepening integration.

In the introduction of Eugene Rogan's book, *The Arabs: a history*, it was explained a concept which is particularly indicated to conclude these thoughts: in the decade following 9/11, many in the West saw the biggest threat to their security and way of life coming from the Arab and Islamic nations, in what became known as "jihadi terror". They failed to recognise that many Arabs and Muslims saw the West as the most serious danger to their security and way of life too. What should have been obvious to each of the parties was that there was a genuine link between Arab stagnation and discontent, and the terror threat that affected Western democracies. Western policymakers and intellectual must pay significantly greater attention to history if they're going to address the ills that afflict the Arab world today³¹³.

I also wanted to conclude this thesis making a final consideration towards the new definition of the "anti-Semitism" concept presented in an article by Ilan Pappé of 5 November 2023 for Aljazeera, entitled *Why Israel Wants to erase context and history in the war on Gaza*³¹⁴: he described how the deprivation of historical context helps Israel pursuing his oppression policies in Gaza. Pappé gave the example of when Israeli government condemn the statement by UN Secretary Antonio Guterres in which, while condemning the attack committed by Hamas on 7 October, he wished to remind the world that it did not take place in a vacuum, explaining that one cannot dissociate 56 years of occupation from what occurred that day. After these words, Israeli officials demanded Guterres's resignation, claiming that he supported Hamas and justified the massacre it carried out, declaring that this statement promote anti-Semitism. This reaction suggests that a new type of allegation of anti-Semitism may now be on the table; in fact, Dina Porat had already characterised some anti-Zionist ideals as anti-Semitic because it is discriminatory in its nature: « [...] antisemitism is involved when the belief is articulated that of all the peoples on the globes (including the Palestinians), only the Jews should not have the right to self-determination in

³¹³ Rogan, *The Arabs: a history*, cit., pp. 4-5.

³¹⁴ I. Pappé, *Why Israel Wants to erase context and history in the war on Gaza*, in «Aljazeera», 5 November 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/11/5/why-israel-wants-to-erase-context-and-history-in-the-war-on-gaza>, last consultation 14/02/2024.

a land of their own»³¹⁵. However, many believed that singling out Israel for disproportionate criticism is justified as a result of its conduct and actions³¹⁶, and some critics of Israel or Israeli policies, like Noam Chomsky³¹⁷ and Desmond Tutu³¹⁸, suggest that equating criticism of Israel with antisemitism is inappropriate or inaccurate, claiming that supporters of Israel sometimes associate criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism in a deliberate attempt to prevent legitimate criticism of Israel. So, having the awareness of the existence of this new form of antisemitism developed in the late XX and early XXI centuries, «now contextualising and historicising what is going on could also trigger an accusation of anti-Semitism»³¹⁹: what is needed to be pointed out is that the several historical contexts that are analysed in this thesis, and all the other which are not included, cannot be ignored, historicisation should never be a guilt in the understanding of a context, on the contrary it should always be taken into account: but, if it is internationally permitted this to happen, Israel is implicit authorised to continue to resort oppression and forms of ethnic cleansing in order to gain total control over historical Palestine.

There is also the historical background of the 16-year-long siege on Gaza, in which over half of the population are children. Already in 2018, the UN warned that the Gaza Strip would become a place unsuitable for human habitation by 2020³²⁰. It is important to remember that the blockade was imposed in reaction to Hamas' democratic election victory following Israel's unilateral disengagement from the area: on the contrary, Israel controlled the exit and entry points to the Gaza Strip, controlling even the type of food that entered, sometimes

³¹⁵ D. Porat, *Defending Antisemitism*, in «Institute for Study of Anti-semitism and Racism», 2 April 2008, <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2003-4/porat.htm>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

³¹⁶ M. Neumann, *The Case Against Israel*, Chico, AK Press, 2007.

I. Buruma, *Is Israel a normal country*, in «Haaretz», 9 July 2010, <https://www.haaretz.com/2010-07-09/ty-article/is-israel-a-normal-country/0000017f-dbb4-d3ff-a7ff-fbb4c7bd0000>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

E. C. Corrigan, *Israeli Criticism of Zionism and the Treatment of Palestinians: The Politicians*, in «Dissident Voice», 30 July 2010, <https://dissidentvoice.org/2010/07/israeli-criticism-of-zionism-and-the-treatment-of-palestinians-the-politicians/>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

S. Shalom, *Singling out Israel – the argument revisited*, in «Jews for Justice for Palestinians», 19 November 2010, <https://jifjp.com/singling-out-israel-the-arguments-revisited/>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

³¹⁷ Mentioning one, N. Chomsky, I. Pappé, F. Barat, *Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel's War Against the Palestinians*, Chicago, Haymarket Books, 2010.

³¹⁸ C. McGreal, *When Desmond Tutu stood up for the rights of Palestinians, he could not be ignored*, in «The Guardian», 30 December 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/dec/30/desmond-tutu-palestinians-israel>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

³¹⁹ Pappé, *Why Israel Wants to erase context and history in the war on Gaza*, cit.

³²⁰ *Gaza "Unliveable", UN Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in the OPT Tells Third Committee – Press Release (Excerpts)*, in «UN, The question of Palestine», 24 October 2018: «In fact, the United Nations has stated that Gaza may well be unliveable by 2020: safe drinking water has almost disappeared, the economy is cratering and “the state of unlive-ability is upon us”, he said, urging the international community to insist that all parties bring an immediate end to this disaster». <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-unliveable-un-special-rapporteur-for-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-opt-tells-third-committee-press-release-excerpts/>, last consultation 14/02/2024.

limiting it to a certain calorie count³²¹. Hamas reacted to this debilitating siege by launching missiles into civilian areas of Israel: the Israeli government claimed these attacks were motivated by the movement's ideological wish to kill Jews – a new form of Nazim – while ignoring the context of the 1948 Nakba and the continuing strong oppression imposed on historical Palestine.

Finally, I hope that Palestinians know that many civil societies are supporting them meanwhile their governments and institutions are providing Israel with an exceptional immunity and unique protection: also the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on January 2024 declared that Palestinians had a right to be protected from acts of genocide, calling Israel to «take all measures within its power» to prevent such actions and allow the entry of desperately needed humanitarian aid into the war-shattered enclave³²². Yet, Alessandro Masala³²³ raised an interesting point in a general future perspective: even if you believe you have all of the legitimate reasons, ethnic cleansing remains as such, and if this does not occur, it will imply that other dramatic episodes in the past may be justified based on the reasons that motivated them. In the end, as explained in the last paragraph of the thesis, the Palestinians will continue their struggle for self-determination, so it is crucial to not give up hope, persisting to wish for a change of policy in Israel that brings equal rights for everyone: this could lead to the cessation of attacks (and the subsequent necessity of creation) of violent extremist groups, perhaps towards the real formation of a democracy representing both populations. Otherwise, this endless cycle of blood and hate will never end.

³²¹ The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/israeli-military-calorie-limit-gaza>;
The Times of Israel: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-counted-calorie-requirements-of-gazans-during-land-blockade-to-avoid-crisis/>;
Aljazeera: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/10/18/israel-set-calorie-limit-during-gaza-blockade>;
The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/world/middleeast/israel-counted-calories-needed-for-gazans-in-blockade.html>.
Last consultation 14/02/2024.

³²² UN world court calls for prevention of genocidal acts in Gaza, in «UN News», 26 January 2024, [https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145937#:~:text=The%20International%20Court%20of%20Justice%20\(ICJ\)%20on%20Friday%20declared%20that,into%20the%20war%2Dshattered%20enclave](https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145937#:~:text=The%20International%20Court%20of%20Justice%20(ICJ)%20on%20Friday%20declared%20that,into%20the%20war%2Dshattered%20enclave), last consultation 14/02/2024.

³²³ Alessandro Masala of Breaking Italy, *Ghali e Dargen CENSURATI dalla Rai?*, on «Youtube», 12 February 2024, video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5HXucJUAjc>, last consultation 14/02/2024.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources

Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, in «The White House: President George W. Bush», <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html#:~:text=Our%20war%20on%20terror%20begins,why%20do%20they%20hate%20us%3F>, last consultation 13/02/2024.

Bulletin of the EC 6-1971, in «Archive of European Integration», http://aei.pitt.edu/4550/1/epc_ministers_3rd_meet.pdf,

Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, Milestones: 1977-1980, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david#:~:text=The%20Camp%20David%20Accords%2C%20signed,and%20Egypt%20in%20March%201979>, last consultation 11/01/2024.

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in «EUR-Lex», <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E/TXT>, last consultation 02/01/2024.

Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union, in «EUR-Lex», https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF, last consultation 02/01/2024.

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords), 13 September 1993, in United Nations Peacemaker <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloaccord93>, last consultation 25/01/2024.

European Council Meeting, 29 and 30 June 1977 in London, in «Consilium Europa», https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20785/london_june_1977_eng.pdf, last consultation 11/10/2024.

Gaza “Unliveable”, UN Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in the OPT Tells Third Committee – Press Release (Excerpts), in «UN, The question of Palestine», 24

October 2018, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-unliveable-un-special-rapporteur-for-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-opt-tells-third-committee-press-release-excerpts/>, last consultation 14/02/2024.

James Baker's Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians, 18 October 1991, United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/letter_of_assurance.pdf, last consultation 23/01/2024.

Peel W. et al, Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (1937), in «UNISPAL», <https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/Cmd5479.pdf>, last consultation 19/12/2023.

Press conference of Charles de Gaulle, Paris, Palais de l'Elysée, 27 November 1967, <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00139/conference-de-presse-du-27-novembre-1967.html>, last consultation 18/01/2024.

Press conference of Georges Pompidou, Paris, Palais de l'Elysée, 10 July 1969, <https://www.georges-pompidou.org/portail-archives/conference-presse-10-juillet-1969-au-palais-lelysee>, last consultation 18/01/2024.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 6 March 1991, US Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-doc-pg218-3.htm>, last consultation 23/01/2024.

Resolution 1001 (ES-I), in «United Nations Digital Library», <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/208418>, last consultation 13/12/2023.

Resolution 181 of General Assembly 1947, in «United States, The Question of Palestine», <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185393/>, last consultation 29/11/2023.

Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council, on «United Nations Peacemaker», <https://peacemaker.un.org/middle-east-resolution242>, last consultation 15/12/2023.

Resolution 338 of the UN Security Council: Ceasefire in the Middle East, in «United Nations Peacemaker», <https://peacemaker.un.org/middleeast-resolution338>.

The European Council in 2010, in «Consilium Europa», <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21369/qc3010507enc.pdf>, last consultation 26/12/2023.

The Hague Summit Declaration : Communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Member State of the European Community, The Hague, 2 December 1969,

https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_hague_summit_2_december_1969-en-33078789-8030-49c8-b4e0-15d053834507.html, last consultation 09/01/2024.

The Need for Convening the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in «United Nations, The Question of Palestine», <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-206430/> last consultation 05/01/2024.

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT>, last consultation 02/01/2024.

Treaty on European Union, 1992, in «EUR-Lex», <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT>, last consultation 05/12/2023.

UK memorandum 1947, in [https://www.un.org/unispal/\(https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185776/\)](https://www.un.org/unispal/(https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185776/)), last consultation 29/11/2023.

United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 247-I-3461, in «UN Treaty Collection», <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20247/volume-247-I-3461-English.pdf>, last consultation 14/12/2023.

United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 70, in «UN Treaty Collection», <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%2070/v70.pdf>, last consultation 14/12/2023.

UNSCOP Report 1947, in <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-179435/>, last consultation 05/02/2024.

Venice Declaration, Declaration of the European Council on the Middle East of June 13 1980, available in «EEAS – European Union», https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf, last consultation 11/01/2024.

Yearbook of the United Nations 1982 (excerpts II), in «United Nations, The question of Palestine», <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-195619/>, last consultation 17/01/2024.

Secondary Sources

Monography

- Aggestam K., Bjorkdahl A., *Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans*, London, Routledge, 2012.
- Al-Fattal R., *The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2010.
- Al-Madfai M. R., *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974–1991*, Cambridge Middle East Library, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Allan P., A. Keller, *What is a Just Peace?*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Arrigonie H., *British Colonialism: 30 Years Serving Democracy or Hypocrisy*, Gaskell, Devon, 1998.
- Ashrawi H., *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, New York, Simon&Schuster, 1995.
- Attiga A. A., *The Arabs and the Oil Crisis, 1973-1986*, Kuwait, OAPEC, 1987.
- Azarova V., *Israel's unlawfully prolonged occupation: Consequences under an integrated legal framework*, Berlin, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017.
- Bagon P., *The Impact of the Jewish Underground upon Anglo Jewry: 1945-1947*, Oxford, M. Phill. thesis, 2003.
- Begin M., *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, New York, Nash Pub. Co., 1977.
- Bloch M., *The Historian's Craft*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Chomsky N., Pappé I., Barat F., *Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel's War Against the Palestinians*, Chicago, Haymarket Books, 2010.
- Cronin D., *Europe's Alliance with Israel: Aiding the Occupation*, London, Pluto Press, 2011.
- Dallal S. D., *The Palestinian Israeli Peace*, Syracuse, J. Int'l L. & Com., 1996.
- Dajani O., Lovatt H., *Rethinking Oslo: How Europe can Promote Peace in Israel-Palestine*, Berlin, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017.
- De Vasconcelos A., Marcin Zorowki, *The Obama moment. European and American perspectives*, Paris, European Union Institute of Security Studies, 2009.

- Dieckhof A., *The European Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, in C. P. Hanelt, F. Neugart, M. Peitz «Europe's emerging foreign policy and the Middle East challenge», Munich, Guetersloh, 2002.
- Dosenrode S., Stubkjaer A., *The European Union and the Middle East*, London-Sheffield, Academic Press, 2002.
- El-Gamasy M. A. G., *The October War: Memories of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt*, Cairo, American University in Cairo Press, 1993.
- El-Rayyes R. N., Nahas D., *The October War: Documents, Personalities, Analysis, and Maps*, Beirut, An-Nahar eds., 1973.
- El-Sadat A., *In Search of Identity*, London, Collins, 1978.
- Finkelstein N. G., *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, New York, Verso, 2003.
- Fraser T. G., *The Middle East, 1914-1979*, London, Arnold, 1980.
- Garfinkle A., *Western Europe's Middle East Diplomacy and the United States*, Philadelphia, Philadelphia Policy Papers, 1983.
- Gilbert M., *European Integration. A Concise History*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011.
- Golan G., *Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans from Oslo to Disengagement*, New York, Markus Wiener, 2007.
- Golan G., *Israel and Palestinian Statehood*, in «Global Convulsions: Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century, New York, Winston Van Horn, 1997.
- Greilsammer I., Weiler J. H. H., *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours*, Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1988.
- Hart A., *Arafat: Terrorist or Peace-maker?*, London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984.
- Heikal M., *Nasser: The Cairo Documents*, London, New English Library, 1972.
- Heikal M., *The Road to Ramadan*, London, Collins, 1975.
- Hill C., Smith K.E., *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*, London, Routledge, 2000.
- Hinnebusch R. A., *The International Politics of the Middle East*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003.

- Hunt M., *The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present – A Documentary Reader*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Hurewitz J. C., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, New Haven (CT), Yale University Press, 1975.
- Kacowicz A. M., Bar-Siman-Tov Y., *Stable Peace Among Nations*, Boulder, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
- Karsh E., *Israel: The First Hundred Years: Politics and Society since 1948*, vol. 3, London, Routledge, 2013.
- Keukeleire S., MacNaughtan J., *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Gordonsville, Palgrave, 2008.
- Le More A., Keating M., Lowe R., *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine*, London, Chatham House, 2005.
- Le More A., *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money*, London, Routledge, 2008.
- Louis W. R., *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Mani R., *Beyond Retribution. Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002.
- McCarthy J., *The Population of Palestine*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990.
- Mendes-Flohr P. R., Reinhartz J., *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Mikdadi L., *Surviving the Siege of Beirut: A Personal Account*, London, Onyx Press, 1983.
- Musu C., *European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Möckli D., *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*, London, I.B. Tauris & Co, 2009.
- Morris B., *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2009.

- Neumann M., *The Case Against Israel*, Chico, AK Press, 2007.
- Norgaard O., Pedersen T., Petersen N., *The European Community in World Politics*, London/New York, Pinter Publications, 1993.
- Nusseibeh S., *Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life*, London, Halban, 2007.
- Oren M. B., *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, London, Penguin, 2003.
- Panayiotis I., *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy*, Averbury, Aldershot, 1987.
- Pardo S., Peters J., *Uneasy Neighbour: Israel and the European Union*, Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2010.
- Petersen N., *The European Union and foreign and security policy*, Ole Norgaard, Thomas Pedersen and Nikolaj Petersen (eds.), «The European Community in World Politics», London/New York, Pinter Publications, 1993.
- Pijpers A., *The EU and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: The limits of the CFSP*, The Hague, Clingendael Institute, 2007.
- Rogan E., *The Arabs: a history*, London, Penguin Books, 2011.
- Rubin B., Rubin J. C., *Yasir Arafat: A political Biography*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Saying Y., *Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Said E., *Orientalism*, New York, Vintage Books, 1979.
- Said E., *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After*, New York, Knopf Doubleday, 2001.
- Segev T., *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British*, Picador, 2001.
- Shlaim A., *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, New York, W.W. Norton, 2000.
- Shlaim A., *The Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace*, London, Allen Lane, 2007.

- Sierp A., *Democratic Change in Central and Eastern Europe 1989-90. The European Parliament and the end of the Cold War*, Luxembourg, Historical Archives Unit, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015.
- Sloan S., Anderson S. K., *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, Scarecrow Press, 2009.
- Smith C., *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Boston-New York, Bedford-St Martin's, 2001.
- Smith K. E., *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008.
- Stein K., *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab–Israeli Peace*, Abingdon, Taylor & Francis, 1999.
- Sternhell Z., *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Tanzi A. M., *A Concise Introduction to International Law*, The Hague, Eleven International Publishing, 2023.
- Tocci N., *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, London, Routledge, 2007.
- Varsori A., Mignani G., *Europe in the International Arena During the 1970s*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang 2011.
- Von Dosenrode-Lynge S. Z., *The European Union and the Middle East*, London, Sheffield Academic Press, 2002.
- Yergin D., *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*, New York, Free Press, 1991.
- Youngs R., *Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September 11*, London, Lynne Rienner, 2006.
- Zu'aytir A., *The Palestine National Movement 1935-1939: Diaries of Akram Zu'ayti, 1935-1939*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1980.
- Zurayk C. K., *The Meaning of the Disaster*, Beirut, Khayat, 1956.

Articles

Al Sayed El Salim M., *The European Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, Navid Ahmed Tahir (ed.), in «Relations between the European Union and the Muslim World in Contemporary Geopolitical and Economic Scenario», Karachi, Area Study Centre for Europe, 2003.

Aggestam K., Bjorkdahl A., *Deliberating and Negotiating Just and Durable Peace*, Conference paper, ISA, 2009.

Aggestam K., Bjorkdahl A., *In Search for Just Peace: Constructing a Third Culture of Negotiation*, in «The National Conference in Peace and Conflict Research», Conference paper, Lund University, 2008.

Ahren R., *Israelis cry foul as UN leaders lament 50 years of “occupation”*, in «The Times of Israel», 6 June 2017, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israelis-cry-foul-as-un-leaders-lament-50-years-of-occupation/>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

Albinyana R., Fernández F., *From the Euro-Arab Dialogue to a Euro-Arab Summit: Revamping the EU-Arab Partnership*, in «European Institute of the Mediterranean – IEMed», 2018, available in <https://www.iemed.org/publication/from-the-euro-arab-dialogue-to-a-euro-arab-summit-revamping-the-eu-arab-partnership/>, last consultation 12/01/2024.

Andersen L. E., Jaradat Y., *Future of Palestine. A sovereign Palestinian state remains the only sustainable solution*, in «Danish Institute for International Studies», 2020.

Asrar S., Hussein M., *How the US has used its veto power at the UN in support of Israel*, in «Aljazeera», 26 October 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/26/how-the-us-has-used-its-veto-power-at-the-un-in-support-of-israel#:~:text=A%20history%20of%20US%20vetoes%20protecting%20Israel&text=Since%201945%2C%20a%20total%20of,the%20United%20Kingdom%2C%20and%20France>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

Avnery U., *A Binational State? God Forbid!*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 28, no.4, Summer 1999.

Beinart P., *I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State*, in «The New York Times», 8 July 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/opinion/israel-annexation-two-state-solution.html>, last consultation 02/02/2024.

Beinart P., *Yavne: A Jewish Case for Equality in Israel-Palestine*, in «Jewish Currents», 7 July 2020, <https://jewishcurrents.org/yavne-a-jewish-case-for-equality-in-israel-palestine>, last consultation 02/02/2024.

Belkin P., *Germany's relations with Israel: Background and implication for German Middle East Policy*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2007.

Bertelsmann Stiftung Kronberg Talks, *Europe and the Middle East: Perspectives for Engagement and Cooperation*, Gütersloh, Discussion Paper of the XI Kronberg Talks, January 23-25, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005.

Bouris D., *The European Union's Role in the Palestinian Territory after the Oslo Accords: Stillborn State-building*, in «Journal of Contemporary European Research», vol. 6, no. 3, 2010.

Buruma I., *Is Israel a normal country*, in «Haaretz», 9 July 2010, <https://www.haaretz.com/2010-07-09/ty-article/is-israel-a-normal-country/0000017f-dbb4-d3ff-a7ff-fbb4c7bd0000>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

Claiborne W., *Israel Condemns West Europeans' Stance on Mideast*, in «The Washington Post», June 16, 1980, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/16/israel-condemns-west-europeans-stance-on-mideast/3a58a209-635c-4d7f-9c26-3918c2e1228d/>, last consultation 11/10/2024.

Dawson B., Cafolla A., Waite T., *It's not a 'conflict': how to talk about Palestine*, in «Dazed», 2021, <https://www.dazeddigital.com/politics/article/52785/1/it-is-not-a-conflict-how-to-talk-about-palestine-israel>, last consultation 21/12/2023.

De la Gorce P. M., *Europe and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A survey*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», Berkeley, vol. XXVI, No. 3, Spring 1997.

Del Sarto R., *Wording and Meaning(s): EU-Israeli Political Cooperation according to the ENP Action Plan*, in «Mediterranean Politics», vol. 12, no. 1, 2007.

Du Plessix C., *The European Union and Israel: A lasting and ambiguous "special" relationship*, in «Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem», 2011, <https://journals.openedition.org/bcrfj/6675>.

European Commission, *One currency for one Europe. The road to the euro*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007, available at https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication6730_en.pdf.

Farsakh L., *The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects*, in «Middle East Journal», vol. 65, no. 1, Winter 2011.

Filiu J. P., *François Mitterrand and the Palestinians: 1956–95*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 38, no. 2, 2009.

Friedemann B., *The Dilemmas of a Policy of Even-Handedness*, in «Germany and the Middle East: Past, Present and Future», Jerusalem, The Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2003.

Guasconi M. E., *Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1970s: The Setting Up of the Euro-Arab Dialogue*, in «IRICE», vol. 1, no. 3, 2013.

Hafez S., *Edward Said's Intellectual Legacy in the Arab World*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 33, no. 3, Spring 2004.

Hammad S., *Stories from the first Intifada: "They broke my bones"*, in «Aljazeera», 10 December 2017.

Harpaz G., *The dispute over the treatment of products exported to the European Union from the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – The limits of power and the limits of law*, in «Journal of World Trade», vol. 38, no. 6, 2004.

Hollis R., *Europe and the Middle East: power by stealth?*, in «International Affairs», Oxford, vol. 73, no. 1, January 1997.

Hoppe T., *Just Peace as Leading Perspective: Towards the Concept and Task Profile of an Ethics of International Politics*, in «Studies in Christian Ethics», vol. 20, nr. 1, 2007.

Hughes M., *The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939*, in «English Historical Review», no. 124, 2009.

Inbar E., *Arab- Israeli Coexistence: Causes, Achievements and Limitations*, in «Israel Affairs», vol. 6, nos. 3-4, Summer 2000.

Inbar E., *Israel's Small War: The Military Response to the "Intifada"*, in «Armed Forces & Society», vol. 18, no. 1, Fall 1991.

Issawi, C., *The 1973 Oil Crisis and After*, in «Journal of Post Keynesian Economics», vol. 1, no. 2, 1978.

Jaber H., *Palestinians Taking the Initiative: Dissolve the PA and Embrace a One-State Solution Strategy... Now*, in «Palestinian Centre for Policy & Survey Research», 2019.

James W., Maclean R., *European Union Treaties*, in «CIVITAS Institute for the Study of Civil Society», 2015.

Khader B., *The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014): The Performance-Expectation Gap*, in «Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali», vol. 81, no. 3 (323), 2014.

Karmi G., *The One-State Solution: An Alternative Vision for Israeli-Palestinian Peace*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 40, no. 2, Winter 2011.

Kelman H., *The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How can we overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution*, in «Political Psychology», vol. 8, no. 3, September 1987.

Le More A., *Killing with kindness: funding the demise of a Palestinian state*, in «International Affairs», vol 81, no. 5, 2005.

Lustick I. S., *Israel's One-State Reality and the Challenge of Democratisation*, in «TPQ», 30 November 2022, <http://transatlanticpolicy.com/article/1166/israels-one-state-reality-and-the-challenge-of-democratization>, last consultation 02/02/2024.

McGreal C., *When Desmond Tutu stood up for the rights of Palestinians, he could not be ignored*, in «The Guardian», 30 December 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/dec/30/desmond-tutu-palestinians-israel>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

Miller R., *The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention in the Middle East, 1974–1977*, in «Middle Eastern Studies», vol. 50, no. 6, 2014.

Moerenhout T., *Essay on EU Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - Consistency and Cohesiveness from 1967 to the Emergence of the Arab Spring*, 2012, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179483>.

Moisi D., *La France de Mitterand et le conflit de Proche-Orient: Comment concilier emotion et politique?*, in «Revue Politique Etrangere», no. 2, 1982.

Muller P., *Europe's Policial Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process – A Comparison of the Foreign Policies of the "Big-Three" EU Member States vis-à-vis the Peace Process*, Conference paper, BISA, 2006.

Musu C., *The EU and the Middle East peace process: a balance*, in «Studia Diplomatica», vol. 60, no. 1, Global Europe, 2007.

Narea N., *The many, many times Israelis and Palestinians tried to make peace – and failed*, in «Vox», 22 November 2023, <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/11/22/23971375/israel-palestine-peace-talks-deal-timeline>, last consultation 26/01/2024.

Neriah J., *Yitzhak Rabin, the Oslo Accords, and the Intelligence Services*, in «Jewish Political Studies Review», vol. 30, no. 3/4, 2019, pp. 136–65.

Noor S., *European Union and the Middle East: A Historical Analysis*, in «Pakistan Horizon», vol. 57, no. 1, 2004.

Overhaus M., Maull H. W., Harnisch S., *German Foreign Policy and the Middle East Conflict*, in «German Foreign Policy in Dialogue», Mei, 2002.

Pappé I., *Why Israel Wants to erase context and history in the war on Gaza*, in «Aljazeera», 5 November 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/11/5/why-israel-wants-to-erase-context-and-history-in-the-war-on-gaza>, last consultation 14/02/2024.

Parker R. B., *The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored*, «Middle East Journal», vol. 46, no. 2, 1992.

Pennick S. A., *On the right track: challenges and dilemmas of Eu peace-keeping in the Middle East*, Jad- PbP, Working Paper, no. 6, March 2010.

Perssons A., *Legitimizing a just peace: EU's promotion of the parameters of just peace in the Middle East*, in «Jad-Pbp Working Paper», Series no. 9, Lund University, 2010.

Peters J., *Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Declaration of the European council of Berlin and Beyond*, in «Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the Middle East», Bertelsmann-Gutersloh, Sven Behrendt & Christian-Peter-Hanelt (eds.), 2000.

Pinder J., *Prospects for Europe after the Summit*, in «The World Today», vol. 26, no. 1, 1970.

Porat D., *Defending Antisemitism*, in «Institute for Study of Anti-semitism and Racism», 2 April 2008, <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2003-4/porat.htm>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

Rabbani M., *Rocks and Rockets: Oslo's Inevitable Conclusion*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 30, no. 3, Spring 2001.

Ratti L., *The Enduring Relationship between NATO and European Integration*, in «The Cambridge History of the European Union», Cambridge University Press, 2023.

Rondot P., *France and Palestine: From Charles de Gaulle to Francois Mitterrand*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 16, no. 3, 1987.

Ryan S., *Israel's Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 11/12, 1982.

Said E., *Palestinians under Siege*, in «London Review of Books», vol. 22, no. 24, December 2000.

Sayigh Y., *Palestinian Armed Struggle: Means and Ends*, in «Journal of Palestine Studies», vol. 16, no. 1, 1986.

Shalom S., *Singling out Israel – the argument revisited*, in «Jews for Justice for Palestinians», 19 November 2010, <https://jffjp.com/singling-out-israel-the-arguments-revisited/>, last consultation 17/02/2024.

Simons J. W., *European Union is “breaking international law by funding illegal West Bank building projects”, report claims*, in «The Daily Mail», 5 February 2015, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2874883/EU-funding-illegal-building-West-Bank-says-report.html>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

Stingelin P., *Europe and the Oil Crisis*, in «Current History», vol. 68, no. 403, University of California Press, 1975.

Tahir N. A., *European Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Inception to the Present Day*, in «Journal of European Studies», vols. 23 & 24, nos. 2 & 1, 2009.

Taylor A. R., *The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership*, in «Middle East Journal», vol. 32, no. 4, 1978.

TOI Staff, *Jews now a 47% minority in Israel and the territories, demographer says*, in «The Times of Israel», 30 August 2022, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/jews-now-a-minority-in-israel-and-the-territories-demographer-says/>, last consultation 02/02/2024

Toniolo A., *Questione israelo-palestinese: perché non si può parlare di conflitto*, in «The Bottom Up», 2021, <https://thebottomup.it/2021/05/26/questione-israelo-palestinese-non-e-un-conflitto/>, last consultation 30/11/2023.

Weiner J. A., *Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo Accords*, in «Fordham International Law Journal», vol. 43, no. 1, Berkeley, Electronic Press, 1999.

Websites

Alessandro Masala of Breaking Italy, *Ghali e Dargen CENSURATI dalla Rai?*, on «Youtube», 12 February 2024, video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5HXucJUAjc>, last consultation 14/02/2024.

Comments submitted by the Israeli Football Association (IFA) to the draft report of the Chairman of the Monitoring Committee, 24 April 2017, in «Court of Arbitration for Sport», <https://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/Shared%20Documents/5166,%205405.pdf>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

Common Foreign and Security Policy, in «European Commission», https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/common-foreign-and-security-policy_en#:~:text=The%20Common%20Foreign%20and%20Security,human%20rights%20and%20fundamental%20freedoms, last consultation 07/02/2024.

Eid Haddad, *Painful memories from Al Bassa* in <https://www.palestineremembered.com> (<https://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/al-Bassa/Story1240.html>), 2004, last consultation 28/11/2023.

EUR-Lex database of EU law: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>.

Human Rights Council 34: UK explanation of voting on the resolution regarding Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in «Gov.UK», 24 March 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/human-rights-council-34-uk-explanation-of-voting-on-the-resolution-regarding-israel-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territories>, last consultation 30/01/2024.

Lustick I. S., *Israel in Depth, Episode 4*, interview by D. Waxman, *Israel in Depth*, in «UCLA Y&S Nazarian Centre for Israel Studies», 22 June 2020, audio, min. 40:51, https://www.international.ucla.edu/israel/article/223547?fbclid=IwAR0ntEYE8zidfa2daUBRFiJFXyM9Zo%02gauocEtjPUedHKNRqliZLe_CIKPzw, last consultation 02/02/2024.

Types of institutions and bodies, on «EU», https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/types-institutions-and-bodies_en, last consultation 02/01/2024.